In 2004 10 countries joined the #EU.
Incl. 8 #CEE states that at some point had socialist/communist regimes (imposed on them).
My🧵on what 2004 means for #EU & #Ukraine today
🔥prompted some interesting & important reactions
so ...
🧵
The thread was mainly about the success of enlargement & how it benefitted the #EU (by embodying its unique model of geopolitical power) as well as the acceding states.
Here's how the thread started, incl. the fateful word choice "former communist states"
As a scholar of #CEE, & having lived & worked across the region for many years, I should have been more careful.
Normally I would use the term 'post-communist' or 'post-socialist' with the inverted commas indicating that this was a term of use, including during 2004 accession.
They have long been standard academic 'terms of art' that seek to both recognise the painful pasts (of communisms imposed to various degrees) AND processes of overthrowing, overcoming & dealing with the legacies of these communisms/socialisms.See e.g. long-running journals like
BUT - & this is the reason for this thread - using the terms 'former communist states' (as I did) or 'post-communist states' as I should have done (& did in further discussion) got a 🔥fierce reaction 🔥 from Twitter's 🇪🇪🇱🇻🇱🇹communities that really made me think & reflect on
- who uses these terms/concepts?
- why?
- with what legitimacy?
- with what effects?
- what it shows & what it obscures?
- why did I use those terms?
The article pictured above, linked to below, does a great job of unpacking many of these issues in a very insightful way that I can't do justice to here, but I draw on it in the rest of thread.
[The bibliography is also a real treasure trove] researchgate.net/publication/22…
The majority of negative reactions included the following:
- EE, LT & LV are not 'former communist states' - they were occupied by first Nazis then Soviets
- The states were not new in 1991, they had interwar histories.
- stop using this outdated term, we've moved on. E.g.
Across #CEE there were varying degrees & modes of IMPOSITION, resistance to & reproduction (often under extreme duress) of communist/socialist regimes (incl. denied statehood). I should have been clearer on that.
BUT nowhere did I imply a 'newness' to the post-89/91 states -
Which made it interesting that many ppl read that into what I was saying. I was highlighting the complex & contested pasts of those societies (incl. dictatorship), how they overcame them, then reckoned with & used their legacies. What I didn't mention was the interwar period ...
which is a🔑point of hist democ. legitimacy for many in the region (& I've written on this).
Despite such omissions CZ & PL Responses were generally more positive & engaged the thread not the term.
[This is o/c anecdotal but indicative of the Qs that need to be asked & answered]
So why did I use 'former communist' [or, why would I, if I could edit, the tweet use 'post-communist']?
B/c, reminding Western European leaders of that painful past was crucial to Havel, Walesa et al's case for membership rather than mere 'association'
Therefore the legacy of suffering, but also the inspiration of resisting & overthrowing communist regimes was important at the time. Thus post-communist was a standard term in popular & political discourse leading up to #EU accession. See, e.g. ... library.fes.de/libalt/journal…
So it was analytically important to this thread & my argument [which precisely says we need to go beyond any patronising readings of enlargement as a kind of Western charity, and that it was actually a geopolitical win for all #EU members & the EU itself] BUT there's more ...
Ignoring the communist past would be to ignore the suffering & brave struggle of those who endured the oppressive regimes imposed on them.
Havel's 'Power of the Powerless' is V. insightful & moving on this - & discusses the implication of people in power hac.bard.edu/amor-mundi/the…
BUT we could also, for example, point to @kajakallas superb speech in Berlin on 25/04 where she directly & powerfully drew on the experience of having her freedom deprived (primarily by the occupiers who imposed communism)
CEE societies have engaged this issue in different ways, e.g. this wonderful exhibition, which I saw in Prague (but was also in Warsaw & Budapest) a few years back critiqued these blindspots (which were having pol effects) in an interesting way
That was attacking the loss of memory, but there have also been attempts to salvage the everyday experience of life under communisms, where people made the best of their circumstances DESPITE the regimes. Stenning & Hörschelmann point to & here's one e.g. panelaci.cz/stranka/panela…
BUT I can fully understand that, if you're fed up to the back teeth of having the past rammed down your throat when you'd rather look to the future & not have your country defined by the imposition of communism by occupiers, this word choice by a W. European was a red rag ...
This exchange was really indicative for me in that regard - from this testy beginning, we had a very good chat in the end & I was reminded of some important nuances I'd obscured & which I needed to reflect on - Especially as I have called out others for '#Westsplaining'!
BUT a key point in all of this (as Stenning & Hörschelmann emphasise) is recognising differences & unevenness in communisms, postcommunisms & in the CEE states, the Baltics, (& whichever other groupings we use) - see e.g. this alternative response which focuses on context:
However, I'd also agree with what @KuldkeppMart wrote in response to some of my points in one of the discussions above.
There are a LOT of lazy uses of these terms when they don't need to be there. I've also noticed this myself in much recent journalism - & didn't like it.
I thus agree with the need to stop using term in those contexts - and so do others. See the discussion in the articles linked to here article, which suggest getting rid of it tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
or put it in broader & better context & connexions journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/23…
I still think it has analytical value - *in the right e.g. hist. context* -but not to describe #CEE TODAY.
I should've been clearer about differences between CEE states (Twitter is not notorious for nuance but still) but we shld also note difference & contestation *w/in* them eg
So overall, I got a great reminder to be more nuanced (even on twitter) - & use the right terms! -but I think these discussions opened up really interesting & important questions, which are highly relevant for dealing with present & future challenges for #EU, #CEE & #Ukraine.
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To Avoid Another Munich, Europe Must Act to Secure Ukraine
To counter the fatalism in Western Europe, which is in danger of becoming disastrously self-fulfilling, 100+ politicians, experts, military & intelligence professionals argue that
a coalition of willing Europeans must step up for Ukraine’s victory & our common security, regardless of the outcome of the US Election, because:
1️⃣ Russia is not destined to prevail. Russia cannot sustain its war effort at current levels beyond 2025 when it will exhaust key stocks. It is losing heavy cannon barrels and armoured vehicles at a rate far higher than it can replace.
2️⃣ There is no credible plan for European security after any ‘ceasefire’. The Putin regime cannot be trusted to keep a deal. A ceasefire would let Russia reconstitute its forces, putting us at a disadvantage.
3️⃣ Failing to win endangers all European allies. A ‘Minsk III’ (or Munich II) agreement would signal weakness and invite coercion upon us.
4️⃣ A route to Ukrainian victory still exists. Using new military technology we can quickly leverage Europe’s industrial capacity to build the capabilities to disable Russia’s war machine.
5️⃣ Those who want to act, can. A coalition of willing powers could supply Ukraine with what it needs to win and provide Kyiv with real security guarantees. Where they change facts and policy on the ground, others will follow.
➡️In this appeal we urge willing European capitals to urgently arm themselves with a real contingency plan for any outcome of the US election by collectively enhancing financial and military support to Ukraine, focused on a clear theory of victory.
@james_rogers @LarryPfeifferDC @ThreshedThought @StephenGethins @DerkBoswijk @AdamKinzinger @robinwagener @StanKutcher @ratnaomi @DonnaDasko @SlawomirDebski And was signed by German MPs including
It’s here!
🔥Long awaited new piece on #NeoIdealism is OUT NOW!🔥
➡️ Develops Neo-Idealism as Grand Strategy for the Free World 🌍
I Lay out 8 pillars that we need if we are to build a Neo-Idealist approach in international (& domestic) politics!
👇🧵 macdonaldlaurier.ca/wp-content/upl…
Why do we need a grand strategy?
Because we, the world’s free societies, face multiple tests of our value & prowess - & severe & urgent threats to our security, prosperity & freedom. Threats to our democratic way of life
- but we’ve not yet got our collective act together. 🧵
The challenges we face span geopolitics, geoeconomics, climate change, technological transformation & cut across foreign & domestic policy.
We must defend our democracies against external threats
- but also renew them to defeat internal anti-democratic & illiberal forces.🧵
#Germany is both #Ukraine’s biggest European supporter in absolute financial terms
- AND rightly seen as problem by allies (As well as by many Germans)
Here’s why.🧵
(& no, it’s not just Scholz, the SPD & #Taurus)
There's a lot of confusion & conflicting figures flying around, so what support has 🇩🇪 provided to 🇺🇦 in financial terms?
We use🇩🇪Govt figures (because they're unlikely to be underestimates) but pls correct if needed.
We also separate military from other aid
(to 24/02/24).🧵
German military aid to Ukraine
- €12.082bn in military aid DELIVERED
(6.6bn buying equipment for Ukraine
5bn in 2023, 1.6bn in 2022
5.2bn value kit donated from stocks, 282m training UA soldiers)
(16bn more promised for future but we don't include that as its not there yet) 🧵
The fight back has begun.
Everyone has rightly talked about grim mood at #MSC2024
BUT there were major signs that true leaders across Europe have had enough of the gap between words & action
& of key Allie’s failing to stand up for our common interests & for our security. 1/
Danish PM Mette Fredriksen pledged ALL of her country’s artillery to Ukraine - and called out allies who claim they have nothing left to give - saying that they manifestly do. And when it comes to giving Ukraine what it needs to win they should Just Do It. news.yahoo.com/pm-says-denmar…
German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius emphasised that Ukraine must win & be supported to do so (Olaf Scholz hasn’t said Ukraine should win & acts accordingly) -
& BP argues that as a defender of the free world Germany would have to spend beyond 2%
It seems
the🚦coalition is turning inward & de-prioritising key issues, including Ukraine
There's a mixture of complacency (about Germany's Zeitenwende) & delusion (about 🇩🇪 ability to ignore geopol & do its own thing)
V. Dangerous.
🧵
BLUF: Letting Scholz focus on uncontroversial topics like UA reconstruction (not victory) puts the cart before the horse, distracts from the need to create (& ensure) a stable security order, a stable peace in Europe.
This puts all Europeans, incl Germans at risk.
After all the 🚦 infighting, there is an understandable desire to find points of unity & try to make stable government.
But if that comes at the cost of making the reforms #Germany really needs & sells Ukraine down the river it is a dereliction of duty.