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Iván Ramírez de Arellano, The Jomini of the West

@JominiW

Jun 11, 2022 • 25 tweets • 9 min read • Read on X

1/ Ukrainian TVD, Day 98-107. The first week & a half of June has seen the Russo-Ukrainian War escalate into a deadly attritional phase dominated by artillery duels and positional battles with little major change in the forward edge of the battle area. #UkraineRussianWar

2/ Weather Outlook. Forecast for the next ten-days will see an initial 4-day period of thunderstorms in the Donbas that may slow operations in non-urban terrain. Temps will range from 31-14 C with higher humidity. Cloud cover & wind speed will make toss bombing problematic.

3/ Kharkiv OD. This remains a critical front and has become an unstable region over the past week. The RAF needs to expand its northern enclave to maintain pressure on Kharkiv & pin down UAF units still defending here. #Kharkiv

4/ For the UAF it is unclear if they will have the combat power to renew their offensive to push remaining RAF units over the international border. At a minimum UAF forces in the Kharkiv metro area will be able to contain RAF activity to its present enclave.

5/ Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD. The strategic importance of Severodonetsk has grown out of how the RAF & UAF have arrayed their forces in relation to each other to achieve a clear operational advantage relative to each sides war aims throughout the Donbas. #Donbas #Izyum #Popasna

6/ The RAF must secure the Severodonetsk Salient to achieve a true general breakout into the relatively undefendable terrain of western Donetsk. Penetrating the remaining UAF defenses on the Siverskyi Donets north of Slovyansk and expanding the Popasna Bulge shapes this.

7/ Improved Russian artillery survivability tactics & VKS support to ground operations is allowing sustained Russian maneuver success. Improved artillery & VKS strikes against UAF troop concentrations & logistical infrastructure are facilitating RAF momentum.

8/ Severodoentsk AO. Momentum has swung back in favor of the RAF in Severodoentsk, but the UAF is still holding their ground in the western part of the city, particularly in the industrial sector centered on the Azot Chemical Plant. #Severodonestk

9/ However, the UAF is struggling to keep its artillery units supplied, hindering their ability to deliver timely counter-battery fire against the Russians. With losses mounting the UAF will face a difficult choice in deciding to maintain the defense of Severodonetsk or pullback.

10/ Zaporizhzhia OD. RAF & UAF activity in the Zaporizhzhia OD remains limited to localized attacks to improve tactical positioning. There are indications that both the RAF & UAF are preparing to renew offensive action in the Hulyaipole-Orikhiv area. #Melitopol #Mariupol

11/ Odesa-Kherson OD. The UAF counteroffensive into northern Kherson has met with little success so far. Despite the significant number of forces allocated to the operation, UAF units were only able to establish an 8km wide & 10km deep lodgment on the east of the Inhulets River.

12/ RAF units under the control of the 7th Guards Air Assault (Landing) Division have been able to successfully contain the breach in their NW defensive line and halt the Ukrainian advance for now. The UAF still have enough forces on hand to expand these lodgments.

13/ Black Sea OTMO. The Russian blockade of Odesa continues. However, improved Ukrainian anti-ship capabilities have forced the majority of Black Sea Fleet surface activity to be pushed back 100km from the southern Ukrainian coast. The NW region of the Black Sea is now contested.

14/ Aerospace Assessment. VKS & Naval cruise missile strike effects remain negligible for ordnance expended. Both the quantity of strikes against critical infrastructure & the overall accuracy of the missiles employed are not impeding the delivery of Western aid.

15/ Improved Russian electronic warfare is causing havoc with Ukrainian recon UAVs, C2 nodes, counter-battery radar, and radio network communications. With their heavy reliance on UAVs for targeting, RAF EW is hindering UAF artillery operations. apnews.com/article/russia…

16/ Battle Damage Assessment. The Ukrainian Government Authorities have acknowledged the heavy toll current combat operations in the Donbas is having on UAF manpower. The UAF is reportedly losing 100-200 KIA and 400-500 WIA a day. theguardian.com/world/2022/jun…

17/ The continued loss of a battalion equivalent a day will erode UAF overall combat effectiveness faster than it will the RAF, even with Russian force generation issues. The RAF cannot ignore growing resistance to coercive mobilization practices if it hopes to replace losses.

18/ Ukrainian TV, Day 98-107. There is a growing unevenness to support of Ukraine. Britain, Poland, Denmark, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the Baltic States are the most supportive while Germany, France, Italy, & Hungary voice support but show little by way of their actions.

19/ Tension continues to rise as a global food crisis appears likely due to the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports & sanctions on Russian grain exports. Turkey intends to act as a mediator but not without its own suspicious activity in grain exports. bbc.com/news/business-…

20/ Humanitarian Impact. Ukrainian refugees total 9.87+ million with 7.23+ million in countries bordering Ukraine, another 2.64+ throughout Europe. Internally displaced people throughout Ukraine are now at 6.76+ million (1.7+ million in east & 562K in south Ukraine).

21/ Information War. While speaking to Russian entrepreneurs President Putin made clear his goal in Ukraine is to “restore” supposed “lost territory” in the same way Peter the Great did in his 21-year war with Sweden (Great Northern War, 1700-21). cnn.com/2022/06/10/eur…

22/ This rhetoric is meant to justify 1) the historic right of Russia to wage war in the Ukraine to restore “New Russia” to the Motherland, 2) all and any means to accomplish this, 3) the length of time this may take, 4) greater sacrifice required by the Russian people to do this

23/ Overall Assessment. The character of the war has turned more favorably toward Russia, a grinding attritional war of positional battles in which RAF ground forces can make steady incremental progress behind their advantage in artillery & close air support.

24/ The UAF will struggle to gain offensive parity or localized superiority in a war based off this character, as evident by the limited success of the northern Kherson counteroffensive, despite the UAF advantage in maneuver units. More Western artillery & EW are needed.

25/ Time remains the ultimate enemy of both belligerents. The UAF needs to contain the RAF to the occupied areas, acquire more modern Western weapon systems & train enough forces to turn the tide. The RAF needs to complete its conquest before the UAF can defeat it. #SlavaUkraini

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More from @JominiW

Iván Ramírez de Arellano, The Jomini of the West

@JominiW

Dec 21

1/ Ukrainian TVD Operational Update (Day 1030): The situation in the Ukrainian Theater of Military Action (TVD) remains challenging for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Since November 28, the ZSU has struggled to stabilize defensive lines in many key sectors along the Strategic Front while effectively managing delaying operations in the critical Pokrovsk-Kurakhove Operational Direction. However, Ukrainian forces have regained lost ground in a few important areas. This thread provides a general overview of events throughout the Ukrainian Theater of Military Action (TVD) since late November. #UkraineWar #Donbas #Pokrovsk #Kupyansk #Pishchance #VelykaNovosilka #Kurakhove #ChasivYar #Siverek

2/ Operational Terms. Here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions to help you understand the thread's graphics.

3/ Northern Strategic Direction: The Northern Strategic Direction (SD) remains the TVDs secondary SD. ZSU operations in this SD have very likely lost the ability to shift the operational initiative in Ukraine’s favor. As previously assessed, the employment of the RS-26 Rubezh intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) (a.k.a. Oreshnik) has not deterred Ukraine from continuing to employ ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP systems against Russian deep logistics and command nodes within the territory of the Russian Federation. However, since Western authorization to use these systems on the territory of the Russian Federation was granted, ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP strikes have been limited. This is likely due to low stockpiles and not the continued threats by President Putin to conduct another Oreshnik strike.

OSV Kursk will continue to counterattack the southwestern flank of the Sudzhalodgment, threatening an operational encirclement of Ukrainian forces and forcing a withdrawal. It is likely that OTU Siversk(?) will attempt to counterattack towards Novoivanovka. DPRK forces will almost certainly continue to be atomized at the small-unit level and integrated into larger VSRF formations to gain experience. VSRF and ZSU forces will likely continue positional engagements in the Kharkiv region; Russian forces will likely remain focused on efforts to seize Vovchansk.

Read 20 tweets

Iván Ramírez de Arellano, The Jomini of the West

@JominiW

Dec 3

1/ Southern Strategic Direction Update (Day 1013): Today's short update focuses on events in the Southern Operational Direction since November 04, 2024, and the Maritime and Aerospace theaters. The Southern Strategic Direction is now the tertiary SD of the Ukrainian Theater of Military Action (TVD). VSRF activity throughout this SD is mostly defensive and has primarily focused on the continued in-depth strengthening of the Surovikin Line.

Elements of the Operational Group of Forces East (OSV Vostok) in the Velyka Novosilka Operational Direction will prioritize offensive actions in coordination with OSV Tsentr to complete the seizure of southern Donetsk Oblast. Operational Group of Forces Dniepr(OSV Dniepr) will continue to conduct limited assaults in the Orihkiv Operational Direction and set conditions for a potential offensive to seize Orihkiv. Russian forces will maintain defense along the Dnipro River in Kherson. The ZSU will continue to rely on deep strike and SSO-U infiltration raids in coordination with Partisans to disrupt and degrade SVRF's capability and capacity to defend Zaporizhzhia and Kherson effectively. The priority of ZSU effort will remain the defense of southern Donetsk Oblast. #UkraineWar #Zaporizhzhia #VelykaNovosilka #Orikhiv #Kherson #Crimea #BlackSea #RussianAirForce

2/ Operational Terms. To help you understand the thread's graphics, here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions. (Note: I am still refining and updating this list. Please bear with me as I do. Thank you.)

3/ Velyka Novosilka Operational Direction: The failure of OSUV Tavriva's leadership to anticipate an assault on Velyka Novosilka from any direction other than the southern approaches has placed this geographic objective point in danger of falling to the Russians. Within days of the capture of Shakhtarske and Yasna Polyana, the 29th Guards Combined Arms Army executed an operational left turn to reorient on an east-west attack axes to assault Velyka Novosilka. The eastern approaches to the town were lightly defended, with only spare minefields guarding likely avenues of approach, which were quickly breached by advancing Russian forces. Supporting this attack were assaults from the south by elements of the 5th Guards Combined Arms Army on Makarivka and Novodarivka. ZSU defenses in these directions were better prepared to respond to a multi-axes SVRF advance. The Russians briefly held Makarivka in early November 2024 before ZSU counterattacks retook the settlement by the end of the month.

The 29th Guards Combined Arms Army will continue to attack north and northwest of Velyka Novosilka towards the T-0518/H15 Highway intersection. Russian forces in the Rozdolne and Noyvi Komar will expand their zone of control north and west; they are not likely to advance into the north environs of Velyka Novosilka. The 5th Guards Combined Arms Army operational priority is likely the capture of Zelene Pole and Temyrivka to cut the last line of communication into Velyka Novosilka to to facilitate the operational envelopment of OSUV Tavriva’s strategic flank in southern Donetsk Oblast, forcing a general withdrawal into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. OSUV Tavriva will continue their active defense of the Velyka Novosilka Operational Direction and seek counterattack opportunities.

Read 8 tweets

Iván Ramírez de Arellano, The Jomini of the West

@JominiW

Nov 28

1/ Ukrainian TVD Operational Update (Day 1008): The situation in the Ukrainian Theater of Military Action (TVD) remains challenging for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However, since November 5, the ZSU has managed to stabilize defensive lines in many key sectors of the Strategic Front while effectively transitioning to a delaying operation in the critical Pokrovsk-Kurakhove Operational Direction. This thread provides a general overview of events in the Northern and Donbas Strategic Directions of the Ukrainian TVD since early November. #UkraineWar #Donbas #Pokrovsk #Kupyansk #Pishchance #VelykaNovosilka #Kurakhove #ChasivYar #Siverek

2/ Operational Terms. To assist in comprehension of the thread's graphics, here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions. (Note: I am still refining and updating this list. Please bear with me as I do. Thank you.)

3/ Northern Strategic Direction: After approximately 104 days since offensive operations started in Kursk, the Biden Administration (with the governments of France and the United Kingdom closely following suit) has finally been compelled to lift restrictions on the use of long-range strike weapons (like ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP) on targets within the Russian Federation. However, the United States has not committed to President Zelensky’s request for Tomahawk cruise missiles and other long-range missile systems. Due to the limited quantity of ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP stockpiles, ZSU strikes on logistics facilities, airfields, and command posts inside the Russian Federation have been limited in scope and have had negligible effects on VSRF operations.

In the Kursk OD, VDV-led counterattacks continue to pressure ZSU defensive lines. Although there has been anecdotal reporting from Ukrainian troops in the Kursk lodgment stating they have engaged in combat with DPRK forces, there has yet to be credible footage to substantiate these claims. Russian efforts to mask the location of DPRK units by atomizing units (i.e., only deploying small units, likely company and below, within SVRF battalions) and dressing them in Russian uniforms appear successful. Obfuscating the location of DPRK units allows them to gain the necessary experience to operate as an effective independent force.

Read 15 tweets

Iván Ramírez de Arellano, The Jomini of the West

@JominiW

Nov 5

1/ Election Day in the United States is finally here. The Presidential Race between Republican Candidate, Former President Donald Trump, and Democratic Candidate, Vice President Kamala Harris, has been polarizing, to say the least, with anxiety running high for not only Americans but people around the world, on its outcome. Ukrainians likely have the highest amount of anxiety over the outcome of the U.S. Presidential Election, as the winner will almost certainly set the war on a trajectory that will either enable a Ukrainian victory or a capitulation. #UkraineWar #UkraineRussiaWar️️ #USAElection2024 #HarrisWalz2024 #TrumpVance2024 #PresidentialElections

2/ According to a Bipartisan Policy Center report, an estimated 244 million Americans are eligible to vote. The 2022 mid-term elections saw 161.42 million Americans registered to vote. However, the turnout saw roughly 75 million people vote, or 46.6% of the electorate. By comparison, approximately 158.4 million Americans voted in the 2020 Presidential Election out of 240 million eligible voters (168.3 million registered), a turnout of 66%. According to the New York Times, 78 million Americans have already cast their votes through early voting. Suppose the 2024 election cycle sees at least the same percentages of the electorate participate. In that case, at least 161.04 million people will cast ballots for the 2024 Presidential Election, with possibly roughly 48% of those votes already having been cast through early voting.

3/ Polls across the United States generally open between 0500-0600 locally, with polls closing between 1900-2000 locally. The first polls will close on the eastern seaboard of the United States at 2000 EST (0100 GMT). It will take several hours for the first returns to come in, but all eyes will be on the turnout in the 7-battleground states in this election: Georgia, North Carolina, Nevada, Arizona (though some elections models have the state leaning Republican in the final days of the Presidential Race), Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania.

Read 10 tweets

Iván Ramírez de Arellano, The Jomini of the West

@JominiW

Nov 5

1/ Ukrainian TVD Daily Tactical Update (DTU) (Day 983): Since Sept 17, the situation in the Ukrainian TVD has deteriorated for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU). As of 04 November 2024, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) retain the strategic initiative and have improved positive operational momentum in the Donbas, specifically throughout the southern Donetsk Oblast. This thread provides a general overview of events since mid-September. #UkraineWar #Donbas #Pokrovsk #Kupyansk #Pishchance #Vuhledar #Kurakhove

2/ Operational Terms. To assist in easy of comprehension of the threads graphics, here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions. (note: I am still refining and updating this list, please bear with me as I do, thank you).

3/ Northern Strategic Direction: The Northern Strategic Direction (SD) is now the TVDs secondary SD. There is remote potential for ZSU operations in this SD to shift the strategic initiative in Ukraine’s favor. Despite some tactical and operational success in Kursk, the Government of Ukraine failed to achieve its principal strategic goal, to compel the United States to lift restrictions on the use of long-range strike weapons on targets within the Russian Federation. The ZSU remains faced with the dilemma of either continuing to reinforce efforts in Kursk or transition to the defensive and shore up the operational deterioration of OSUV Tavriya’s strategic flank in southern Donetsk Oblast. The decision on where to place its operational focus during the winter of 2024-25 will impact the strategic trajectory of the war.

Read 13 tweets

Iván Ramírez de Arellano, The Jomini of the West

@JominiW

Sep 18

1/ Ukraine TVD, Day 935: As of 16 September, the VSRF retains the strategic initiative and positive operational momentum throughout the Ukrainian TVD. The ZSU continues efforts to expand the Kursk lodgment, with Russian ground forces conducting a counterattack in the Korenevo area. OGV Sever offensive actions, through reduced in scale, maintain the ability to fix a significant number of Ukrainian forces in the Kharkiv region. In the Donbas elements of the 2GCAA have slowed their advance on Pokrovsk for logistical resupply, with the 201MRD attacking through the operational flank of OSUV Tavriya south of the M30 highway. In Zaporizhzhia, elements of OSV Tsentr and Vostok have renewed offensive action in the Vuhledar area, pressing hard for Bohoiavlenka. The VKS stepped up strikes on Ukraine's energy grid while the PSU continues large drone strikes targeting fuel and energy complex facilities in the Moscow region. #UkraineRussiaWar️️ #UkraineWarNews #UkraineFrontLines #RussianArmy #UkraineNeverSurrenders #Russia

https://x.com/davidhelms570/status/1835335338203504894

2/ Current weather outlook for the Ukraine TVD. Weather will not significantly impact ongoing operations. Weather favors offensive action. Courtesy of @davidhelms570

https://x.com/davidhelms570/status/1835335338203504894

3/ Operational Terms. To assist in easy of comprehension of the threads graphics, here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions. (note: I am still refining and updating this list, please bear with me as I do, thank you).

Read 17 tweets

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