Michael Bond Profile picture
May 15 • 51 tweets • 20 min read
Thread🧵consolidating updates from May 9 – May 15 on the large scale unit repositioning and resupply efforts ongoing in Ukraine. This thread will be incorporated into my primary thread on combat losses, which will be linked at the bottom once complete
Combat Strength
The US most recently (May 10) assessed Russian combat strength remains at 65-70% of what was committed at the beginning of the war.


Here is the history of US estimates of Russian combat strength to May 2

The UK defense ministry estimated that Russia has likely lost a third of the forces it sent to Ukraine in February

Of an estimated 120 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) committed by Russia to the invasion, it is believed there are currently 105 BTGs in Ukraine as Russian moves and reconstitutes its forces
Earlier, it was noted that Russia continues to rotate BTGs into and out of Ukraine, so the number available at any given time varies slightly

Some of the last Russian units known to have been deployed initially to northern Ukraine have been spotted moved into Ukraine recently. It is unclear whether there are still significant units being held in reserve by Russia on the Ukrainian border

There was speculation that a broader Russian mobilization or declaration of war would be announced around the Victory Day on May 9, but no such announcement was made and US defense officials saw no evidence of a large mobilization

The Ukrainian government asserts that a covert, smaller scale mobilization is taking place as Russia quietly signs new contract soldiers, assembles new units and sends them to fight in Ukraine

gur.gov.ua/ua/content/ros…
How the war will proceed, given the apparent personnel constraints, varies from speculation about the possibility of a Russian collapse


to suggestion of a stalemate by the US Defense Intelligence Agency Director
Russian Equipment and logistics
There is increasing focus on the potential for Russian military manufacturing to be significantly affected
There is evidence of this already affecting the Russian defense industrial base with regard to precision guided missiles


and there are reports of Russia using circuitry normally intended for household appliances in its vehicles
washingtonpost.com/technology/202…
Interesting arguments are being made that Ukrainian targeting of Russian logistical capability is also having significant success
While some Russian units are training on new drones, their supply appears to be from mixed sources
The argument is also being made that smaller, reconnaissance drones are being relied on to drop munitions, suggesting that there is insufficient availability of purpose built UCAVs
Russian sources on Telegram are critical that there is insufficient availability of Russian drones for the purposes of artillery spotting


This is in contrast the apparently widespread use of artillery spotting by the Ukrainians
Newly deployed Russian units have been spotted primarily using bolt action rifles of very old design and it is not clear why more modern battle rifles are not available
Captured Equipment
In recent weeks I have been incorporating figures for captured equipment into my larger thread on available forces using a conservative estimate of only 1/3 of captures being suitable for short term reuse.
There have been efforts to track equipment loss accounting for capture over time. Note that this version includes all captures as additions to the opponent’s forces
Repair
There were many updates on repair facilities and practices in past weeks’ consolidations. No significant update this week.
New Equipment for Ukraine
For an effort to keep an ongoing count of equipment supplied to Ukraine see
oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/answer…

Here is another helpful collection of the data
ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-aga…
There has continued to be a high rate of delivery of military aid to Ukraine



Here is an alternate presentation from the perspective of the US transportation effort
Here is the list of total US military assistance provided to Ukraine



although, some minor US equipment has been spotted in use in Ukraine that has not previously been mentioned by US officials

The Ukraine Democracy Defence Lend-Lease Act 2022 was signed by President Biden on May 9. There is already speculation that it could be used to backfill systems to Finland in order to allow them to send air defense and tanks to Ukraine

Such transfers remain critical, as it has been observed that Ukraine is clearly using tanks and other heavy equipment in its counter offensives

The additional funding initiative was increased from $33 billion to $40 billion and approved by the US House of Representatives. Here is a breakdown of the spending

The vote in the US Senate was not approved on fast procedures and it is hoped to be approved by the Senate in the next week.



The US recently focused on production capacity for some systems: the company aims to boost production of the Javelin from the current 2,100 missiles per year to 4,000 per year, a process that could take up to “a couple of years”

However, there are still limitations on putting some weapon systems to use in Ukraine, including training rates for Javelin missiles

thedrive.com/the-war-zone/u…

and new production initiatives for Stinger missiles

thedrive.com/the-war-zone/r…
Therefore, it makes a lot of sense that the next upcoming conference of western countries supplying arms to Ukraine will focus on defense industrial base issues

Many western systems recently delivered to Ukraine are seeing heavy use already. In particular, it has been noted that both sides are fully engaged in artillery warfare.
and Ukraine has thanked the US for delivery of the last of the allocated M777 guns

Related systems are seeing a lot of use, including counter battery radar


and rocket propelled artillery shells that have longer range than standard shells
Interestingly, there is evidence that some of the more advanced systems used by the US along with the M777 guns has been stripped, as the Ukrainians do not have the systems to make use of them
The UK, after announcing significant new funding for Ukraine last week, has now come out and said it would support any country that wanted to supply soviet or Russian designed combat jets to Ukraine

The UK then advocated for NATO countries to begin supplying NATO standard equipment to Ukraine in the coming months

There was also an update on a new, domestically produced Ukrainian drone called the Punisher

Ukrainian Logistical Challenges
Russia has focused much of its efforts on attacking Ukrainian logistics capacity in the past two weeks, and this continues, albeit at an apparently slower pace. Here is one example
Perhaps more important for continued Ukrainian success will be overcoming shortages of trucks

Training of Ukrainian personnel
US training of Ukrainian soldiers continues


There is also more intensive US training on maintaining artillery systems ongoing
Germany has pledged to provide new artillery to Ukraine and to train the Ukrainians on its use


and that German training has now begun

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More from @HelloMrBond

May 16
May 15 Full update to thread 🧵 on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to available forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT observations and estimates Image
Image
Summary
OSINT % losses of Russian Committed (Russian total) vs Ukrainian total
Personnel 34.1(8.8) vs 10.3
Armor 40.1(11.2) vs 12.7
Tanks 41.5(20.2) vs 13.8
Artillery 15.3(4.4) vs 3.6
Aircraft 7.3(1.9) vs 16
Helicopters 14.6(4.3) vs 11.3
Read 50 tweets
May 9
May 8 Full update to thread 🧵 on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to available forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT observations and estimates
Here is the more detailed table so that you can see the values for captures and newly delivered equipment
Summary
OSINT % losses of Russian Committed (Russian total) vs Ukrainian total
Personnel 37.4(7.9) vs 8.9
Armor 49.8(10.7) vs 12.4
Tanks 51.8(19.1) vs 13.1
Artillery 14.9(4.2) vs 3.5
Aircraft 7.9(1.9) vs 16
Helicopters 17.1(4.3) vs 8.1
Read 63 tweets
May 9
Thread🧵consolidating updates from May 2 – May 8 on the large scale unit repositioning and resupply efforts ongoing in Ukraine. This thread will be incorporated into my primary thread on combat losses, which will be linked at the bottom once complete
Combat Strength
The US most recently (May 2) assessed Russian combat strength remains at 75% of what was committed at the beginning of the war.


Here is the history of US estimates of Russian combat strength

Read 43 tweets
May 8
A reported Russian mobilization notice. Note the caveats in the thread, including that the date has apparently been changed from 2021 to 2022 for unknown reasons. I will try to confirm whether the law referred to could include this being a conscript from the normal April round
Further reservations about this claimed mobilization notice

A second claimed mobilization notice
Read 4 tweets
May 6
I am waiting for confirmation of the original source, but 3.8M departures from Russia in the first three months of 2022 vs 5 million total in one year (2020-2021). We don’t know how many might have returned. 2020 may have been a low rate due to the pandemic. Still interesting
To be clear, I have used my interpretation of the statement on past data. The translation was “For the period from 2000-2021, according to the data of Such Cases, about 5 million people left the Russian Federation”.

I believe the poster intended 2020-2021 and not 2000-2021
For contrast, departures for central Asian countries don’t look as elevated if you go back to pre-pandemic 2019
Read 4 tweets
May 2
May 1 Full update to thread 🧵on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to available forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT observations and estimates
Additional detail so that you can follow values for captures and new equipment deliveries to Ukraine. Excuse the formatting
Summary
OSINT % losses of Russian Committed (Russian total) vs Ukrainian total
Personnel 35.3(7.4) vs 8.3
Armor 47.2(10.1) vs 12
Tanks 48.8(18) vs 12.3
Artillery 14.7(4.2) vs 3.4
Aircraft 7.9(1.9) vs 16
Helicopters 16.3(4.1) vs 8.1
Read 58 tweets

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