Thread by @Volodymyr_D_

Losses of Russia in the war:
1/25 Now there is a lot of controversy about how many soldiers Russia has lost.
But in reality, there is no magic number after which war must stop
@SpencerGuard @TheStudyofWar @shashj #oryx #RussiaUkraineWar #RussianArmy

2/25 Tempos are more important. Rates of losses and rates of mobilization of reserves.
If you lose more than you can mobilize - your army is shrinking.
If mobilization exceeds losses, your army accumulates reserves.

3/25 At the beginning of the war, the Russian forces consisted of:
a) 150-190K - Regular troops of Russia
b) 30K+ - Forces of the separatist LDNR
c) 5-10K - Russian Guard
d) 1K+ - Wagner Group
businessinsider.com/russia-up-to-1…

4/25 In the first phase of the war, the Regular Forces of Russia and the Russian Guard suffered the greatest losses. In April-May, they often talked about mass desertion in the units that took part in the first phase of the war.

5/25 In total, up to 40% of soldiers who took part in the battles in the north of Ukraine and near Kharkiv resigned from the service.

6/ Russia tried to compensate for the losses by introducing into battle those units that were not initially planned to be involved in the war. In particular, contingents from Central Asia, the Pacific Ocean and the North.
Forced mobilization also began in the self-proclaimed LDNR

7/25 A few words about LDNR:
By 2014, a depressed region with a large number of bankrupt Soviet factories and mines. 30-40% of the population are Russians, mostly resettled during the USSR.

8/25 Pro-Russian politicians (Yanukovych and others) and Russian propaganda have convinced the residents of this region for years that the reason for their poverty is that Kyiv is "robbing" them. And Donbas "feeds" Ukraine.

9/25 Despite the fact that since 2014 their lives have not gotten better, Russian propaganda has convinced them that Kyiv is to blame for everything. Most pro-Ukrainian people left this territory.
That is why the mobilized LDNR became the optimal "consumable material" of the war

10/25 Starting with the battle for Donbas, LDNR forces have been conducting most of the assault operations (the assault on Mariupol, the assault on Severodonetsk, etc.).
These troops are usually poorly trained, poorly equipped, and suffer heavy casualties.

11/25 But the soldiers of the LDNR have no value for Russia, because they do not influence the electoral support of Russians.
However, the resource of men on the territory of the LDNR is running out.

12/25 In May-June, Russia apparently exhausted the reserves of its regular troops and began active mobilization of the population under the "short-term contract" system.
For most of the poor regions of Russia, this may be the only opportunity to earn 3-5 thousand dollars a month

13/25 Russia avoids a general mobilization on the territory of Russia because this would mean more frequent refusals to follow orders and contest the actions of the military leadership. Unlike the soldiers of the LDNR, Russians still have certain basic rights

14/25 Besides, most of those who support the war are not ready to fight personally.
In the case of mass mobilization, the Russian army may become poorly managed. So Putin will most likely leave this step for an emergency edition.cnn.com/2022/07/29/eur…

15/25 If we take as a basis the dynamics of losses of Russian soldiers according to Ukrainian data (after all, only these data are published systematically), then we can see a slowdown in the rate of losses in the second phase of the war.

16/25 In general, the dynamics of losses decreased by approximately 2 times. Probably, Putin is convinced that he is able to ensure the replenishment of current losses at the expense of "volunteers" and mobilization in the occupied territories and to wage this war long enough.

17/25 Tanks
Based on reports from Western officials, Russia lost approximately 1,500-1,700 tanks in 6 months.
These are the most tangible losses because, at the beginning of the war, Russia had only about 3,000 tanks in combat readiness.

18/25 Replenishment of tank losses occurs at the expense of mobilization of tanks in store. But usually, the following factors are inherent in such a technique:
- improper storage;
- theft of spare parts and use of old tanks as donors for active tanks;

19/25
- low technical condition, which requires modernization with modern protection systems, optics, and repair of the engine and control systems.
Eliminating these shortcomings takes a lot of time.

20/25 Russia mostly mobilized those tanks that require the least effort. In particular, the T-62 suffered the least from decommissioning and was much simpler than the T-72 and T-80, which forced Russia to engage them in combat.

21/25 Armoured vehicles
For AMVs, the situation is similar to the situation with tanks. But Russia has much more of this technology.
About 10,000 AMVs are still in combat. This is 4-5 times more than Ukraine has.

22/25 Russia also primarily mobilizes old, but simple AMVs, such as MT-LB, BTR-70/80, BMP-1. Which require lower costs for their repair and service.

23/25 Artillery
Russia's reserves in artillery are the largest in relation to the dynamics of losses.
Ukraine uses the tactic of destroying warehouses and logistics routes against Russian artillery. But Ukraine lacks counter-battery fighting on the entire front line.

24/25 Russia can probably maintain the supply of shells up to 20-50 thousand per day for quite a long time. And supporting at least 3,000 artillery barrels on the battlefield. The main task is to "suppress" this monster.

25/25 Conclusions:
Despite Russia's heavy losses, it seems that this is an acceptable price for Putin. He is ready to fight until the ratio of casualties and mobilized does not tip to the side of casualties.