Thread by @jwuthnow

#Xi Jinping commands the PLA, but who advises him on military matters? What kinds of officers sit atop the pyramid? How do their careers unfold? What leadership challenges would they face in a war? I address in a new @NDU_EDU monograph
ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/New…
Thread 1/11

Immediate relevance is the upcoming 20th Party Congress, which will select a new Central Military Commission. Picks will indicate types of expertise Xi values. But new CMC will be drawn from a larger pool of senior leaders. This project characterizes that pool.
2/11

Research assessed biographies of ~300 of China’s top military officers in two batches – 2015 and 2021 – giving a sense of continuity and change before and after Xi’s military reforms. For context, see an earlier work in this series
inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Art…
3/11

The PLA’s senior military leadership has shrunk by more than 10% since 2015 with fewer billets available. In a bid towards #jointness, the ground force’s dominance of senior ranks has diminished – but the army still holds the #1 position by a fairly wide margin.
4/11

The PLA leadership remains homogenous – entirely male and almost entirely (99%) Han Chinese. One must slowly climb the ladder over 40+ years; very few fast burners. Thus #Xi did not look to a younger generation of officers to fill key leadership. The Old Guard remains.
5/11

PLA careers are service-centric and stove-piped. Joint experience is extremely limited – no de facto copying of US Goldwater-Nichols joint qualification system. Success is within one’s service. Careers are also narrow – operational cdrs rarely have logistics tours, etc.
6/11

Officers atop the pyramid come from all the theaters and all the group armies. There is no particular “cradle of generals” in the PLA. Overlapping with Xi career not esp strong predictor. Xi seems to want diverse perspectives & keeps faith with institutional interests.
7/11

The most senior 20 or so PLA officers concurrently hold important CCP positions. But at the next level down rates of officers in the Central Committee or Party Congresses are much lower. Success means loyalty to the party & Xi but not necessarily active political roles.
8/11

Implications for #China’s military effectiveness aren’t great. #China isn’t making use of total talent. Senior cdrs w/o joint perspectives + broad expertise will find it hard to lead a Joint Force. Failures of Russian leadership in Ukraine spring to mind as a parallel.
9/11

Some change is likely in future cohorts – different generational experiences, more technical literacy, more exposure to joint training. But PLA is likely to remain a conservative institution that provides narrow opportunities and spends much time on political work.
10/11

In a strategic competition w/ China, US thus has opportunities to retain “intellectual overmatch” but must continue necessary reforms to PME and talent management, build jointness at all stages of careers, and encourage diversity in leadership.
jcs.mil/Portals/36/Doc…
11/11