There was no single ‘cold war’ - across either time or space.
But, despite the Sino-Soviet split, Ostpolitik & other muddying aspects, there WAS an organising principle:
Contain & Defeat communism
Substitute authoritarianism for communism & it still works
Jul 13 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
The #NATOSummit failed to meet the historical moment - its heartbreaking for Ukraine, but makes all Europeans less safe & makes it more difficult to make the world safe for democracy.
There were positive steps which we must now transform into a platform for what we need
Washington & Berlin have chosen to make Ukraine's victory more costly in terms of money but also in terms of Ukrainian lives. It sends a weak deterrence signal & seems to concede (on spurious grounds) that Moscow has a veto on NATO enlargement.
Jul 12 • 18 tweets • 4 min read
This tweet from @ischinger points to some of the most serious failings of #Germany’s foreign policy -of which he has helped set the tone. They must to be addressed if there is to be a real #Zeitenwende -& if 🇩🇪is to protect its interests & properly contribute to a safe Europe🧵
The view expressed here 1. Ignores views of non-US allies 2. Shirks Responsibility 3. Continues vicious cycle of inadequate European security provision 4. Reactive 5. Miscalculates interests & ignores values.
Jun 30 • 25 tweets • 10 min read
'Security Guarantees' for #Ukraine are a hot topic - but it's a false debate.
NATO membership is the only viable option - but there's no consensus.
So we need an interim solution:
⏩We should extend the #JEF & transform it into a
'Joint European Defence Initiative' (#JEDI)
In this new policy brief for @dgapev
-I show why #NATO membership for #Ukraine is the only way in the medium-term
& analyse the available options for the interim 2/ dgap.org/en/research/pu…
Jun 14 • 18 tweets • 7 min read
#Germany’s first National Security Strategy was published today.
A short 🧵 of reflections on what is, overall, a disappointing document (even taking account of lower expectations) - but also has some interesting & positive points to work with.
1. Ukraine's war is our war - & must be won.
That means restoring UA's 1991 borders & ensuring UA's ability to defend them - & the people within them. 2. After victory we have to get #Ukraine into #NATO & the #EU as fast as possible.
- As @SwedishPM has said:
This should be merit based but cannot again be an excuse for going soft or going slow on UA's accession.
- we have to institutionally tie our future to UA's.
Apr 3 • 10 tweets • 8 min read
Is #Germany's #Zeitenwende
a) "a Fundamental Change?"
b) 🇩🇪's emergence as a "Leading Power"?
c) "a mere buzzword"
* its been described as all those things
- but how to judge & why does it matter? A 🧵 1/10 ip-quarterly.com/en/zeitenwende…
📷Michael Lucan CC 3.0
Olaf #Scholz' 'turning point' speech in Feb '22 declared #Russia’s full-scale invasion of #Ukraine a 'watershed moment' (#Zeitenwende") -something happening to #Germany & others- but also set out the Zeitenwende as a task for🇩🇪 to develop new capabilities & a new approach.
Mar 13 • 23 tweets • 15 min read
There's been criticism of the detail (esp re #Poland, which has already delivered Leos) - but @JeremyCliffe's main point is right.
▶️I'd actually take it further (it's not about #Germany but about #Ukraine), which is why we need to talk about #Finland🧵
- & how it free-rode on security, enriched & entrenched RU & undermined #Ukraine, helping RU enact the very sphere of influence logic he bemoans from far right allies of Morawiecki (eg Le Pen)
Mar 8 • 30 tweets • 11 min read
Ever tried to Global #Britain but ended up accidentally pulling a little #England?
- Turns out you’re not alone.
A🧵on British identity, foreign policy & why we need to properly understand #Brexit to move beyond it.
- based on a new article I have out in @ISQ_Jrnl
The article, which I'm really happy to have in top IR journal @ISQ_Jrnl, challenges a received wisdom about #Brexit – that it both reflected & reinforced a general, almost tribal polarisation of British society. 2/ academic.oup.com/isq/article-ab…
Mar 1 • 6 tweets • 5 min read
If the #EU & it’s member states really wanted to do something about #Orban’s #Hungary, they would.
- The mess over ratifying #Sweden & #Finland’s NATO membership is only the latest incident & 🇭🇺‘a continuing presence is a stain on 🇪🇺reputation & effectiveness.
🇭🇺should go. 🧵/1
In case anyone doubts the game playing over 🇫🇮& 🇸🇪’s #NATO membership the country’s foreign minister Peter Szijjarto made it clear earlier this week
- Fidesz now says it will support accession but it has been a farce & again cast doubt on 🇪🇺competence /2
On 25/02/22 as I was pushing my sleeping daughter in her stroller, listening to @BBCr4today, Nick Robinson spoke from the roof of the hotel where he was holed up in #Kyiv.
And, looking over the city, he said something that stopped me in my tracks. #Ukraine
Feb 17 • 6 tweets • 3 min read
Paying this national security premium is actually an investment in our future: it gives us the chance to make our democracies what we claim them to be - and thus to reactivate our soft & transformative power. opencanada.org/is-canada-read…
No longer relying on the cheap shortcuts of (dependencies on) market & fossil fuel on authoritarian regimes should be the spur to transform our own societies to deliver a better future, to revive the hope of progress & share its benefits more fairly.
Feb 17 • 12 tweets • 9 min read
A long, thoughtful article by @jnpowell1 who knows a lot about negotiations. it contains many insightful & useful observations.
But I disagree with its main thrust & key choices he outlines - A 🧵 on why #Ukraine#Russia#NeoIdealism 1/ prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/ukrai…
My main objection is to this framing of the ‘issues between #Ukraine & #Russia’ as somehow not being clear & clearly 🇷🇺’s fault & 🇷🇺’s problem.🇷🇺 needs to get out of 🇺🇦 & stop menacing it’s neighbours.
There can be no bothsidesing - it is wrong & sets terrible precedent. 2/
Either would be far, far better than #Babis who could undermine🇨🇿's intl standing & support for #Ukraine.
Jan 8 • 25 tweets • 15 min read
1. What is Neo-Idealism?
(seeing as many of you have asked)
It’s a new approach to Grand Strategy & International Relations that I think we can see emerging in responses to #Russia’s war & from #Ukraine’s brave resistance.
1st 🧵in a series on #NeoIdealism
I introduced the idea of #NeoIdealism in a piece for @RUSI_org in April '22. Its fullest elaboration so far is in my book 'To #Ukraine With Love' that came out last month - available on kindle & paperback on all amazon stores 😃
So what is it? 2/25 amazon.co.uk/Ukraine-Love-E…
Jan 6 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
No surprises here - the ‘restraint’ school of foreign policy (little more than thoughts & prayers for a world they know little about & care for even less.)
- what does consistently amaze me is their failure to see the interconnection of US security with others & with values 1/3 twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
The strenuous effort that Posen makes to shoehorn every Russian move into something that can be lauded is remarkable- and totally transparent. He nods to his own glaringly wrong assessment of the conflict last summer as ‘stalemated’ -yet it doesn’t deter him from repeating it 2/3
Patronising Ukrainians & underrating #Ukraine's progress on the battlefield has been a consistent feature of Germany's public debate this year. From so-called intellectuals behind the #emmaoffenerbrief to the chief of Germany's military.
So this claim is apparently bullshit. - that #Germany had to spend extra money fitting its Puma IFVs (which failed at the NATO exercise) to meet workplace requirements for heavily pregnant women.
🇩🇪has enough issues to solve without inventing fake ones.