#Moldova_Russia: It is something that not many are willing to admit, but the Moldovan government is blackmailing Russia to ensure its political survival and lower the pressure from Moscow. I have raised this point several times and I will briefly explain it again (long THREAD:
1) Last year the govt signed an agreement with Russia, which was recently praised again by President Sandu for the good price formula (in short: the price of gas prevails in summer and global oil price in winter); 2) The Moldovan govt is unwilling to implement ⤵️
last year's agreements with Gazprom and requests further delays in the audit of the gas supplier controlled by Russia (50% - MoldovaGaz). The audit is essential to solve the problem of the debt of $700 million that Russia demands from Moldova and had to be done before May;⤵️
3) Despite criticism from the Moldovan govt, the gas price paid by Moldova corresponds to the agreement signed by the same government last year. Using the anti-Russian card is useful for the govt because the EU can justify⤵️
its aid to Moldova (which is valuable but still insufficient: less than 150 million euros in 2021-22, when Moldova paid around 30 million dollars for August; 4) The govt is trying to buy time regarding the audit and put the Russians in a difficult position.⤵️
If Moscow decides to cancel the contracts citing non-compliance by Moldova, gas cuts should follow. But that would also mean that the Transnistrian region will be in danger because it depends on Russian gas for economic activity; 5) The Moldovan govt is confident that ⤵️
its Plan B will work. It included the purchase of gas from Romania but at prices (European spot market) that are almost double the price that Russia now offers to Moldova; 6) The Moldovan govt openly says that Transnistria will have to pay the market price like the rest of⤵️
Moldova, if the gas is no longer obtained from Russia. The Russians tried to create a separate company to supply gas to Transnistria independently, but failed; 7) Now, Russia is in a dilemma: if it cut the gas flows to Moldova because⤵️
it does not fulfill the contract (which would provoke protests for the benefit of the pro-Russian and anti-government forces alike), it will expose Transnistria to an “economic”. winter) that can end with the collapse of the separatist regime.⤵️
Moldova is also taking a risk because it buys 80% of its energy from Transnistria and this energy is produced with Russian gas. So the Moldovan govt (Sandu-PAS) bets in a risky way and the stakes are high for all sides. END
I explained the context around the 2021 contract with Gazprom in this piece👇
Moldova's confidence to push Russia back could also lie in this year's integration of the country into ENTSO-E (European network), along with Ukraine. That could secure power for a short time in the event of a sudden shortage due to supply disruptions from Transnistria.
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#Armenia: Apparently the CSTO still exists. Putin pushed the organization to show signs of life and do something about Armenia during today’s extraordinary meeting of the CSTO Council. These are the main steps that I have been able to detect so far: ⤵️
1) The CSTO wants to send a “mission” to assess the circumstances on the ground in Armenia. 2) Perhaps Russia does not fully trust the Yerevan accounts (which Baku called provocations), perhaps the mission will be deployed in Armenia exactly as a deterrent against Azerbaijan. ⤵️
It will be seen shortly whether the Azeri attacks in the direction of Armenia will stop after that. 3) The findings of the “mission” will be included in a report to be presented at the CSTO session organized in Yerevan. 4) Another step by Russia to keep the CSTO visible in ⤵️
#Russia_VisaBan: As of today, the facilitated visa regime is gone, Russian tourists are subject to a more onerous, complicated and longer process and higher prices to get legally to the EU. Money is not a big problem for Russians (80 euros instead of 35 euros).⤵️
The most problematic change is the EU's request to tighten and lengthen application verification procedures and reject any minimally suspicious applicants (probably more problematic for the FSB). The data processing will extend to weeks and even more than a month.⤵️
Visa applications for students, dissidents, media, relatives of EU citizens, etc. will remain a priority, the rest will be treated as low priority. Member States may individually refuse to issue visas or limit their effect to a single country. ⤵️
#Ukraine: The exchange of strategic information between the Ukrainian and American militaries has been instrumental in the recent successes of the counteroffensive in the occupied regions of the Northeast. This has been reported by NYT. The Russians were taken by surprise and⤵️
had to withdraw to reorganize right in the middle of the local elections in Russia (which didn’t affects the results of elections). Seemingly, the yesterday’s attacks on critical infrastructure by the Russians were done to slow down the movement of Ukrainian forces.⤵️
This shows why the protection of critical infrastructure with anti-missile systems is of the utmost importance in the course of the counteroffensive. In addition, the West should increase the capabilities of civilian crisis management institutions in Ukraine (the fire brigades).
#Russia: The population voted mainly for 3 parties during the local elections. Putin's United Russia “won” everywhere (like in any typical autocratic regime), being followed by either the communists or the far-right liberals. Even more than before, the suspicion of rigged⤵️
elections is very high. Such results allow Putin to carve out and maintain a comfortable degree of public legitimacy for carrying out his militaristic policy abroad and, in particular, his aggression against Ukraine. Non-systemic opposition is silenced and marginalized.⤵️
With that in mind, Putin can do whatever he wants. The only actors that can hold him accountable are Western IOs and governments through sanctions. These should be extended and better enforced.
#EU_Gas: Germany is prepared to sign long-term gas contracts to import LNG from the US and others (Middle East). Bulgaria agreed to buy 1 billion m3 from Azerbaijan through the interconnection with Greece, functional since October, with a future increase in imports via⤵️
the Southern Corridor. EU governments and companies are diversifying their gas imports away from Russia. In the short term, this helps ensure the certainty of security of supply. However, it is premature to say that EU countries will no longer buy Russian gas.⤵️
In the post-war time, Gazprom's offer can always drive down prices on the European spot market. Industries are looking for a competitive advantage and may be eager to return to old business as usual.⤵️
#Russia_VisaBan: Finland suggests a new mechanism that would slow down the issuance of tourist visas to Russian citizens. The idea would be to apply for the tourist visa only on Monday and from Tuesday to Friday all other types of visa (related to family, study etc.).⤵️
On the other hand, Denmark supports Estonia and Lithuania in applying a (indiscriminate) visa ban on Russian citizens. However, the Danish side is of the opinion that such a measure makes sense if applied throughout the Schengen area.⤵️
If the ban is not in effect in all 26 Schengen states, Russian citizens can circumvent the visa ban by traveling by land, rail, or sea from one country to another on a Schengen visa issued by non-ban supporters (such as Hungary). etc.).⤵️