Or rather, I read @stephenfry’s highly enjoyable version “Troy”
Here are a couple of points with some relevance to today’s war in #Ukraine
A short 🧵(with some classical art)
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Who is to blame for the war, and at what point did it become inevitable?
Was it the Trojan abduction of Helen, the judgement of Paris, the lottery Odysseus organised, Paris’ and Antimachus' undermining of the Greek ultimatum?...
/2
Or was it the challenge Troy presented to Agamemnon’s hegemony as “king of men”....
... or the Greek pursuit of Troy’s spoils?
In the case of Russia vs Ukraine, we also see multiple reasons being debated, some more realistic than others.
(Did someone say 'Mearsheimer'?)
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2. Allied cohesion is always, always a critical factor of success. Avoid infighting.
See the clash between Achilles and Agamemnon, which nearly led to a Greek defeat.
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3. Wars take on a dynamic of their own. They always last longer than you think. The Greeks expected to be “home by Christmas” (Ok, well, not really Christmas, but soon)
It took them 10 years
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4. Symbols matter.
See Pseudo-Achilles or Neoptolemus carrying the shield of #Achilles, which roused the Greeks and boosted morale
Compare it to #Ukraine’s fight for Snake Island or the sinking of the Moskva
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5. As the fighting endures, emotions and wishful thinking tend to challenge objective and rational decision-making.
When a stalemate ensues, small things can snowball to have a major impact.
Events that you think are side-shows may turn out to be of central importance.
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6. Technology can make a difference
See Heracles’ envenomed arrows, which we today might call #HIMARS
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7. A strong military industry is a prerequisite for success
See Hephaestus and his rapid production of Achilles’ new shield and sword, which turned the battle in favour of the Greeks
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8. No party in a conflict is immune to atrocities. But some atrocities are worse than others.
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9. Heed the warnings of those that dare speak against the established consensus.
The Trojans were hopelessly susceptible to #groupthink, and failed to take the words of #Cassandra or #Laocoon seriously.
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10. False flags, deception and trickery are a common element in all wars.
**Murmurs something about Sinon and a big horse**
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11. And finally, and perhaps most relevant to Europe today, why did Troy’s allies – like Memnon or the Amazones – show up so late?
Troy had been more or less routed by the time they appeared.
Lesson for today: support your allies, when it matters, not when it’s too late
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I'm sure there are many more lessons and parallels.
But these are some that came to mind.
And be sure to read @stephenfry's highly accessible Illiad.
/n
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We have a new Dutch 🇳🇱 coalition agreement!
Here are some highlights with an international/ EU dimension:
Defence
- Continued military, political & financial support for #Ukraine
- Legally enshrine 2% defence spending
- Support for NL & European defence industry
/1
Migration
- NL will seek opt-out for (parts of) European asylum/migration policy, and will discuss setting up mini-Schengen’s in times of crisis
- NL will work with EU members to externalise migration policy to 3rd countries
/2
Migration (cont'd)
- NL will seek limits to freedom of movement for new EU members (i.e. same thing that happened in 2004)
- Various measures to dissuade migration, including fewer international students in Bachelors programmes, except technical studies
/3
1) EU's timing was totally off, at least if it wanted a positive response frm London. Perhaps BXL's timing had more to do w VDL extending a hand to the UK at the end of her term. In any case it had little to do with political realities in London
/1
This suggests either VDL came up with the idea herself, or she was poorly advised by @PedroSerranoEU's team in London (which I don’t believe as they are highly competent)
Is there another option?
/2
@PedroSerranoEU .@anandMenon1 suggests here that the Commission wanted to pre-empt bilateral efforts by individual member-states
Plausible. Tho I haven’t heard many Europeans talk about bilateral deals with the UK on visas and youth mobility (aside from the French)
/3 theguardian.com/politics/2024/…
"As a result of the staggering implementation failures of the past six years, we have so far borne the costs of leaving the EU - the majority of which were the result of a choice by vindictive European protectionists...
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"...rather than the necessary outcome of leaving - while only enjoying a small fraction of the possible benefits."
Interesting perspective: trade barriers r blamed on 'European protectionists' instead of the logical outcome of leaving an internal market. But OK.
If the West doesn’t want to get directly involved in Ukraine, it has two options:
-Arm Ukraine
-Use economic tools of coercion (sanctions)
We are doing the first. But the second remains tricky.
Some thoughts on economic sanctions.
A thread. 🧵
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If you are serious about using sanctions as a tool, you also accept harming your own economy.
Imposing sanctions ALWAYS means striking a balance between the amount of economic pain you are willing to absorb versus the amount of economic pain you can inflict on the other.
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Examples.
Personal sanctions are relatively painless; their impact is also limited.
Prohibiting sales of luxury goods is bad for oligarchs and bad for LVMH, but probably won’t lead to a change in behaviour either.