1/ Ukrainian TVD, Day 98-107. The first week & a half of June has seen the Russo-Ukrainian War escalate into a deadly attritional phase dominated by artillery duels and positional battles with little major change in the forward edge of the battle area. #UkraineRussianWar
2/ Weather Outlook. Forecast for the next ten-days will see an initial 4-day period of thunderstorms in the Donbas that may slow operations in non-urban terrain. Temps will range from 31-14 C with higher humidity. Cloud cover & wind speed will make toss bombing problematic.
3/ Kharkiv OD. This remains a critical front and has become an unstable region over the past week. The RAF needs to expand its northern enclave to maintain pressure on Kharkiv & pin down UAF units still defending here. #Kharkiv
4/ For the UAF it is unclear if they will have the combat power to renew their offensive to push remaining RAF units over the international border. At a minimum UAF forces in the Kharkiv metro area will be able to contain RAF activity to its present enclave.
5/ Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD. The strategic importance of Severodonetsk has grown out of how the RAF & UAF have arrayed their forces in relation to each other to achieve a clear operational advantage relative to each sides war aims throughout the Donbas. #Donbas#Izyum#Popasna
6/ The RAF must secure the Severodonetsk Salient to achieve a true general breakout into the relatively undefendable terrain of western Donetsk. Penetrating the remaining UAF defenses on the Siverskyi Donets north of Slovyansk and expanding the Popasna Bulge shapes this.
7/ Improved Russian artillery survivability tactics & VKS support to ground operations is allowing sustained Russian maneuver success. Improved artillery & VKS strikes against UAF troop concentrations & logistical infrastructure are facilitating RAF momentum.
8/ Severodoentsk AO. Momentum has swung back in favor of the RAF in Severodoentsk, but the UAF is still holding their ground in the western part of the city, particularly in the industrial sector centered on the Azot Chemical Plant. #Severodonestk
9/ However, the UAF is struggling to keep its artillery units supplied, hindering their ability to deliver timely counter-battery fire against the Russians. With losses mounting the UAF will face a difficult choice in deciding to maintain the defense of Severodonetsk or pullback.
10/ Zaporizhzhia OD. RAF & UAF activity in the Zaporizhzhia OD remains limited to localized attacks to improve tactical positioning. There are indications that both the RAF & UAF are preparing to renew offensive action in the Hulyaipole-Orikhiv area. #Melitopol#Mariupol
11/ Odesa-Kherson OD. The UAF counteroffensive into northern Kherson has met with little success so far. Despite the significant number of forces allocated to the operation, UAF units were only able to establish an 8km wide & 10km deep lodgment on the east of the Inhulets River.
12/ RAF units under the control of the 7th Guards Air Assault (Landing) Division have been able to successfully contain the breach in their NW defensive line and halt the Ukrainian advance for now. The UAF still have enough forces on hand to expand these lodgments.
13/ Black Sea OTMO. The Russian blockade of Odesa continues. However, improved Ukrainian anti-ship capabilities have forced the majority of Black Sea Fleet surface activity to be pushed back 100km from the southern Ukrainian coast. The NW region of the Black Sea is now contested.
14/ Aerospace Assessment. VKS & Naval cruise missile strike effects remain negligible for ordnance expended. Both the quantity of strikes against critical infrastructure & the overall accuracy of the missiles employed are not impeding the delivery of Western aid.
15/ Improved Russian electronic warfare is causing havoc with Ukrainian recon UAVs, C2 nodes, counter-battery radar, and radio network communications. With their heavy reliance on UAVs for targeting, RAF EW is hindering UAF artillery operations. apnews.com/article/russia…
16/ Battle Damage Assessment. The Ukrainian Government Authorities have acknowledged the heavy toll current combat operations in the Donbas is having on UAF manpower. The UAF is reportedly losing 100-200 KIA and 400-500 WIA a day. theguardian.com/world/2022/jun…
17/ The continued loss of a battalion equivalent a day will erode UAF overall combat effectiveness faster than it will the RAF, even with Russian force generation issues. The RAF cannot ignore growing resistance to coercive mobilization practices if it hopes to replace losses.
18/ Ukrainian TV, Day 98-107. There is a growing unevenness to support of Ukraine. Britain, Poland, Denmark, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the Baltic States are the most supportive while Germany, France, Italy, & Hungary voice support but show little by way of their actions.
19/ Tension continues to rise as a global food crisis appears likely due to the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports & sanctions on Russian grain exports. Turkey intends to act as a mediator but not without its own suspicious activity in grain exports. bbc.com/news/business-…
20/ Humanitarian Impact. Ukrainian refugees total 9.87+ million with 7.23+ million in countries bordering Ukraine, another 2.64+ throughout Europe. Internally displaced people throughout Ukraine are now at 6.76+ million (1.7+ million in east & 562K in south Ukraine).
21/ Information War. While speaking to Russian entrepreneurs President Putin made clear his goal in Ukraine is to “restore” supposed “lost territory” in the same way Peter the Great did in his 21-year war with Sweden (Great Northern War, 1700-21). cnn.com/2022/06/10/eur…
22/ This rhetoric is meant to justify 1) the historic right of Russia to wage war in the Ukraine to restore “New Russia” to the Motherland, 2) all and any means to accomplish this, 3) the length of time this may take, 4) greater sacrifice required by the Russian people to do this
23/ Overall Assessment. The character of the war has turned more favorably toward Russia, a grinding attritional war of positional battles in which RAF ground forces can make steady incremental progress behind their advantage in artillery & close air support.
24/ The UAF will struggle to gain offensive parity or localized superiority in a war based off this character, as evident by the limited success of the northern Kherson counteroffensive, despite the UAF advantage in maneuver units. More Western artillery & EW are needed.
25/ Time remains the ultimate enemy of both belligerents. The UAF needs to contain the RAF to the occupied areas, acquire more modern Western weapon systems & train enough forces to turn the tide. The RAF needs to complete its conquest before the UAF can defeat it. #SlavaUkraini
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1/ Daily Tactical Update (DTU), Ukrainian TVD Day 1073: Today's DTU focuses on actions in the Siversk Operational Direction during January 2025. #Siversk #Donbas #UkraineWar #RussiaUkraineWar #Russia #Ukraine #SlavaUkraini
2/ Operational Terms: Here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions to help you understand the thread's graphics.
3/ Operational Overview: The Siversk OD is not only militarily sensitive for Russia and Ukraine but also politically, especially for Russia. Since the fall of Severodonetsk, Lysychansk, and Popasna, Siversk has been a key operational hub. It occupies a crucial position within the OSUV Khortytsia area of responsibility. It acts as a coordination center between OTU Lyman and OTU Luhansk to defend the Slovyansk/Kramatorsk urban conglomerate, a critical strategic point in the Donbas SD. Additionally, it serves as the entry point into northern Donetsk Oblast.
Little has changed in the Siversk OD for almost two and a half years. It is a principal source of Russian military frustration, exemplifying the inadequacies of the Russian Armed Forces in achieving a decisive victory over Ukraine and the Ukrainian ability to hold their territory and outfight the Russians.
1/ Daily Tactical Update (DTU), Ukrainian TVD Day 1069: Today's DTU focuses on actions in the Southern Donetsk Front from January 22-27, which includes the Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka Operational Directions. #Pokrovsk #VelykaNovosilka #UkraineWar #RussiaUkraineWar #Russia
2/ Operational Terms: Here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions to help you understand the thread's graphics.
3/ Operational Overview: Major Viktor Tregubov, spokesperson for the Ukrainian Operational-Strategic Grouping of Forces (OSUV) Khortytsia, stated that the Russians are trying to bypass Pokrovsk from the western side, looking for vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defenses to capture the city. Tregubov also suggested that the Russians would not try to reach the Dnipropetrovsk region but concentrate on capturing Pokrovsk city. The major stated that the Russians maintain their daily average of 50-60 combat actions along this sector of the front.
1/ Daily Tactical Update (DTU), Ukrainian TVD Day 1067: Today's DTU focuses on actions in the Kupyansk Operational Direction from January 5-25, 2025, with some highlights of events in other parts of the TVD. #Kupyansk #Torestsk #VelykaNovosilka #Kursk #Pokrovsk #UkraineWar #RussiaUkraineWar #Russia
2/ Operational Terms: Here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions to help you understand the thread's graphics.
3/ Operational Overview: The 1st Guards Tank Army continues its well-coordinated multi-division offensive along a line of operations at the junction of the OTU Kupyansk and OTU Staroblisk areas of responsibility. The assault by the 2d Guard Motorized Rifle Division into northern Kupyansk and Dvorichna during late 2024 and early 2025 has revealed vulnerabilities in Ukrainian defenses in this segment of the front to infiltration. The expanding Dvorichna Bridgehead presents a substantial challenge for ZSU forces. Should the Russians succeed in capturing Dvorichna and extend their lines south towards Radkivka and Holubivka, the 2d Guard Motorized Rifle Division would establish a new avenue of advance to possibly encircle Kupyansk from the north.
1/ Daily Tactical Update (DTU), Ukrainian TVD Day 1066: Today's DTU focuses on actions in the Toretsk Area of Operations from January 05-24, 2025, with some highlights of events in Velya Novosilka and in Kursk. #Torestsk #VelykaNovosilka #Kursk #UkraineWar #RussiaUkraineWar #Russia
2/ Operational Terms: Here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions to help you understand the thread's graphics.
3/ Operational Overview: OSV Yug successfully and swiftly integrated reserve forces into the front-line units of the 41st Guards Combined Arms Army by the end of December 2024. In early January 2025, Russian forces in central Toretsk initiated a series of well-coordinated platoon-sized assaults, taking advantage of the limited visibility caused by ongoing adverse weather conditions, to concentrate assault teams along key routes of advance. This tactical approach diminished the effectiveness of Ukrainian FPV targeting while enhancing Russian maneuver superiority.
As a result, Ukrainian defenses in central and southern Toretsk rapidly deteriorated, with approximately 70% of the city coming under Russian control by mid-January. ZSU forces established a final defensive line stretching from the forested region west of Dachne to the Toretska mine. Further south, Ukrainian troops maintained control over the Tsentralna Mine and exerted FPV and fire control over the western areas of the ZabalkaMicro-District, accounting for around 30% of Toretsk's territory still under Ukrainian control.
1/ Daily Tactical Update (DTU), Ukrainian TVD Day 1065: Today's DTU focuses on actions in the Chasiv Yar Operational Direction from January 05-23, 2025, with some highlights of events in Toretsk and a quick update on developments in Pokrovsk and Velya Novosilka. #ChasivYar #Torestsk #VelykaNovosilka #Pokrovsk #UkraineWar #RussiaUkraineWar #Russia
2/ Operational Terms: Here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions to help you understand the thread's graphics.
3/ Operational Overview: Despite recent achievements, the Chasiv Yar Operational Direction has produced minimal progress for the SVRF since the capture of Bakhmut. While under significant pressure, OTU Luhansk(?) still effectively prevents OSV Yug from advancing towards Kostyantynivka, which poses a risk to the defense of OSUV Khortytsia in central Donetsk Oblast. The Siverskyi-Donets Canal continues to act as a significant barrier hindering Russian movements, potentially enhanced by ongoing construction of field fortifications in successive lines to the west of the canal and north of Toretsk. However, since late December 2024, the 98th Guards Airborne Division has achieved notable progress along critical sections of the Siverskyi-Donets Canal and within Chasiv Yar.
1/ Daily Tactical Update (DTU), Ukrainian TVD Day 1064: Today's DTU focuses on actions in the Velyka Novosilka Operational Direction from January 05-22, 2025. #VelykaNovosilka #UkraineWar #RussiaUkraineWar #Andriivka #Vremivka
2/ Operational Terms: Here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions to help you understand the thread's graphics.
3/ Operational Overview: The Velyka Novosilka Operational Direction situation continues deteriorating for OSUV Tavriva. Efforts by OTU Krasnohorivka throughout late December 2024 and early January 2025 failed to hold the defensive line in Kurakhove and along the Sukhi Yaly River Valley. The 29th Guards Combined Arms Army has secured the banks of the Sukhi Yaly River from Uspenivka to the southern approaches of Ulakly.
With the 51st Guards Combined Arms Army seizing control of most of the T05-15 Road and pressuring Ukrainian defenses to the north, there is a real threat to OTU Krasnohorivka ability to break contact and execute an orderly delayed withdrawal along the H-15 Highway and reestablishing a coherent defense within the Andriivka-Oleksiivka fortified conglomerate.