1/n Family, friends and some followers ask me where I think the market is heading. Some are bulls, others are bears. It's a good question. Here is my answer. I have no freaking idea. $SPX $SPY $NDX $QQQ #ES_F#NQ_F
2/n Maybe I'm not as smart as some gurus who predict a rebound to new highs, or some others who think this is going way lower. Or, I have learned my lessons. This is what I mean.
3/n During the dot com bear market, after a 20% drop I thought the market was going to rebound. I didn't lose much from trading, I lost from my stock portfolio. Because after it dropped 30%, I sold in panic and took the loss. I didn't add when the market bottomed in 2003.
4/n I thought this was a temporary bottom and didn't take advantage of the 2003-2007 rally to break even. Then the market collapsed in 2008 and I lost any confidence in passive investing without proper risk and hedging. But I learned the lesson.
5/n The losers are those who hold strong views about market direction. The winners are those who are agnostic and wait the proper time to pull the trigger. I see many holding strong views now. This is a rudimentary mistake IMO, regardless of direction.
6/n There are actors in the market, some very powerful, some good and some bad. Most of you know who they are. You never know when they will decide to go on a shopping spree and invalidate all the fundamentals and technicals. They don't care. They know stocks go up in long term.
7/n Most powerful actors with large AUM or personal wealth don't give a damn about drawdowns. Their long-term goal is to buy cheap the shares the retail bought at high prices. They enjoy this. This is their game. It's a tricky world out there. Very tricky.
8/n When I traded for a hedge fund during the 2008 crash, I had no market view. My plan was many positions with small risk and total portfolio heat of no more than 2% at any given moment. I ended 2008 with a small profit, nothing to brag about but not with a 50% loss.
9/n But trading for a hedge fund I would never do again if I had to justify every position to the managers. It's a waste of time. I wasted more time justifying the signals than generating them with my programs (data-mining). Either you do it for yourself only or not at all.
10/n I have no view about the market because I'm not the one who determines the direction and those who do won't pick up the phone or tweet. I'm surprised some people who are supposed to be experienced have strong views about market direction.
11/11 As I wrote in a book many years ago, every point on a trend, up or down, is a potential level for reversal. Trends are known only in hindsight. No one knows where the market is going to be at the end of the year and IMO those who think they do overestimate their abilities.
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Thread 🧵 CTAs are having a good year so far with Top 50 +12.8% YTD, according to BarclayHedge. But let's not forget that from 2004 to 2021, top 20 CTAs returned about 2.5% on the average.
This is another form of tail risk hedging but with higher intrinsic risk than using other tail risk protection method. The 80s and 90s aren't coming back, when CTAs using TF discipline profited from naïve TA traders in commodity futures. Nowadays there are no such fools en masse.
CTAs nowadays are the parties who assume hedging risk of producers. Producers have become way more sophisticated then in 80s and 90s. They won't pay fortunes to hedge when they are the ones who know the market direction. The game for CTAs is difficult.
Advanced performance analysis is fine but nothing beats common sense. Below are some common sense ways of analyzing strategy and fund performance.
1. Annualized return
The strategy must offer an acceptable annualized return subject to constraints. Very low annualized return is undesirable but also high annualized return that comes at high risk is also undesirable and even more so.
Note that even if annualized return is low, the strategy may be acceptable due to the leveragability it offers. Often is better to leverage 2X a strategy with a smooth equity than use one w/o leverage but with volatile equity.
In strategy development, false positives (Type-I) can cause losses but false negatives (Type-II) can cause missed profits. This problem cannot be solved quantitatively at a high level. The answer is experience and no algo has that (except if it's a sophisticated expert system.)
A false positive is when you select a strategy that was the result of data snooping or over-optimization but the Sharpe, t-stat or p-value looked good. These may fail immediately but in some cases can remain profitable for many years due to luck of persisting market regimes.
A false negative is a missed discovery because among other things someone used a procedure for adjusting Sharpe, p-values of t-stats that ruled out the strategy as one generating returns from distribution with zero mean. Again, a regime change could make the strategy profitable.
Short thread. I see some charlatans and especially one of most notorious, which I won't name, arguing for high probability of rebound tomorrow in stocks. I posted a backtest yesterday with results from shorting at close of Friday if larger than 2% drop.
These backtests have small samples and particular one shows, as expected, there is higher frequency of rebounds on Mondays after a large drop on Fridays, of around 60%. Now, frequency in historical data hardly translates to probability and also even then, 60% probability is low.
If you're aren't going to repeat this trade for several decades, then you may experience a large drawdown until the expectation converges, if ever. These charlatans don't understand probability doesn't translate to expectation for the next move.
Thread. We consider the question. Why regulators in USA are not acting to eradicate the cryptocurrency and NFT pandemic? In other countries they have already taken action.
The answer is as always complicated because everything in Western World has become so complicated there may be no answers to even basic questions: Complexity has increased beyond bounds.
When complexity is extreme, the only possible answers are extreme. This is primarily due to "curse of dimensionality." See slides 24 - 33 of my Dec 2018 M4 presentation in NYC. priceactionlab.com/Blog/2018/12/m…
Let's talk about going short after another permabear fund announced shut down.
But before that, I'll talk briefly about going to the casino. It's related in a way.
I don't like casinos because I don't like to be around so many losers. The energy is bad. Casino players essentially go short the casino with tiny odds to win.
Last time I visited one was many years ago. I made windfall profits with a martingale system playing the roulette.
I cashed the ships and tried to get out. A few waitresses blocked my way offering free drinks and a man in black suit offered me a room at the hotel. I had to find an exclude to leave as the pressure to stay was mounting. Why? Because they knew if I stay long enough, I'd lose.