Thread🧵consolidating updates from May 23 – May 29 on the large scale unit repositioning and resupply efforts ongoing in Ukraine. This thread will be incorporated into my primary thread on combat losses, which will be linked at the bottom once complete
It may be helpful for context to read the consolidation I put together previously:
May 22
Whether out of fear of the effectiveness of Ukrainian weapons, or increased protectiveness of limited hardware, we are now seeing more improvised armor applied even to Russian tanks
The use of this older equipment is not a good sign. New analysis of captured Russian equipment shows a significant reliance on foreign chips. Catalogues are being developed about what parts are used by Russia, in order to further tighten export controls
A lack of foreign electronics may not prevent use of older equipment, but it will result in inferior performance.
Here a drone dropped a grenade, missing its target
Captured Equipment
In recent weeks I have been incorporating figures for captured equipment into my larger thread on available forces using a conservative estimate of only 1/3 of captures being suitable for short term reuse.
Former artillery boat "Akkerman" was captured by the Russians and received a new tail number "201" after being abandoned by crew in the port of Berdyansk in March
Another case of multiple claims of capture, whether intentional or accidental. This is among the reasons that I am currently only counting 1/3 of captures as likely in reuse.
The second of an ongoing series of meetings was held for nations to coordinate military aid to Ukraine. There were also several new participants, including Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Ireland, and Kosovo
However, note that this plan may not go as reported, as there is controversy over Germany’s willingness to provide tanks to Poland to replace those that Poland has already delivered to Ukraine
Observers have noted that the CAESARs have been modified to coordinate with the battlefield management systems being used by the Ukrainians. Details are available in French in the embedded tweet
Russia has focused much of its efforts on attacking Ukrainian logistics capacity in the past several weeks, but these efforts have repeatedly failed to stop the flow of military aid
Repair
There have been several updates on Ukrainian domestic repair capacity and the offers of repair assistance to Ukraine from Bulgaria and the Czech Republic in previous weeks. There are no updates this week.
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May 29 Full update to thread🧵on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to available forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT observations and estimates
Summary
OSINT % losses of Russian Committed (Russian total) vs Ukrainian total
Personnel 35.7(9.7) vs 6.9
Armor 42(12.4) vs 12.2
Tanks 43.2(22.2) vs 15.3
Artillery 15.4(4.6) vs 4
Aircraft 8.1(2.1) vs 16.3
Helicopters 15.2(4.5) vs 8.3
The Russian Central Bank continues to publish updates on Russia's foreign currency reserves. The net balance varies quite a bit from week to week, but we can see that it was flat from mid-March through mid-April and has been negative for a month at an average outflow of ~$1B/day
Note that the foreign currency reserves in the graph above above represent the available reserves. $320B has been subtracted from the values in the table to reflect reserves frozen overseas. Additional details can be found in this report
Note that European energy purchases from Russia are adding inflow of ~$1B/day in the last few months. This may be dwindling as several countries have reduced their purchases or had energy flows cut by Russia. If such purchases were eliminated, the net outflow would be ~$2B/day
May 22 Full update to thread🧵on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to available forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT observations and estimates
Summary
OSINT % losses of Russian Committed (Russian total) vs Ukrainian total
Personnel 35.4(9.2) vs 11.8
Armor 41(11.6) vs 12
Tanks 42.4(20.8) vs 14.6
Artillery 15.6(4.5) vs 3.7
Aircraft 7.3(1.9) vs 13.7
Helicopters 14.9(4.4) vs 6.4
An ongoing thread to keep track of attempts to correct for errors in evaluating evidence of battle damage in connection with the Russian invasion of Ukraine
This is a good post to highlight the challenges in counting battle losses accurately given photographs taken from different angles and in different conditions
Another complicating factor is deliberate attempts to use lost equipment in multiple pictures to inflate the observed loss count. This is a Ukrainian example, but the same attempts have been made by both sides
Thread🧵consolidating updates from May 16 – May 22 on the large scale unit repositioning and resupply efforts ongoing in Ukraine. This thread will be incorporated into my primary thread on combat losses, which will be linked at the bottom once complete
It may be helpful for context to read the consolidation I put together previously:
May 15
May 15 Full update to thread 🧵 on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to available forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT observations and estimates
Summary
OSINT % losses of Russian Committed (Russian total) vs Ukrainian total
Personnel 34.1(8.8) vs 10.3
Armor 40.1(11.2) vs 12.7
Tanks 41.5(20.2) vs 13.8
Artillery 15.3(4.4) vs 3.6
Aircraft 7.3(1.9) vs 16
Helicopters 14.6(4.3) vs 11.3