Thread by @WilliamYang120

"Amid the unfolding crisis, #China has gone further and drawn a parallel between NATO and the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy announced by the Biden administration in February." channelnewsasia.com/cna-insider/us…

"Key thrusts of the new US strategy include a free and open Indo-Pacific; supporting India’s continued rise and regional leadership; strengthening the Quad; strengthening extended deterrence with Japan and South Korea; ...

... expanding US Coastguard presence; contributing to an empowered Asean; and closing the region’s infrastructure gap."

"As regards China, the US stated in its strategy paper that Beijing’s “harmful behaviour” — coercion, aggression and undermining of human rights and international law — spans the globe but is “most acute” in the Indo-Pacific."

"To former Singapore diplomat Kishore Mahbubani, one thing is “very clear”: The “biggest geopolitical contest of all time … has just broken out between the US and China”.

“Whenever a major geopolitical contest breaks out, watch out. There’s definitely a danger of war,” he said.

But Charles Edel, the Australia chair at the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said setting up a nuclear-propelled submarine fleet is not a “gateway” to nuclear weapons and that the Aukus partners “won’t continue if it is”.

He noted that Aukus has “broad bipartisan support” in Australia, a country where 84 per cent of its people do not trust China to act responsibly in the world, according to the latest annual poll by think-tank Lowy Institute.

And as China continues to build up its military forces, “what’s happened in the South China Sea hasn’t stayed in the South China Sea”.

“They’ve continued to push outward and further down … We’ve seen multiple attempts by the Chinese to do a similar spate of building (projects) that they conduct in the South China Sea in the South Pacific,” he cited.

“We’ve seen discussions … about whether or not there’d be a dual-use military-commercial base in Papua New Guinea, in Vanuatu and even just this past month in the Solomon Islands. All of these are much closer to Australia.”

o better protect security in the region, countries should rather focus on “developing patterns of co-operation and interdependence”, said Mahbubani, who spearheads the National University of Singapore’s Asian Peace Programme.

He cited the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership — the world’s largest free trade deal — which entered into force in January and counts Australia and China among its members. “Submarines are stealthy, but trade agreements are stealthier,” he said.

"Today, Quad co-operation includes climate change action, counterterrorism and infrastructure development. Its members have also collectively pledged to donate at least a billion COVID-19 vaccine doses globally by year end."

“Three or four years ago, it would’ve been focused more on maritime security,” noted Stephen Nagy, a senior associate professor in the department of politics and international studies at the Tokyo-based International Christian University.

“Today, the Quad has evolved to focus on the provision of public goods … connectivity aid to Southeast Asia and South Asia and … investment in the selective diversification of supply chains throughout the region.”

Without a shift away from “a security view of the Quad”, he said, the alliance “isn’t going to get buy-in” from countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam.

In Southeast Asia in general, the Quad has had a mixed response.

The “main concern” was that the Quad “would heighten tensions in the region, especially vis-a-vis China”, said Lynn Kuok, Shangri-La Dialogue senior fellow for Asia-Pacific security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

But with its moves away from “its more militaristic elements” and towards “areas that Asean cares more about” such as pandemic recovery — which demonstrate “sensitivity to the region’s needs” — she thinks “the position on the Quad dialogue has softened somewhat”.

Asean centrality was “right up at the top”, pointed out Gregory Poling, senior fellow for Southeast Asia and director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the CSIS. These are engagement efforts taking place in a region that is “much more heterogeneous than NATO."

“(NATO countries) have the same political systems … similar economic standards, and they’re well integrated into each other’s economies, whereas (in) Southeast Asia and Japan and Korea, we have a variety of government styles,” he said.

“We have a variety of commitments to democracy, a variety of development levels.”

Hence, on the question of the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy, he thinks it “doesn’t make sense” to equate NATO to the Quad.