How prepared is #China to respond to a domestic emergency? What is the role of the People’s Armed Police? How in control of the internal security forces is #Xi Jinping? I address in a new @chinaquarterly article
In 2018, the PAP (China’s primary internal security force) was moved fully into the military chain of command under Xi, reducing ability of local officials to mobilize PAP during emergencies. For overview, see an earlier @NDU_EDU publication
Dilemma was that localities still need PAP capabilities to respond to national disasters and large scale unrest. Updated PAP Law contained a loophole for PAP to “report while acting” – mobilizing before full approval process has completed
3/8
In practice, localities have updated emergency response plans for general and specific contingencies that demonstrate that PAP is still regarded as an integral of the local emergency response system and clarify mechanism through which coordination should take place.
4/8
There is also variance across localities. Some municipalities, such as Shanghai, have more elaborate procedures and policies for using PAP than other places. Greater pre-planning and coordination could smooth friction during mobilization process.
5/8
Even in well-run localities, however, officials could be wary of higher level scrutiny. Using PAP means that local system was inadequate. Speculatively, this could produce more cautious decisions to use PAP, especially in localized incidents where center isn’t yet engaged.
6/8
To centralize power over internal security forces, Xi and his colleagues thus took a calculated risk that the emergency response system could be less effective. They tried to square the circle with a new PAP Law but this could prove inadequate depending on local variables.
7/8
Research also found a useful vein of #Chinese open sources – emergency response plans – that are by necessity public and yield much insight into the ways that localities (and national authorities) prepare for a range of contingencies. Further use is recommended.
8/8
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#Xi Jinping commands the PLA, but who advises him on military matters? What kinds of officers sit atop the pyramid? How do their careers unfold? What leadership challenges would they face in a war? I address in a new @NDU_EDU monograph ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/New…
Thread 1/11
Immediate relevance is the upcoming 20th Party Congress, which will select a new Central Military Commission. Picks will indicate types of expertise Xi values. But new CMC will be drawn from a larger pool of senior leaders. This project characterizes that pool.
2/11
Research assessed biographies of ~300 of China’s top military officers in two batches – 2015 and 2021 – giving a sense of continuity and change before and after Xi’s military reforms. For context, see an earlier work in this series inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Art…
3/11
First, a note of caution. Analysts need to make assumptions about how PLA learning happens. There’s uncertainty about the process and how lessons translate into actions. New post-20th Party Congress CMC could think differently. (2/10)
Most “lessons” from the opening stages of Russia’s campaign discussed in US circles aren’t new or decisive. PLA has been thinking through joint ops, nuclear signaling, logistics upgrades, information dominance, decapitation strikes, etc. for many years. (3/10)
What is #China’s military strategy for Taiwan? What problems are the #PLA still facing? What can #Taiwan do?
Just as another CODEL visits Taipei, @ndu_press releases “Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan”
Short thread (1/16) ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Doc…
The book is the latest product of an annual conference on the PLA sponsored by @RANDCorporation, @NDU_EDU, and Taiwan’s Council on Advanced Policy Studies. Contributors are top PLA scholars from the U.S, Taiwan, and Europe (2/16)
Overall, contributors saw an increasingly dangerous situation in the strait – as we’ve all observed since Speaker Pelosi’s visit – but also lingering PLA weaknesses and options for improving Taiwan’s defenses. (3/16)
How has #China’s military strategy changed under #Xi Jinping? In a new @jststs article, @fravel and I take a look at the latest (ca. 2019) military strategic guidelines. Short thread. 1/8 tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
The MSGs provide answers to key strategy questions and were updated nine times between 1949 and 2014. For a comprehensive analysis, see Taylor’s 2019 @PrincetonUPress book 2/8 press.princeton.edu/books/hardcove…
We look at the 10th strategy, announced in early 2019. This is the 2nd issued under Xi. Based on PLA sources, we found consistency with the previous (2014) iteration. PLA still focused on ’informatized local wars’, ‘integrated joint ops’, and Taiwan/US as main opponents. 3/8
Drawing inspiration from British SOF in the Falklands, other campaigns, PLA theorists see 3 roles for SOF in Taiwan: recon/targeting, strikes/raids (incl. political targets), and info ops. SOF is integral to the basic command structure for the island landing, not distinct. (2/6)
Most PLA (and PAP) SOF resembles US Army Rangers but there are a few units more like Delta Force or the SEALs, which delegate more authority to the team commander. PLA SOF is investing in advanced equipment useful for clandestine maritime missions. (3/6)
In August 2020, the PLA released an updated version of its core strategy textbook for senior officers – the Science of Military Strategy. What’s new in this book? I took a look and offer some findings in @CHinaBriefJT
Compared to the last (2017) version, the book has some new content. It has an interesting new section on “wartime political work” that underscores the importance of defensive psychological operations – PLA troops need to be loyal. (2/7)
There is also a greater focus on “intelligentization” – a concept of fighting with cutting edge equipment such as AI, quantum, and hypersonics. (3/7)