π§¨π§¨Part III of the soon-to-end thread: Why is adaptation more than risk management & climate proofing? Why are measuring approaches such as indicators not going to capture progress?
TLDR: What is implemented as 'adaptation' is not going to help people adapt to cc.
Part II ended βΆοΈ vulnerability was not the focus of most adaptation projects by the mid/late 2000s. Karen @cCHANGE_OBrien et al's paper on Contextual vs Outcome Vulnerability helped demonstrate the consequences of these different views on vulnerability 2/ tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108β¦
Scholars addressed the idea of sustainable adaptation in a Special Issue in @ClimDevJournal in 2011, including in the seminal paper by @sirieriksen7 et al 'When not every response to climate change is a good one' 3/ doi.org/10.3763/cdev.2β¦
Now also the work on #maladaptation was beginning to emerge. More on maladaptation is in the thread below. It felt like it was desperate to get some clarity on how adaptation projects were leading to maladaptation 4/
So - as Atteridge and Remling asked in 2017 - is adaptation reducing vulnerability or redistributing it? doi.org/10.1002/wcc.500. This question is key. What are the donor practices that appear to be influencing this process? Some scholars point to the funding architecture asποΈ 5/
SO: we have ended up with projects that only scantily address the real needs; they don't go far enough in incorporating power & equity & justice questions; don't touch on complex socio-cultural structures, eg gender norms; and all this to avoid being labelled development. 7/
There is no question that risk management strategies such as early warning, flood protection, etc are important for immediately saving lives. But when we are faced with a development deficit that is closely linked to the adaptation deficit, we need to ask: where do we start? 8/
IN SUM: In discussions about Pakistan floods, the most pressing question is *NOT* 'who is responsible/who should pay??' but *WHAT* should be funded (there is no doubt that many are to blame for the floods, and they should pay). Is it climate response or development? 9/and FIN. π€
@LeaBerrang you have two profiles so I tagged the wrong one (?)
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π’PART II: Why is adaptation more than risk management & climate proofing? Why are measuring approaches such as indicators not going to capture progress?
A 𧡠on adaptation and development, in several instalments (bare with me).
We left Part I at *additionality*. One 1st policy milestone for adaptation came with the 2001 LDC Fund, which covered the costs of writing a National Adaptation Programme of Action. While some of these NAPAs were country-driven many were an outcome of parachute consultancies 2/
Consequently, the negotiation of which kinds of activities would be listed in the NAPAs was not necessarily embedded in vulnerability contexts nor what local people even wanted. B/c these were LDCs, the chance that the activities were essentially development was high. 3/
Why is adaptation more than risk management and climate proofing? Why are measuring approaches such as indicators not going to capture progress?
A 𧡠on adaptation and development over the years, digging deep back to the 1990s through to current scholarship. (Part I for now)
Adaptation has been described as the black sheep of climate policy, because people thought that talking about adaptation was tantamount to admitting that climate change was really occurring, said Sarewitz & Pielke (2000) & Burton (1994). For background undark.org/2022/08/12/the⦠2/
But there is more to it. Adaptation is not necessarily an equivalent to mitigation because adaptation is far more than just addressing climate change impacts. It goes beyond what most climate decision makers are tasked with, and isn't therefore just a policy objective. 3/
Have you watched this? Allan Lavell and Andrew Maskrey - megaheavies in #DRR talking about the history of thinking on risk and vulnerability, interviewed by Bruno Haghebaert ...
'Disasters as the epitome of failed development' says Allan. And of course it's this perspective that has inspired so many of us working on social vulnerability. Climate change impacts are also the epitome of failed development. So why do we even continue with BAU??
What does gender equity have to do with climate change? A lot - according to science. It sits within the larger issue of #climatejustice.
A brief thread on Gender in the #IPCC#WGII and #WGIII reports. TL;DR: Discourse has shifted from women as victims to agents of change. π§΅π§΅
Let's start with the #WGII key message. Emphasis on 'for all' mine - but this is key. Climate action must be for everyone/ especially the most marginalised, like women often are. 'For all' comes from #SDGs in case you missed it.
AR6 is different from previous reports - it centres around equity and justice. It identifies LOTS of adaptation strategies around the world, but notes that many of these are not effective. BUT: Adaptation solutions that are effective and feasible conform to principles of justice.
I've been asked by many journalists about the concept of #maladaptation in the new #WGII#IPCC report out last week. Since this is a topic that I have been working on for a while, here comes a brief thread with a bit of history and some resources for further insights π§΅ππΌ
Unlike some claims, maladaptation is not a 'new' concept for the #IPCC. In fact, in my 2004 PhD I cite #WGII's Third Assessment Report - chapter 20 by Smit et al is the place to go for that background. Bob Kates and Tony Oliver-Smith are others who have written on #maladaptation
Maladaptation in its most basic form refers to when adaptation strategies go wrong ('mal'). This means that people become more sensitive or exposed to climate change such as closing off opportunities for income-generation or creating new hazards. ++ examples below, 1st readingππΌ
'Where are the numbers in the new #IPCC#WGII report??'
Irate journalists demanded to know at a press briefing with some IPCC authors over the weekend. A brief thread on why this IPCC report may contain the most (and most robust) qualitative social science knowledge yet.
We drew on established arguments, for example by Castree et al (2014) that previous efforts to consolidate climate change knowledge 'reveal a limited conception of social science and virtually ignore the humanities'. nature.com/articles/nclimβ¦