In part I we explained that Europe must replace 150bcm of Russian gas imports to help support the end of the Russian genocide in Ukraine.
It will also be the recipe to reduce the current risk-premium in gas prices & avoid long-lasting food shortages or a refugee crisis.
2/n
We explained that...
- (1) higher LNG imports from optimised infra & capacity utilisation can deliver up to 90bcm or 62% of 150bcm if free market prices can continue to "pull" LNG into Europe;
- (2) one-off storage potential of up to 25bcm (one winter) to buy some time...
3/n
- (3a) ...to fix some policy shortcomings & get new fields up & running;
- (3b) while having identified Groningen has an immediate "swing producers", capabable to deliver 20bcm (13%) within weeks and subject to local & Dutch government "consent";
For good order sake, let us now illustrate Europe's indigenous production potential by picking 3 projects in 3 different European countries that should be capabale to add 10-12bcm soon:
a) North Eigg (tie-back): 2025
b) Tyra: 2023
c) Neptun Deep: 2025/26
5/n
(a) @SericaEnergyUK will spud the the promising exploration well of the so called North & South Eigg license. If successful in October, a straightforward tie-back into existing infrastructure may deliver 2-3bcm per annum by 2024 for 10-15 years (60mboe resource).
6/n
(b) TotalEnergies (& Noreco) will deliver Tyra in Denmark next year, a project with some "Covid-related" delay but 200mboe 2P reserves. It should produce >1.5bcm for more than 10 years.
The North Sea has at least dozen more such ready-made (although less advanced) projects.
7/n
(c) There is a bigger fish to fry: @omv must approve Neptun Deep in the Black Sea - capable to deliver 8bcm pa for 20y to replace 5.5% of RUS imports.
The questions: why is the Romanian project - around for 10y - still not approved?
OMV is majority owned by the Gov.
Austria is also the one EU member with significant RUS import dependence. Worse, as Eastern Europe's gas hub it comes out of this winter with the lowest EU storage-fill-percentage reading (17% now).
Maybe that will speed up Neptun Deep?
9/n
Why is Austrian storage so low?
Answer: Because its local business community had close ties with Gazprom, not just for imports but storage too.
The issue: Gazprom did not re-fill its Haidach storage (below), visibly so since May 2021. It left it go "dry" since!
10/n
Which brings us to some EU policy shortcomings.
For that, let us first understand the remaining 7 EU Gazprom storage facilities. Is there evidence that Gazprom is about to replenished 12bcm of much needed EU storage?
Answer: Not really!
11/n
Instead, the Kremlin now requests payments in Rubel which may violate EU sanction rules.
We discussed it below but in essence it the Kremlin's way to support the Rubel (set FX rate) while putting EU utilities at risk of sanction violation.
Which is why past policy shortcomings mustn't be repeated. Take the NOR-POL link to reduce POL from RUS imports. Its permit for the undersea pipe was rejected by Danish authorities last year due to "environmental concerns", just to be resumed now.
The issue: this was a rather painful policy mistake b/c VVP & cronies maybe brutal murderers but they are not stupid. And so they decided for yesterday to stop gas delivers to Poland as a first example & as of next week.
At least the Polish government had the wisdom to bring an LNG regasification terminal with the entry point "Kamminke" online. That terminal is now advertises to be "in expansion" according to the latest EU Commission paper on LNG from Feb 2022.
Which brings us to Germany which consumes 20% of (90-100bcm) of a total of 500bcm in the EU but it does have a single regasification terminal.
Instead it mainly relies on pipeline imports from Russia (Yamal & Nord Stream I&II) to keep the 4th largest economy going.
19/n
Yes - democracies have corrective mechanisms - unlike autocracies..!
Minister Habeck made it clear that the dependence on Russian imports must be reduced quickly "as the latest Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine makes this mandatory".
It's just that only in January 2022, the project failed because "it would drive up Germany's CO2 emissions while the terminal's operation was considered an IMMENSE safety risk if operated improperly". Google translate for yourself.
The terminal in Brunsbüttel wasn't the only LNG project in Germany that hit obstacles. Uniper decided earlier in 2021 to ditch a terminal project in Wilhelmshaven in favor of turning the site into a green hydrogen hub. Has the EU Commission noticed?
It seems Minister Habeck is serious & now launches up to 4 terminals for >12bcm by 2024, some of which in the from of floating terminals. Permits? Exemption. The new sponsor? German tax payers. Cost? €12bn.
Maybe the Minister can also decide to keep the remaining 3GWh of nuclear online. Or how about bringing 3GWh of nuclear back that Germany took offline in Dec 2021 - for a total of 5bcm of gas savings?
Basics first: How much gas does Europe need to replace (not just the EU, UK et al too)?
Answer: Europe purchased 150 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas from Russia, imported from 3 pipelines & 15bcm in the form of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) by sea.
2/n Source: Burggraben
Why is it important to cut Russian gas?
Because it finances Putin's genocide in Ukraine which in turn pushes gas prices up. That destroys businesses and - for heaven's sake - creates food shortages with a subsequent refugees crisis.
What do farmers need to to maximise crop yields of wheat, corn or soybeans?
Answer: they need 3 fertilisers, namely Nitrogen (ammonia), Phosphorus & Potassium. The mix varies by region but the world cannot be fed without the three.
More observations on EU/US sanctions on Russia & possible implications on logistics disruption.
In April, India bought Russia crude for frist time ever. It bought 15mb in April according to news, altough we yet only measure 9mb as at 17 April 2022 through @Kayrros.
1/4
How much crude needs to be diverted to Asia if self-sanctioning (or EU ban) bites? At least 2.9mbpd of Russian Urals in EU (1.6-1.8mbpd seaborne; 1.3mbpd Druzhba pipeline system into the EU) need to be diverted. So far, seaborne loadings increased in March! Time will tell.
2/4
What does it mean to divert 1.8mbpd seaborne Urals away from Europe & into Asia? According to our calculation, it would increase ton-miles by a factor of 6 (!) & voyage time by a factor of 5 (!). In other words, Russian crude voyages will jump from 15 to 75 days on average.
Dollar Wrecking Ball - Brazil exports 55% of global #soybeans (mainly to China). Issue: US export 35% which seems to set international prices. That turns soybeans farming in Brazil into poor business at current potash prices ($1250/Mt) b/c of BRL-FX rate.
Same for corn. BRL exports 21% of total, ARG 20%, US 32% while setting prices. LatAm farmers need fertiliser subsidies or use less which would reduce yields & worsen ongoing food crisis. What do I miss? Stocks? Labour cannot move dial. Below BRL, worse for ARS.
There have been 8 shocks to the global food prices - yes eight (8). Most of them are ongoing!
🧵
1/n As for team transitory,…
No 1 - War: Ukraine, which was known as the ‘breadbasket of the FSU’, has 1/4 of world’s ‘black soil’ fertile land. In 2021 Ukraine accounted for 20%, 7%, 18% of global exports of barley, wheat & corn, respectively. It is under attack & VVP wants this war to be a food crisis.
2/
He will get his will. The UN Food and Agricultural Organisation estimates that 20-30% of sunflower, grains and corn will not be planted or harvested. It forecasts food prices to rise by another 8-22% because of the loss of Ukrainian production (FT, 9 April).
“Lower fertilizer use [b/c of higher cost] may mean a smaller crop. The International Rice Research Institute predicts that yields could drop 10% in the next season, translating to a loss of 36m tons of rice, or the equivalent of feeding 500m people.” bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
“Rice farmers are particularly vulnerable. Unlike wheat & corn, which have seen prices skyrocket, rice prices have been subdued due to ample production and existing stockpiles.”