Thread by @WarintheFuture

It is 43 days since the Russian invasion of #Ukraine began. Building on yesterday’s thread about Russia’s shift in emphasis to the east and what its campaign might look like, today I explore Ukraine’s options to respond. 1/25 (Image - ft.com)

2/25 Russia has made many errors in this war. And Ukraine has played its inferior hand well. It is a country that is smaller in size, population, economy, and military forces than its invader. In this war, Russia got the mass, but Ukraine got the brains and the heart.

3/25 The Ukrainians have out thought the Russian President, his advisors and the Russian military institution. The Ukrainians have been superior strategists, and this could still deliver them victory. smh.com.au/world/europe/u…

4/25 Seeking to achieve something that approximates a Russian victory will be a central part of Putin's strategic calculus. The Russians are smarting from their defeat in the north. And that is what it was – a defeat.

5/25 We know the Ukrainians are excellent fighters & can beat the Russians on the battlefield. The Ukrainian challenge from here is to decide what their strategic objectives are. Each will have different implications for their military campaign in the east.

6/25 There is little time. Both sides are racing to build up forces in the east. The Russians & Ukrainians will understand that the more rapidly they reinforce their forces, the more quickly they can launch operations. (Image - uawardata.com)

7/25 So what are the strategic options open to the Ukrainians which might then guide their eastern front campaign?

8/25 Before we think about strategy and the supporting military operational design, what is the situation in the ‘east’ that Ukraine is dealing with? This image from @war_mapper shows the dimensions of this task in the east, northeast and south of Ukraine.

9/25 There are three distinct operating areas – northeast, north, and south. The Ukrainians will also need to consider their rear areas and the conduct of air operations (air control, air defence, ground support, transport, ISR) as well.

10/25 First, they might adopt a defend in place strategy. Ukraine would defend the ground they hold in the three operating areas, defend their airspace & attack Russian rear areas. This is the simplest strategy (but in war, as Clausewitz writes, even the simplest things are hard)

11/25 It is also a very passive strategy, always allowing the Russians to throw the first punch. And for a combat experienced Ukrainian Army, this strategy will probably not allow them to exploit opportunities that arise.

12/25 Second, they might adopt a ‘defend and roll back’ in the northeast and east, while holding ground in the south. This would see the Ukrainians undertaking limited offensives in the Donbas & north east areas to seize ground taken by the Russians since the start of the war.

13/25 It is a less passive #strategy but leaves the situation in the south unresolved. It does not address the pre-war occupation of eastern Ukraine by Russian proxies. It does, if successful, posture Ukrainian for operations further east, or to later shift their focus south.

14/25 A 3rd Ukrainian strategy may be to conduct offensives in the northeast, east & south concurrently to take back territory seized since 24 Feb. This is quite complex as it would require a large amount of fire support, logistics and air support for three concurrent operations.

15/25 It is also more difficult to exercise command and control over. And offensive operations are much more difficult to plan, command and sustain than defensive operations. Part of this is just the nature of offensive v defensive operations.

16/25 But as Robert Scales writes here, 21st century technologies have probably shifted the advantage to the defender, at least for the time being. This is a lesson the Russians have learned in the past month. warontherocks.com/2018/10/return…

17/25 A fourth and final option for the Ukrainians is a full roll back of all Russian gains since 2014. This would include pushing all Russian forces out of the Donbas and Crimea. This is the more complex and difficult option because it would require a very large military force.

18/25 It would also be complicated by higher casualties, longer lines of supply, larger areas to be covered by ISR and the Ukrainian Air Force and would involve a maritime component in the south. It might also cross a Putin ‘red line’ for the use of chem, bio or nuclear weapons.

19/25 Option four is the most politically difficult option. But I imagine all options (if this was the thinking of the Ukrainian High Command) would need to be briefed to the President. Each has varying political impacts & would influence war termination negotiations differently

20/25 And it should go without saying, the Ukrainian High Command hardly need my advice on this! They have planned and executed a magnificent military strategy so far. They have proved to be one of the most effective military institutions of the 21st century.

21/25 Regardless of which approach the Ukrainians chose, all their options are more logistically challenging. A quick glance indicates that western lethal aid & logistic support from western Ukrainian depots, has much further to travel than that provided to the Battle for Kyiv.

22/25 This, if the Russians get their air force into the game, offers an array of inviting targets for the Russians to attack and impede the sustainment of Ukrainian offensives on the eastern front. The Russians know from experience how damaging this can be to a campaign.

23/25 The east will feature even more attrition that we have seen in the north and the south. The implication of this is that the Ukrainians need as much aid in air defence, precision missiles, logistic support, air / ground transport & armoured vehicles as the West can provide.

24/25 Military operations, conducted within a national military #strategy and effective operational design, will be necessary in the northeast, east and south of Ukraine to defeat Russia. Note I used the term ‘defeat Russia’ not just ‘defend Ukraine’.

25/25 Each option has political challenges & requires different levels of military resourcing, logistic support & western aid in a shift to offensive ops. But Ukrainian strategic decision making, so far, is getting most of its calls right. End (Image - @UAWeapons)