2/ Wir fragen am Beispiel von Russlands Verletzungen des #Chemiewaffenübereinkommen: Wie soll internationale Gemeinschaft mit Staaten umgehen, die Verträge verletzen und gezielt Sand in Getriebe multilateraler Institutionen wie der @OPCW streuen?
3/ Ausgangspunkt: Stärke internationalen Norm wird in erster Linie durch Maß bestimmt, in dem sie befolgt wird. Es kommt aber auch auf Reaktion der Weltgemeinschaft an, wie @NDeitelhoff und Lisbeth Zimmermann argumentieren is.gd/jOxIwC
4/ Artikel beschreibt neues "accountability" Netzwerk verschiedener Institutionen und zivilgesellschaftlicher Gruppen, das auf vielfältige und komplementäre Umstände von Chemiewaffeneinsätzen dokumentiert, Täter benennt und damit Voraussetzungen für Bestrafung zu schafft.
5/ Autokratische Staaten lehnen solche Weiterentwicklung internationalen Abrüstungsrechts ab. Deutschland sollte Regelverletzer im CWÜ isolieren und dies mit Notwendigkeit der Ächtung von #Chemiewaffen begründen - nicht als Konflikt zwischen liberalen Demokratien und Autokratien.
6/6 Dank an @dsfrieden für Unterstützung! Wir freuen uns darauf, gemeinsam mit @HSKF_PRIF @jlugiessen ZNF @UniHH in neuem Projekt @CBWNet weiter zum Thema zu forschen. Watch this space: is.gd/2ZKF6w
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1/ AEOI President Eslami and @iaeaorg DG @rafaelmgrossi have agreed joint statement which outlines process for possible resolution safeguards issues. iaea.org/node/102067
2/ @rafaelmgrossi "will aim to report his conclusion [on safeguards] by the June 2022 Board of Governors." Says process is "losely related" to possible agreement on #JCPOA reinstatement. Seems like this agreement will be major part of final puzzle to be solved.
3/ At press conference, @rafaelmgrossi says IAEA will no longer pursue investigation of uranium metal disc, 1 of 4 open issues. Says nothing more can be done to resolve this issue, hints at material being in different form (melted down, in inventory).
1/ Nuclear blackmail failing? Russia's nuclear weapons influence Western thinking on intervention. Putin's nuclear threats increase nuclear risks. But Russia's nuclear signalling so far appears to not have changed Western policy. Short thread on nuclear coercion & Ukraine:
2/ Two explicit nuclear threats in first 4 days of war: In Feb. 24 declaration of war speech Putin warned those "who may be tempted to interfere in developments from outside" that "consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history." is.gd/hDIKCm
3/ No detectable policy changes in West, at least none that Putin might have hoped for. Virtual @NATO summit does not explicitly mention nukes, describes its own measures as "non-escalatory". If anything, closing of ranks in light of wild nuclear threats. is.gd/rY6C8m
1/ @NATO SecGen @jensstoltenberg describes content of letter to Russia with "proposals, ideas, topics" where allies agree "it is possible to make progress" including on "risk reduction, transparency, and #armscontrol". Short attempt to unpack: is.gd/Nmj0if
2/ NATO usefully suggests "mutual briefings on exercises and nuclear policies in the NATO-Russia Council". Lots of experience to build on, see for example 2014 @SWPBerlin papers by @KatarzynaKubiak (tinyurl.com/y8zdn8gg) and Max Mutschler here tinyurl.com/yce7yrw9 (.pdf)
1/ Crunch time on @NATO nuclear sharing discussions in talks on new German government. Short thread on debate, picking up couple of contentious points in this interesting but one-sided @derspiegel analysis: tinyurl.com/yeabnsxk
2/ Terms of debate have recently shifted because @usairforce has announced end of production of F18
3/ A need to reassess: F18 was preferred option of outgoing Defense Minister @akk German Ministry @BMVg_Bundeswehr to replace nuclear-capable Tornado. Airforce liked electronic warfighting capabilities of F18 Growler.
1/ German debate on @NATO nuclear sharing is picking up speed: Rolf Mützenich, chairman of coalition partner Social Democrats @spdbt in Parliament in @Tagesspiegel interview tomorrow apparntly calls for future end of #nuclearweapons deployments in Germany is.gd/EFCfLb
2/ Mützenich argues that other @NATO allies participate in nuclear sharing even though they have renounced option to host US nuclear weapons. (To be precise: 21 of 30 NATO allies participate in Nuclear Planning Group even though their territory is free of #nuclearweapons.)
3/ Also points to unilateralism of US administration and argues "Does any believe that @realDonaldTrump would stop planning for #nuclearweapons use just because we are able to transport a few warheads?"
Thread: This E3 statement is indicative of concerns Europeans have about triggering #DisputeResolutionMechanism. Several smart people including @EllieGeranmayeh@diplocharlie@AliVaez have commented on politics, risks & opportunities. A few comments here on DRM procedure.
2/The statement has been complemented by a statement of @JosepBorrellF confirming receipt of E3 letter and confirming his role as Joint Commission Chairman. This is interesting because EU/@eu_eeas at the same time can be independent #JCPOA participant.