Thread by @GresselGustav

1/ Dear journalists, I am travelling 4 @ecfr this week. I can't give individual interviews, so here is a 🧵 on what I think about #mobilisation & #nuclearweapons threats.

2/ Mobilisation was rumored for some time, and it is the bigger news. 🇷🇺 occupation forces had issues finding enough personnel for months. Now a lot of contracts from authumn 2021 expire, in November, a lot of 6 month contracts would have expired.

3/ Now would be the time to approach conscripts from last year's authumn draft. They are fully trained, end of service.
However, the #charkiv counter-offensive came right in time to disturb that. Who will join an army that is loosing?
Recruting inmates & others does not ...

4/ ... provide soldiers in sufficient numbers. If things would have continued the way they were, 🇷🇺 would have lost the war over the winter.
The mobilisation decree kremlin.ru/events/preside… first and foremost stopped people leaving by indefinitely prolonging their contracts.

5/ As @KofmanMichael notes this still does not solve morale & training issues:

https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1572573086490464256?s=20&t=vU_B6rlHCZtyht2jYD0Thg

Most armies that rely on mobilisation, have dedicated reserve force structures: reserve battalions, brigades, TD forces, whatever. Russia does not.

6/ Reservists are drafted into regular formations, where they fill up the ranks. In Soviet times, skeleton divisions should comprise of mostly reservists, but these formations were disbanded.
Of course 🇷🇺 could fill up existing formations, who's contract soldiers were sent to 🇺🇦

7/ But these formations are there to train conscripts. If you sent their officers and materiel to war, you degrade your ability to train future forces and sustain the war effort.
If you form new formations from mobilised personnel, that takes time.

8/ First there is a lack of officers and specialists. The pool of these people is not indefinite. Stop-gap improvisation creates forces inferior in quality.
The same goes to tactical training. You need to create a cohesive fighting force, otherwise they'll bleed.

9/ 🇺🇦 made that experience in April/May, prematurely sending new TD forces to the front.
Now, 🇺🇦 armed forces are 700000 men strong, of which roughly 400000 are on the front, the others rotate or are in support functuion.
🇺🇦 gets training assistance from 🇬🇧🇺🇸🇵🇱

10/ Moscow may stabilise the front, but not turn back the tide of war.
What 🇺🇦 needs right now is more havy equipment: tanks, armoured transport, artillery, air defence. Russia still enjoys materiel superiority.

11/ Moscow has consistently ignored offers and calls to negotiate, choosing to fight. Now it needs to pay the price for this.

12/ Oh, yes, nukes. Nuclear blackmail was part of it from day one. ecfr.eu/article/shadow…
But they are primarily meant to intimidate and scare. It prioduced little results. And I hope it will contunie not to impress.

13/ The other thing is what real options they have. A single employment will not change the course of the war. Employing a dozend will, but this would come as a much higher price for Russia.
So I don't think it is a real option for now. Only if the army collapses in rapid order..

14/ ... he could use one to re-impose him as supreme commander. I think it is more likely in an inward-looking contingency, than in the war itself.