#Armenia_EU: The EU does not want to side with Armenia or Azerbaijan, but Baku interprets this as permission to act purely in accordance with its national interests. The latter seems to be linked to forcing Armenia to make concessions in the discussions on the peace agreement⤵️
and the delimitation and demarcation of borders. Pashinyan has announced that he is ready to recognize the Soviet borders of Azerbaijan, taking all the political risks (including understanding that his physical security could be endangered too). A solution can be made to⤵️
ensure security in Nagorno Karabakh (where Russian’s are staying for at least 3 years) to restore the integrity of Azerbaijan. Here everything becomes clear, and if so, why does Baku need to attack targets inside Armenia? To deter such things from occurring and because CSTO is⤵️
negligent about Armenia’s requests, it is essential to see how an EU monitoring mission (similar to the one in Georgia) could be deployed on the border with Azerbaijan. Aliyev will not allow to shoot the EU (to which he wants to link an energy dependence on Azeri gas).⤵️
An EU mission can be agreed upon through a political decision like the EUBAM in Moldova and Ukraine. Armenia (@NikolPashinyan, @MFAofArmenia) should insist on this through political dialogue under the CEPA agreement.⤵️
Before Armenia makes the political decision to leave the CSTO (the public is already preparing the soil for such a strategic tough decision), it has to find a minimum replacement. More urgently, it has to diversify the external providers of security guarantees.
The EU should start doing something instead of comforting Azerbaijan with a manifestation of "neutrality" when it comes to ongoing military hostilities against Armenia. @JosepBorrellF@vonderleyen
#Russia: Two friends of Putin, Serbian President Vucic and Turkish President Erdogan, separately reiterated their intention to take care of their countries' relations with Russia. The former promised to resist the pressure that would be brought to bear on Serbia to align with⤵️
sanctions on Russia. Vucic is less combative than a few months ago, when he indirectly accused the EU of undermining Serbia's sovereignty in this matter. The second openly speaks of seeking, together with the Russians, alternatives that can replace the “Mir” payment cards,⤵️
which two major Turkish banks have already excluded from their operations for fear of US secondary sanctions. Erdogan’s comments may mean that Turkey is discussing about the benefits of joining the Russian Alternative to Swift (SPFS), without indicating whether the govt is⤵️
#Ukraine: While Putin distracted everyone at home and in the West with partial mobilization, the Russian occupation forces are today holding pseudo-referendums in the Russian-captured parts of Kherson, Zaporozhya, Donetsk and Luhansk. The outcome of these bogus plebiscites⤵️
will benefit Russia's plans to annex most of Ukraine's access to the Black Sea. After these illegalities are approved by the Russian Parliament and Putin, between 300k and 1 million newly mobilized Russians will be deployed to protect Russia's “new” territories (Ukrainian⤵️
occupied parts). Aside from the non-recognition policy in the West, 3 things must be on the table for the EU & the G7: 1) an active diplomacy in the Global South to counter the Russian propaganda; 2) more sanctions (package 8); 3) intensify military & economic aid to Ukraine.
#EU_Gas: The Azeri Ministry of Energy, Shahbazov, announced that his country will increase its gas export to the EU by 40% already in 2022 (up to 11.5 billion m3). This involves the Trans-Adriatic gas pipeline, which is a section of the Southern Gas Corridor. The intention is⤵️
to increase the transport capacity up to 20 billion m3 in the next 5 years, with investment (probably expected to come from Western energy companies that left Russia as an option). The Azeri side insists that it seeks to increase the energy security of the EU by 2027. In my⤵️
opinion, in addition to mutual economic interests, Baku/Aliyev is interested in creating a stronger interdependence in the energy field with the EU (through the memorandum signed by @vonderleyen who called Azerbaijan a trustworthy partner). This will have implications on how⤵️
#Armenia: The CSTO's weak response to the Azeri’s attacks is fueling protests among Armenians who want their country to leave the Russian-controlled military bloc. Armenia activated CSTO's collective defense clause (Art. 4), but the organization and member states refused to⤵️
offer military assistance (including Kazakhstan, which is currently praised for quietly disassociating itself from Russia). The CSTO agreed to conduct an on-the-ground assessment after the attacks by Azeri forces deep in the Armenian territories⤵️
Attention: we are not talking about Karabakh, where both Armenians and Azeri appreciated the Russian peacekeepers. We cannot rule out that after the protests against CSTO membership, dissatisfaction with the presence of the Russian military base may also be seriously questioned.
#Belarus: Lukashenko thinks first and foremost about the well-being of his (autocratic) regime. Comforting Russia is secondary. It has been reported for some time that Russians are traveling to partially sanctioned Belarus to buy whatever is no longer available in⤵️
Russia (as a result of self-sanctioning by Western companies and trade sanctions by the EU). Today Belarus announced a 6-month temporary ban on the re-export to other Eurasian Union countries of technological goods not manufactured in Belarus or Russia. It includes⤵️
250 types of industrial goods, from smartphones to nuclear reactors. Apparently, Belarus is trying to limit the re-export of Western technology goods. Perhaps Lukashenko fears the secondary sanctions or trade related sanctions against Belarus for goods restricted to Russia.
#EU_China: Borrell tried to persuade his Chinese counterpart to put pressure on the Russians to stop the war against Ukraine. It is for the first time that EU officials speak of the "financial crisis" alongside the food and energy crises. Perhaps the EU is facing money issues, ⤵️
which are related to rising energy costs (subsidies to businesses & consumers), as well as the help needed to care for Ukrainian refugees (millions are still in the EU) & from Ukraine (which is in great need of financial support for the economy, the public budget and the army).⤵️
But China is not willing to leave Russia alone, when in reality it needs it as a partner to balance against the West. Until the Communist Party congress in October, Xi will not make any radical moves. The current "neutrality" may help get Xi re-elected for a third term.