I was interested in the much talked about #lendlease#bill for #Ukraine that has been approved by the US senate and is scheduled for a vote by the House of Representatives tomorrow.
I was surprised that it is only three pages long. Let’s read it.
This is the version that was ‘engrossed in Senate’ and presented as materials to the House Committee on Rules on April 27.
FYI - I am not a US lawyer, so if any specialists have comments, please add them in the replies.
The main power set out in sec. 2(a)(1) provides that:
“the President may authorize the United States Government to lend or lease defence articles to the Government of Ukraine or governments of Eastern European countries impacted by the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine”
This is explicitly in order to: “help bolster those countries’ defence capabilities and protect their civilian populations from potential invasion or ongoing aggression by the armed forces of the Government of the Russian Federation”
Defense article is general and includes: A) any weapon, munition, aircraft, vessel, boat B) property, commodity, equipment or good for military sale and C) machinery or tool to make, repair or transport any such items - s47 of the Arms Export Control Act
However, “defence article” does not include nuclear material, production facilities or weapons
s2(a)(3)- Any loan or lease of defence articles must be subject to the relevant laws on the return of or reimbursement for the defence articles. This appears to be a reference to sec. 61(a)(4) of the Arms Export Control Act - to repay the US in the event of damage to loaned items
s2(a)(4) - This broad loan authorization power may be delegated by the President to an appointed official with the advice and consent of the Senate
s2(b) - The President must establish a procedure for delivery of any such defence articles within 60 days of the enactment of the law
This bill would allow the President more freedom for the lease of defence articles than under s61 of the Arms Export Control Act.
The President need not consider the effects of the lease on the national technology or industrial base and a lease is not limited to a max of 5 years
Similarly, the maximum 5 year loan period in sec. 503(b)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is also not applicable to loans under this lend-lease bill.
Loans of a sweeping set of defence articles are permitted with fewer administrative delays, no limit on the length of the loans and no obligation to first consider outright sales.
This should allow the US more flexibility in responding to Ukraine’s needs
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Thread 🧵consolidating updates from April 25 – May 1 on the large scale unit repositioning and resupply efforts ongoing in Ukraine. This thread will be incorporated into my primary thread on combat losses, which will be linked at the bottom once complete
It may be helpful for context to read the consolidation I put together previously:
April 24
New thread 🧵 on reports of personnel losses of #Russia in its invasion of #Ukraine. I am updating a thread on general loss claims. Larger update w analysis coming later today. I hit max thread length, so this is a continuation of the previous thread
This is the original thread with details of Russian personnel losses
April 24 Full update to thread 🧵 on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to available forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT observations and estimates
I have decided to include a graphic with a more complete picture of my spreadsheet, as there are now columns for captured equipment and military aid. In order to allow people to follow the process. I’m working out the best way to present this. Please excuse the graphics quality
Summary
OSINT % losses of Russian Committed (Russian total) vs Ukrainian total
Personnel 33.2(7) vs 7.6
Armor 45.5(9.5) vs 11.7
Tanks 45(16.6) vs 14.2
Artillery 14.3(4) vs 3.6
Aircraft 7.3(1.7) vs 15.2
Helicopters 15(3.7) vs 10.9
Thread 🧵consolidating updates from April 18 – April 24 on the large scale unit repositioning and resupply efforts ongoing in Ukraine. This thread will be incorporated into my primary thread on combat losses, which will be linked at the bottom once complete
It may be helpful for context to read the consolidation I put together last week
Combat Strength
The US most recently assessed Russian combat strength at 75% of what was committed at the beginning of the war. Here is the history of US estimates of Russian combat strength
April 17 Full update to thread 🧵 on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to available forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT observations and estimates
Summary
OSINT % losses of Russian Committed (Russian total) vs Ukrainian total
Personnel 32.1(6.8) vs 10.4
Armor 41(8.6) vs 11.4
Tanks 42.2(15.3) vs 14.5
Artillery 13.8(3.9) vs 3.5
Aircraft 6.4(1.5) vs 13.6
Helicopters 14.2(3.5) vs 8.7
Thread 🧵consolidating updates from April 11 – April 17 on the large scale unit repositioning and resupply efforts ongoing in Ukraine. This thread will be incorporated into my primary thread on combat losses, which will be linked at the bottom once complete
It may be helpful for context to read the consolidation I put together last week