The situation with the Ukrainian #offensive in the south remains unclear. That said, we know enough about both sides - and from the history of such operations - to propose a few areas that are likely to determine success or failure in the coming weeks. 1/23 🧵 (Art: Rado Javor)
2/ The political dimensions of this offensive are as important as the military ones. For Zelensky, it is key to his meeting his promise to take back the south but it is also an area that is of great economic importance to #Ukraine.
3/ For Putin, after the failures of #Kyiv and Kharkiv, losing the south would be a significant blow (but probably not fatal to his regime).
4/ The status of #Crimea would certainly seem to be in play, if not in this phase of the Ukrainian offensive then perhaps subsequently. That would pose a major problem to the Russians, given their infrastructure and bases there.
5/ Key issues to watch - #Ukraine. What might be the Ukrainian objectives for this southern offensive? Is it just the land to the west of the Dniepr river, all of the the south, or something in between? And, are seeing the main effort or a supporting effort for something else?
6/ This will determine sequencing for attacks as well as priorities of allocation for the range of support mechanisms required in their advance, such as logistics, fires, comms, engineers, info,ops, etc.
7/ Are the Ukrainian objectives related primarily to territory or to the enemy? Is their principle aim to take back ground, or is it to capture/destroy a large part of the Russian forces in the south? These are subtly different, and determine tactics, risk, etc
8/ The ground also plays an important role, and control measures such as operational phase lines and limits of exploitation are influenced by it. For example, the Dniepr may be a phase line for operation. Perhaps the Ukrainians might have to cross it - and that will be hard.
9/ The amount of equipment and munitions the Ukrainians have stockpiled for this offensive will determine how long it can be sustained. Likewise, the quantity and location of reinforcements and reserves will be important.
10/ I have no privileged insights into the above. But from my campaign planning experience, these are some of the things that will influence the success or otherwise of this southern campaign. The Russians will be thinking about these issues as well.
11/ The Russians. What will influence Russian success or failure? First, how have they laid down their overall defensive scheme of maneuver? Are they defending forward or back, and what are the capabilities of their dedicated and situational reserve forces?
12/ These reserves (and their locations) will determine how well the Russians can undertake counter attacks, or conduct counter penetration activities to seal off where the Ukrainian break into or through Russian defence.
13/ Their C2 - both the human and comms aspects - will be vital. Do they have assured secure comms to coordinate their defence? What level of decision making has the senior Russian commander delegated to more junior commanders?
14/ Importantly, how much flexibility does the senior Russian commander have to make tactical realignments and conduct withdrawals? Has the Kremlin dictated that they defend at all costs or not?
15/ How will the Russians be able to support the defensive fight with tactical fires, EW, engineers, attack aviation, long range strike and logistics? This will impact on the sustainability of their defence over the coming weeks.
16/ Other issues for the Russians: Will they fight street by street for Kherson, or withdraw to preserve their combat forces? And what is the impact of Ukrainian resistance activities behind the lines on Russian resupply, deployment of reserves and morale?
17/ The Ukrainian efforts to ‘isolate’ the battlefield by cutting bridges and destroying C2 hubs in recent weeks will have an impact on sustainability of the Russian defence, as well as their tactical cohesion and morale. kyivpost.com/article/opinio…
18/ Ultimately, now the fight is underway, this is a battle of wills between opposing commanders who will seek to deceive and out think their opposite numbers. They will each seek to destroy communications and corrode the others ability to command and control.
19/ It is also a battle of logistics, to keep up supplies and reinforcements, and an information battle to fight for - and with - relevant battlefield information. It is also a battle to preserve essential friendly information while also informing the world of events.
20/ Most importantly this will be a campaign featuring hundreds of close combat engagements on the ground (with some also in the air ). This combat - brutal, bloody yet necessary - is the purest expression of will during war.
21/ In this clash of wills, the understanding of purpose is one of the most important differences between combatants. It is unclear if Russian commanders & soldiers know what they fight for. The Ukrainians have a clear understanding of why they fight.
22/ There is much we do not know. But the campaign has important operational, strategic & political implications. And in the weeks ahead, many brave Ukrainians will give their last full measure of devotion in service of their nation. End.
It is impossible for a #military institution to anticipate every eventuality in war. There are too many scenarios to accurately predict pre-war and wartime events. Adaptation is vital, and we have seen it throughout the war in #Ukraine. 1/25 🧵
2/ Because of this, a key virtue for military organizations in war must be a learning culture and an adaptability to unexpected events, as described in my recent @EngelsbergIdeas article. engelsbergideas.com/essays/how-ukr…
3/ The exploration of adaptation has resulted in the development of concepts that underpin understanding of how adaptation occurs and how it can be applied. In military literature, the best-known adaptive cycle is Colonel John Boyd’s OODA (observe-orient-decide-act) loop.
Today there are reports of a series of Ukrainian attacks across the south. Much remains uncertain, particularly whether this might be a larger counteroffensive. While things gain clarity, here is my recent thread on considerations for a Ukrainian southern campaign. 1/5 🧵
2/ If this is a Ukrainian counter offensive, we should expect to see very tough and brutal close combat in the coming days.
3/ We will watch with interest the Russian reactions. How they will synchronise their tactical and operational responses will be worth watching closely.
The 24th of August is the day Ukrainians celebrate their independence. It commemorates the re-establishment of Ukraine’s independence in 1991 in the wake of the breakdown of the Soviet Union. 1/20 (Pic: @DefenceU)
2/ This 31st anniversary of Ukrainian independence marks another milestone. It will be six months since the beginning of the 24 February Russian invasion. There is much that western governments and military institutions can learn from the past six months. smh.com.au/world/europe/s…
3/ The most important observation is that there are still those who believe war is the best way to get what they want. This is an old idea, as ancient as human societies. There are always those who want what others have. So too it goes with nations & their leaders.
The war in Ukraine has almost reached the 6-month mark. It has been a mix of the old & new. Old influences such as uncertainty, surprise, close combat & the impact of leadership have been clear. But so have new aspects. One of these is the expanded impact of social media. 1/25 🧵
2/ 21st century technologies have not only enhanced military lethality at greater distance, but they also now provide new means to inform, as well as target & influence populations in a way that has not been possible before.
3/ Social media is particularly influential. It has the capacity for influencing perceptions of humans that is historically unprecedented, particularly when compared to other means of communication. It is more viral; users are more mobile and more likely to share content.
The Ukrainian attack on Russian bases in Crimea in the past week has brought attention back to a war which many in the west have largely lost sight of. In this thread, an examination of the prospects for a Ukrainian victory. 1/18 🧵
2/ An important caveat - predicting outcomes in war is impossible. But, nations can do certain things that give them a better chance of success. The aim of this thread is to explore five foundational requirements for Ukraine to win this war. smh.com.au/world/europe/u…
3/ First, Western political support has been a crucial element of Ukraine’s defence. While remaining short of ‘boots on the ground’, Western support underpins the flow of weapons into the nation, and an international coalition overseeing a regime of economic sanctions.
It nearly 6 months since the Russian invasion of #Ukraine began. Today, I explore Ukraine’s potential counteroffensive in the south, and the considerations for planning and conducting such a large-scale campaign. 1/25 🧵
2/ First, a little history. In 2002-3 I attended the @USMC School of Advanced Warfighting. Its focus was campaigning and campaign design. We used history to foster these skills, including designing a campaign to successfully invade Russia in 1812 with Napoleon! @MarineCorpsU
3/ So campaign design is something that I really enjoy studying, and I have done a bit of it for real overseas as well. Why does this matter? Well, I use my experience, my schooling and my studies over two decades when I look at the Russian and Ukrainian campaigns in this war.