1/ A short thread: New report by Michael Staack @HSUHamburg and me on "China's role in multilateral arms control" published by @FESonline. pdf here is.gd/5xBp7g
2/ We ask on what arms control, disarmament and nonproliferaton issues engagement with China makes sense from German and EU perspective. Argue China’s involvement in multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements to limit military capacities is a value in and of itself.
3/ Report takes broad approach, looking beyond nuclear arms control. Assumes no longer possible to relegate China to the status of second-rate military power. Chinese involvement is crucial for preservation and further development of global #armscontrol architecture.
4/ Germany should take note of principles that guide Chinese arms control policies, in particular its efforts to attain strategic equality and its scepticism toward intrusive and governance approaches.
5/ Engagement should take as starting points topics in which China’s understanding of its role in arms control is still ambivalent: e.g. interest in non-proliferation vs. geopolitical power claims/economic interests; role of nuclear weapon state vs. rhetoric as non-aligned state.
6/ From this perspective regional confidence-building, verification, implementation of positive arms control commitments, nuclear risk reduction may be useful issues to begin engagement, which should be characterised by specificity, flexibility and willingness to engage.
2/ Wir fragen am Beispiel von Russlands Verletzungen des #Chemiewaffenübereinkommen: Wie soll internationale Gemeinschaft mit Staaten umgehen, die Verträge verletzen und gezielt Sand in Getriebe multilateraler Institutionen wie der @OPCW streuen?
3/ Ausgangspunkt: Stärke internationalen Norm wird in erster Linie durch Maß bestimmt, in dem sie befolgt wird. Es kommt aber auch auf Reaktion der Weltgemeinschaft an, wie @NDeitelhoff und Lisbeth Zimmermann argumentieren is.gd/jOxIwC
1/ AEOI President Eslami and @iaeaorg DG @rafaelmgrossi have agreed joint statement which outlines process for possible resolution safeguards issues. iaea.org/node/102067
2/ @rafaelmgrossi "will aim to report his conclusion [on safeguards] by the June 2022 Board of Governors." Says process is "losely related" to possible agreement on #JCPOA reinstatement. Seems like this agreement will be major part of final puzzle to be solved.
3/ At press conference, @rafaelmgrossi says IAEA will no longer pursue investigation of uranium metal disc, 1 of 4 open issues. Says nothing more can be done to resolve this issue, hints at material being in different form (melted down, in inventory).
1/ Nuclear blackmail failing? Russia's nuclear weapons influence Western thinking on intervention. Putin's nuclear threats increase nuclear risks. But Russia's nuclear signalling so far appears to not have changed Western policy. Short thread on nuclear coercion & Ukraine:
2/ Two explicit nuclear threats in first 4 days of war: In Feb. 24 declaration of war speech Putin warned those "who may be tempted to interfere in developments from outside" that "consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history." is.gd/hDIKCm
3/ No detectable policy changes in West, at least none that Putin might have hoped for. Virtual @NATO summit does not explicitly mention nukes, describes its own measures as "non-escalatory". If anything, closing of ranks in light of wild nuclear threats. is.gd/rY6C8m
1/ @NATO SecGen @jensstoltenberg describes content of letter to Russia with "proposals, ideas, topics" where allies agree "it is possible to make progress" including on "risk reduction, transparency, and #armscontrol". Short attempt to unpack: is.gd/Nmj0if
2/ NATO usefully suggests "mutual briefings on exercises and nuclear policies in the NATO-Russia Council". Lots of experience to build on, see for example 2014 @SWPBerlin papers by @KatarzynaKubiak (tinyurl.com/y8zdn8gg) and Max Mutschler here tinyurl.com/yce7yrw9 (.pdf)
1/ Crunch time on @NATO nuclear sharing discussions in talks on new German government. Short thread on debate, picking up couple of contentious points in this interesting but one-sided @derspiegel analysis: tinyurl.com/yeabnsxk
2/ Terms of debate have recently shifted because @usairforce has announced end of production of F18
3/ A need to reassess: F18 was preferred option of outgoing Defense Minister @akk German Ministry @BMVg_Bundeswehr to replace nuclear-capable Tornado. Airforce liked electronic warfighting capabilities of F18 Growler.
1/ German debate on @NATO nuclear sharing is picking up speed: Rolf Mützenich, chairman of coalition partner Social Democrats @spdbt in Parliament in @Tagesspiegel interview tomorrow apparntly calls for future end of #nuclearweapons deployments in Germany is.gd/EFCfLb
2/ Mützenich argues that other @NATO allies participate in nuclear sharing even though they have renounced option to host US nuclear weapons. (To be precise: 21 of 30 NATO allies participate in Nuclear Planning Group even though their territory is free of #nuclearweapons.)
3/ Also points to unilateralism of US administration and argues "Does any believe that @realDonaldTrump would stop planning for #nuclearweapons use just because we are able to transport a few warheads?"