#Ukraine 10/2 As the liberation of Lyman has been announced and the offensive on Kherson is relaunched by UKR forces, the sequence that has just taken place is an irrefutable proof of UKR military superiority over the RUS army (visible since last July for serious analysts).
#Ukraine 10/2 RUS forces evacuated Lyman under pressure from UKR forces who are now clearing the captured area.
#Ukraine 10/2 Situation remains fluid with UKR advancing and clearing pockets of resistance (RUS withdrawal was not clearly ordered but made hastily, and groups may have been “forgotten”).
#Ukraine 10/2 Prisoners are starting to arrive. And we are discovering the images of russian’s heavy losses (since several days).
(See my yesterday’s tweets).
#Ukraine 10/2 10/2 Images of material losses are also pouring in. There are much more to come.
#Ukraine 10/2 UKR forces continue their push, using the benefits of the ascendancy given by initiative and successes. Kreminna is attacked but the UKR army has several options: to the North (to go up the east bank of the Oskil), to the East (towards Krasna), or to the South...
#Ukraine 10/2 it’s the advantage of having the initiative and the ascendancy. Each operation is easier and can produce more effects than those of the enemy.
#Ukraine 10/2 On the other hand, the RUS forces have only one option: to gather reinforcements in order to build back a front. And therefore choose between sacrificing troops, or releasing ground, to gain the necessary time for that. (Here a train of Iskander-M missiles).
#Ukraine 10/2 Russian army tries to close the gaps by throwing units one after the other. Here a convoy of an engineer unit.
#Ukraine 10/2 Barely formed RUS units with mobilized soldiers are urgently sent to the front. The material is more and more heterogeneous.
#Ukraine 10/2 These mobilized men who were still civilians 10 days ago can sing as if they were going on a "school trip". They won’t be able to do much in a high intensity conflict before several months of training.
#Ukraine 10/2 Convoys are flocking from all over Russia. But these materials can’t solve the main problem, the lack of experienced units. These are only expedients. (Here a towed artillery battery).
#Ukraine 10/2 And to save time, you also have to pound the advancing UKR columns. But the fluidity and speed of the UKR progression makes the accuracy of these shots even less efficient.
#Ukraine 10/2 The problem is that the area east of the Oskil is in favor of UKR operations: the terrain is favorable to mechanized moves, with cover and gentle relief,
And the western bank of the Krasna dominates the eastern bank.
#Ukraine 10/2 I barely mention the RUS efforts towards Bakhmut Soledar, without any effects. In the Kherson’s area, the UKR forces relaunched their assaults, as it was predictable.
#Ukraine 10/2 The UKR offensive starts again by the northern front segment, with the capture of Osokorivka.
#Ukraine 10/2 RUS forces stuck with the Dnipro on their backs are trying to resupply but these efforts won’t work endlessly. In its situation, the powerful RUS device can only end up collapsing if the UKR manage to continue their efforts. (Here pontoons seen from satellites).
#Ukraine 10/2 Let’s take a look at the meaning given to this acceleration, which only surprised the less serious.
#Ukraine 10/2 1st assessment, success at Kherson was systematic (therefore less visible), Izium’s victory can be linked with surprise’s effect, moreover a few could believe (hope?) that it would stay limited.
Lyman demonstrates the contrary : UKR superiority is real & persistent.
#Ukraine 10/2 The liberation of Lyman and the maneuver by the South shows the offensive brilliance of the UKR forces that fought against the Russians “from strong to strong”, without giving them a chance.
(Video of the last 10 days of the operations).
#Ukraine 10/2 The South maneuver only surprised people whom analyses were oriented by pro-russian bias (or just no serious).
The acceleration of the last few days was foreseeable as I stated.
#Ukraine 10/2 This sequence of the offensive isn’t over.
The north-east terrain is far more favorable to UKR and their « elan » allows them to consider a few possible maneuvers.
The Kremina -Svatove -Kupiansk sector therefore stays to be watched.
Although it’s not the only one.#
#Ukraine 10/2 The obligation for the Russian forces to round up their forces so as to rebuilt a front in the north-east AND to sustain its forces stuck in Kherson, literally quartles the Russian army, who regularly panics at every UKR offensive reco on the South front.
#Ukraine 10/2 So now it’s all of the actual front, from the mouth of the Dnipro to the Russian border of Belgorod, which remains vulnerable.
#Ukraine 10/2 With this tension/crisis switching on the Russian side, here comes criticism, doubts and threats of purges or “putsch”.
The military acclaimed by the regiment became feeble fuses in order to hide the personal failure of the dictator : Shoigu, Lapine…
#Ukraine 10/2 And throwing units newly mobilized conscripts in emergency won’t solve the problem.
Except of course if we give up on the Ukrainians. Like we shouldn’t give up on the Iranians, and like how we should have never given up on the Syrians (and many more).
#Ukraine 10/2 Here’s the daily situation review.
Have a great Sunday and have a thought for all of those that have brightened your life in a moment where you needed to get out of it. What they left you is always more important than anything else.
#Ukraine 10/2 UPDATE UKR forces liberated Zolata Balka (North of Kherson bridgehead).
#Ukraine 10/2 UPDATE 2
UKR offensive against Kherson bridgehead seems to restart.
RUS Army is obliged to do the splits between Kherson & North-east front, becoming weak everywhere.
Les émeutes de 2005 se sont étendues pendant plus de 3 semaines à plus de 300 communes "aux quatre coins de la France" (selon la formule consacrée).
Leur ampleur a été entretenue par la répression (grenade lacrymo dans la mosquée de Bilal) et la communication du MinInt Sarkozy.
2/ Les études abondent sur ce phénomène inédit par son ampleur & sa durée.
A l'étranger, on relève ainsi une intégration & une socialisation en déroute parmi certaines «populations dites à risque» aggravé par un modèle de police "à bout de souffle". journals.openedition.org/sdt/23049
3/ Précarité, stigmatisation (discrimination y compris de la part des agents publics) et le sentiment d’injustice sociale lié à l’impunité des "policiers pourtant reconnus coupables d’avoir commis des bavures mortelles" forment un cocktail explosif. cairn.info/revue-pensee-p…
#Russie A Rostov sur le Don, les mercenaires Wagner font face à des forces de sécurité au milieu de Russes qui filment. https://t.co/oa3xtOMTKItwitter.com/i/web/status/1…
#Russie Le déploiement des uns et des autres est compliqué à suivre puisqu’ils ont les mêmes uniformes, les mêmes matériels et les mêmes marquages
#Ukraine Le 20 mai, Prigojine annonçait que la ville de Bakhmut était enfin entièrement tombée aux mains des Russes et de ses mercenaires.
À midi.
Je vous propose un voyage en image dans cette ville depuis sa chute.
Accrochez-vous, les images sont impressionnantes. #Thread
#Ukraine#Bakhmut L’arrivée de la ville se fait par l’Est, zone industrielle et quartiers à l’Est de la rivière Bakhmuts’ka qui furent le théâtre de combats acharnés entre septembre 2022 et janvier 2023.
#Ukraine#Bakhmut Puis il faut quitter les véhicules pour continuer à pied au milieu des ruines désertes où la nature reprends lentement ses droits.
#Russie le défilé écourté et réduit à presque rien du #9mai à Moscou questionne, mais pas nécessairement dans le sens d’une épuisement des moyens militaires RUS (dont les symptômes sont ailleurs).
Thread 2/
#Russie#9mai La faiblesse du nombre d’engins qui ont défilé questionne évidemment.
Beaucoup veulent y voir le signe de la perte de moyens militaires RUS.
Or c’est plus compliqué que ça. 3/
#Russie#9mai Ainsi il faut noter que des chars il y en a eu ailleurs. Plusieurs autres défilés à Omsk, Tchita, Volgograd, Khabarovsk, Oussourisk, Mourmansk, Nizhny Tagil…
(voir le compte @La_souris_DA qui les récapitule) 4/
#Ukraine Prigojine prétend qu’il ne reçoit plus de munitions à Bakhmut.
La réalité semble plus compliquée 2/
#Ukraine Au-delà des déclarations contradictoires (et insincères) du patron de la compagnie Wagner, il faut insister sur son échec à prendre entièrement la ville malgré les moyens dont il a bénéficié.
Les défenseurs UKR s’accrochent dans cet enfer. 3/
#Ukraine De fait, si l’activité de l’artillerie RUS s’est légèrement tassée depuis quelques semaines, ce n’est pas aux dépens de Wagner mais une tendance générale - peu visible à Bakhmout d’ailleurs. 4/
#Ukraine La phase d’attente actuelle offre l’occasion d’une rétrospective sur les évolutions des tactiques offensives.
Nous allons aujourd’hui nous focaliser sur les tactiques d’assaut RUS, et leurs évolutions lors de la bataille de Bakhmut. #Thread
🔞 images violentes
#Ukraine (2) Je ne reviendrai pas sur la première phase (période Dvornikov) avec des tactiques assez rustiques et brutales sur la base de la supériorité en artillerie qui écrase par des feux par zones les axes de progression de l’infanterie mécanisée en blindés.
#Ukraine (3) A partir du mois de fin juin, cette tactique échoue face à une défense renforcée en missiles antichars et en capacités de contre-batterie et de frappes ciblées des dépôts (HIMARS).