The @USNavy aircraft carrier @USSHARRYSTRUMAN pulling into Trieste in Italy marks something of a lull what has been a huge amount of naval activity to reinforce & reassure @NATO allies since the start of the #UkraineWar
Correspondingly, having been deployed to monitor those self-same @NATO#Arctic exercises (& conduct a few of her own), the nuclear-powered, Russian Northern Fleet battlecruiser Peter the Great returned to Severomorsk on 18th April
This does not mean, of course, that naval activity has ceased, by any means & there remains, of course, the none-too-small matter of the reinforced Russian Mediterranean force, led by Moskva's two sister ships, Marshal Ustinov & Varyag, still sat off Crete
While the @USNavy's big, Ohio Class cruise missile submarine USS Georgia sailed from @MODGibraltar on 22nd April, after a few days alongside, almost certainly to resume her patrol in the Eastern Mediterranean
On the surface, of course, forces of smaller vessels, such as @NATO's @COM_SNMG1, currently in the Baltic (albeit with the @RoyalNavy's @HMSNORT, which has rotated out)
& @NATO's @COM_SNMG2 in the Mediterranean (albeit without the @RoyalNavy's @HMSDiamond, which has also rotated out) continue their vital work. However, it does look like most of the big ships are currently back in port, regenerating for the next round.
Interesting @ForeignPolicy piece by Emily Ferris of @ISS_RUSI looking at Russia's reliance on & troubles with rail transport in its #UkraineWar
However, it's worth bearing in mind, particularly amid further talk about Odesa & Mykolaiv, that Russia also has a port opening problem.
Probably the first port Russian forces took in the first days of the #UkraineWar was Berdyansk. The first ships to enter arrived in the middle of March & around ten days later they appeared to have cleared just two berths, whereupon the Saratov was sunk.
It would appear that since the loss of the Saratov, Berdyansk has either not, or been little used. Whether this is due to the sunken hulk of the Saratov & other damage, or ongoing issues with the port's security from further attack, or both, is unclear.
1) Okay, since "coastal-defence equipment" for #Ukraine has been mentioned by the British Defence Secretary, a few days late & to only slightly more than the usual lack of public demand (😉), a little #thread🧵with a few thoughts on what that might mean. #UkraineWar
2) For those interested in the wider context of what broadly still appears to be the state of play in the naval war in the Black Sea, this #thread🧵 posted a month ago, should still be of some use (though the situation ashore may have changed somewhat).
3) The key questions, therefore, are :
a) What might be supplied (predominantly in the British context, since that is who is making the suggestion), &
b) What effect might this have?
Inevitably, perhaps, 1st thoughts tend to turn to anti-ship missiles.
While a P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft of @Forsvaret_no tracks the Russian Navy Northern Fleet, including the big, nuclear-powered battlecruiser Peter the Great, as it deploys to intercept & observe #ColdResponse22
1) An excellent #thread🧵 by @WarintheFuture on the oft neglected southern front in the #UkraineWar & its importance, covering many aspects ashore, so here's a little additional #thread🧵 looking into some of the naval & maritime aspects that hopefully further enrich the picture.
2) As @WarintheFuture points out Ukraine's maritime south is economically vital to the country, handling 60% of its exports & 50% of its imports while containing a number of very large & important industrial centres, not least its 3rd largest city - Odesa.
3) So what has happened to this vital, maritime trade since the start of the #UkraineWar? Well, put bluntly - as @MarineTraffic demonstrates here - it has stopped. Nothing is coming out to help Ukraine's economy, & nothing is coming in to aid the fight.
1) Okay, since there seems to be something of an interest Russian military logistics at the moment, to the usual lack of public demand, a little #thread🧵 on why Russia's naval logistics, particularly in the Mediterranean, have always been a critical time limit on the #UkraineWar
2) An absolutely critical part of Russia's military buildup to its current #UkraineWar was & remains a series of very visible signals, from the High North to the Pacific, to @NATO & others, to not interfere.
3) The most visible of these tended to be at sea most notably with the massive reinforcement of the Mediterranean with two Slava Class cruisers - the Pacific Fleet's flagship Varyag & the Northern Fleet's flagship Marshal Ustinov. It is also by far the most logistically exposed.
I must confess, I've been wondering for a while how sustainable Russia's significantly reinforced fleet in the Mediterranean was going to be (niche, I know🙄). The scrapping of the 2015 access agreement with Cyprus would certainly make it harder... knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/cyprus…
This logistical limitation, along with the creation of a defensive bastion for the base itself, may well be one of the reasons behind the concentration of the fleet around the Syrian base at Tartus, rather than following @French_CSG & @USSHARRYSTRUMAN
Interestingly (& entirely coincidentally it must be emphasised!) @French_CSG ran an exercise last year practising operations against just such an overseas naval base at Djibouti