I argue and show that anti-establishment parties (AEPs) can actively navigate an image of both distinctiveness and ‘normality’ behind their substantive positions, and profit from their rhetorical strategies in terms of increased electoral performance, ceteris paribus 2/
I map rhetorical normalisation on 2 dimensions: mainstreaming and streamlining. Mainstreaming is used to enact broader AEP legitimacy as a ‘corrective’ to the practice of mainstream principles. AEPs use streamlining to enact broader credibility as respectable ‘counter elites’ 3/
I measure these rhetorical strategies directly in 142 social media campaigns by radical right, left and ‘centrist’ AEPs + conventional competitors during 23 elections across Europe (🇦🇹🇨🇿🇫🇷🇩🇪🇮🇹🇵🇱🇸🇰🇪🇸) 2010-2019. The dataset is released #openaccess here: 4/ osf.io/vfqkc/
I find: AEPs combine diverse rhetorical strategies, navigating both dimensions. Most don't just claim to be new niche actors able to 'smash the system', but often operate closer to normal politics. Many of them polarize conflicts as 'true elites' viable to 'fix the system'. 5/
Over time, we observe shifts we would miss had we looked only at party positions. Yet, contrasting rhetoric with substantive ideas remains vital. Normalisation rhetoric didn't correlate with substantive moderation of party positions and differed for radical right and left. 6/
Normalization rhetoric played into broader electoral appeal of AEPs ceteris paribus. Of course, pursuing normalization strategies is not sufficient or automatic for stronger AEP performance. But we need to account more for the role of persuasive rhetoric behind party positions 7/
Note: these effects are not linear. AEPs rely on blurring to avoid appearing too far or too close to normal politics. Exception: unlike with streamlining, radical right parties profited most the more they could depict nativism as compatible with already valid mainstream values 8/
Thus, persuasive rhetoric plays into electoral mobilisation, but it remains vital to contrast rhetorical strategies against different substantive ideologies. Especially as rhetorical normalisation of anti-pluralist ideas can have quite palpable detrimental impact on democracy 9/
Pluralist promises to correct representative malaises may help to confront corruption & structural discrimination. Normalising rhetoric linked to anti-pluralist ideas can instead cement privilege & initiate democratic erosion under veneer of merely ‘fixing’ current politics. 10/
🎉New paper on organisation of PiS in Poland. I show it's vital to contrast what parties say and what they do about their organisational traits. I suggest we need more work on how (populist radical right) parties communicate about and perform organisation🧵doi.org/10.17645/pag.v…
During its succesful electoral campaign of 2015, PiS strategically toned down its radicalism. The mask fell down immediately after the election. Since then, the party aggrandised political power to the detriment of democratic principles and constitutional norms. 2/10
Interestingly, PiS enacted not only programmatic, but also organisational reinvigoration. It made overtures to some aspects of mass‐party‐like organisation and simulated a dispersal of power away from its Chair, Jarosław Kaczyński. Yet, in practice, little has changed. 3/10
My article on mainstream accommodation of radical right politics by conventional gov. parties Fidesz and Smer, as well as counter-strategies of far-right ‘originals’ after 2015 is out (in German). Here a #thread with an English summary. link.springer.com/article/10.100…
I show that Fidesz and Smer did not ‘just’ adopt restrictive asylum positions but justified them with nativist narratives of defense/threat to ‘Nation’ from constructed 'Others' and ideas. RR originals, even in HU, were however able to react by ‘repackaging’ their nativist supply
The essay builds and expands on insights developed in my book which has received the Gero Erdmann Comparative Area Studies Award 2018 from the Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft @DVPW_Vergleichroutledge.com/Radical-Right-…
1. There are two issues with the approach: as others already mentioned, the way the items were combined causes problems with contextual/empirical validity. Second, the scale doesn't reflect the authors' own definition, resulting in issues of conceptual validity as well #thread
2. As authors themselves note in Ch.7, the populism scale (anti-elitism and salience of corruption) doesn't reflect their definition (anti-elitism and invocations of vox populi). Why "populism" scale then? Especially as the operationalisation visibly impacts empirical validity?
3. CHES anti-corr item measures the salience of corruption as an issue, not broad rhetoric of "corrupt" ("distorted") vs "pure" ("genuine") politics. Thus, the way items were combined results in values cancelling each other out in some contexts. Not the fault of @ches_data