1-6 I see claims that a #visabanforrussians would prevent all types of entry into the EU, incl. for defectors.
This overlooks easy travel options to Turkey, Georgia, the UAE, and other countries that all have EU Embassies which a bona fide defector could approach.
2-6 More broadly, I believe such simplistic claims made against a ban are emotional reactions, refusals to recognise that some Russian nationals may present security risks, and a broader refusal to adapt to the reality that our continent is at war.
3-6 Commentators have argued both sides of the debate on the impact of a ban on domestic opinion within Russia. On balance, I side with those who believe that many ordinary Russians would feel chastened, such that a net positive dose of anger would hit the regime.
4-6 But even if that were not the case, other arguments continue to hold. The least questionable by far is the national security argument of limiting entry of individuals who may be either directed state agents or spontaneous, uncontrolled Russian nationalists.
5-6 We also owe it to the millions of Ukrainians who sought refuge in our nations to ensure their peace of mind and security from unacceptable fascist provocations by nationals of the aggressor state.
6-6 There are few things I can conceive of that could occur within our nations that I find more despicable, upsetting, and ultimately dangerous than confrontations between pro-Putin elements and refugees who have fled his war of annihilation.
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1-6 A further note on the #visaban issue.
The impulse leading to its discussion was demands by Allied nations who are disproportionately affected by flows of #Russian travellers circumventing the flight ban the entire Union decided together earlier this year.
2-6 The loudest opponents of a #visaban fall into two categories:
A: West. Europeans not especially affected either by transit flows of RUS travellers, nor by potential RUS threats to national security
B: RUS nationals who want to preserve as much personal freedom as possible
3-6 Now, I am a Western European.
I did not invent calls for a #visaban. I started by *listening* to the govts of fellow European nations who were reporting a problem.
Only then did I consider arguments, leaning towards understanding and supporting a need expressed by our Allies.
- responding to a first attack is a choice. Escalation is a choice.
- govts can and do lie publicly about minor attacks if they really don't want to escalate.
- if the attack is enormous that becomes impossible. But if the enemy launches an enormous attack, it wants war
2-4
- every govt knows clearly what kind of attack would definitely mean war. Shelling, bombing, striking targets with weapons of war, that's war. The scope for "misunderstandings" is massively overplayed.
3-4
1-7 Europe is in trouble not bc it is insufficiently integrated but because it refused to listen. Poland, w.r.t. Russia, is far more experienced than others. The late Lech Kaczynski, was right, but unheard.
Political practice shows that the voices of Germany and France count above all. A formal democracy but a de facto oligarchy. In addition, the strong ones make mistakes and are incapable of accepting criticism from outside.
3-7
The safety valve that protects the EU from the tyranny of the majority is the principle of unanimity.
Abolishing the unanimity rule would mean increasing the weight of Germany's view. A retrospective analysis of German decisions shows this would have made Europe worse off.
1-10
I am going to triple-down on this, because Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine reveals the moral failure of international organisations, and quite specifically of current interpretations of humanitarian and human rights principles. And there is a structure to it.
2-10
What do I mean? Well, go over to the #ICRC website - another august institution whose reputation has been severely damaged in 2022 due to its attitude to the Russia-Ukraine war.
3-10
ICRC page:
"IHL applies to the belligerent parties irrespective of the reasons for the conflict or the justness of the causes for which they are fighting... otherwise, implementing the law would be impossible, since every party would claim to be a victim of aggression."
1-8 This is the reasoning used over at @amnesty, which reveals an inadequate understanding of the concomitant IHL principle of necessity.
If Ukraine followed AI's line, it would directly help the aggressor to win, itself a crime, and thus generating yet more crimes.
2-8 RUS knows where the military bases are, where the frontline is. Nearby woods or isolated structures would leave a tell-tale logistics trail RUS would rapidly identify. So, AI's point is wrong from an IHL perspective, because necessity isn't correctly assessed.
3-8 Necessity has many practical components for a defending nation, which furthermore has an inherent legal right to commandeer its civilian resources and facilities to aid the war effort and increase the survivability of its forces so that they live to fight another day.
(2-13)
Even if Ukraine's chances of survival looked bleak on 21 January, it was a matter of both deterring *further* adventurism and of moral principle to supply it with what means of defence one could.
Meanwhile, he had a headline to his name saying it won't matter.
(3-13)
As a result, his work is instinctively disliked by many Ukrainians and friends of Ukraine.
But the stances he tends to take are also viewed negatively by many others in Central and Eastern Europe - because they seem to promote insufficient deterrence against Moscow.