Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Oct 2, 2022 17 tweets 6 min read Read on X
Lots of reports currently about Ukrainian advances in #Kherson and #Luhansk. Few have been officially confirmed. However, we can draw a couple of things from these ongoing campaigns. 1/17 🧵
2/ First, what we are seeing is an excellent Ukrainian operational design playing out across the south and east of the country. While geographically separate, they are campaigns that are part of an integrated design, and part of an overall military #strategy.
3/ Second, the two campaigns are mutually supporting. The south is the most decisive region because of its economic contribution to Ukraine’s economy. The Russians know this and it is here they have deployed their most capable units.
4/ But the east is also important. It is a region proximate to Russia, and therefore gains here has a significant psychological effect on the Russians. And, the north east is a key logistic route for supporting operations in the Donbas.
5/ Third, because the Ukrainian operational deign for these campaigns has sequenced them well. Large Russian forces were drawn to the south and at trite during by Ukrainian artillery and HIMARS. This provided an opportunity for the next part of their design, the #Kharkiv thrust.
6/ It has been a classic ‘horns of a dilemma’ for the Russians, who have to decide where to weight their forces and reinforcements between the south and north east. And at the same time, they have persisted with their pointless attacks in the Donbas.
7/ Fourth, because the Ukrainians are operating on interior lines, they are better placed to move forces between the campaigns (although it is still a good distance). The Russians, on exterior lines, have big challenges in this regard.
8/ Fifth, the Ukrainian campaigns have continued to implement the ‘strategy of corrosion’ which focusses on destruction of Russian fire support, logistics, C2 nodes and concentrations of troops that might be reinforcements or reserves.
9/ This corrodes the Russians from within. It physically reduces their fighting power and also has a profound psychological impact. But there is also something else going on while this corrosion occurs. This is the ‘recon battle’ - a fight for tactical information.
10/ This reveals weak points which the Ukrainian combined arms teams can break into and penetrate. And then conduct rapid exploitation, as we saw (and continue to see) in the #Kharkiv area. And now MIGHT be seeing in #Kherson.
11/Ultimately the result of the physical and psychological pressure of all these integrated elements of the Ukrainian campaign design can lead to cascading tactical (and potentially operational) failures by the Russians.
12/ Such failure by the Russians in the two different regions can force additional errors. For example, they might speed up the deployment of mobilized troops, competing with transport required to provide other logistical support to front line troops.
13/ It can also force the Russians into taking greater risk with assets such as their EW, fires, and Air Force (they still have one, right?). All of which provides additional opportunity for the Ukrainians to exploit, destroy more of the Russian Army and recapture more ground.
14/ This is less an operational update than an explanation of how the theory of operational design works in practice. But what we have seen recently from the Ukrainian Armed Forces is more evidence that they have a better understanding of modern multi-domain war than all of us.
15/ Their mastery of modern war - including strategic influence operations - has also induced profound psychological shock in the Russians at the political, strategic, operational & tactical levels. Russia must now respond to Ukrainian initiatives at levels.
16/ We will see over the next few hours and days how the Kharkiv and Kherson campaigns play out. And, because of pressure in these two areas, there may be opportunities elsewhere that open up for the Ukrainians to exploit. End.
17/ Thank you to the following for images used in this thread: @TheStudyofWar @criticalthreats @DefenceU @Poutsup @IAPonomarenko @KyivIndependent

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More from @WarintheFuture

Jun 11
Ukraine has just struck a Russian defence plant with its new long-range FP-5 missiles and damaged a key bridge to Crimea. Things keep getting worse for Putin and Gerasimov. My Part 2 assessment of Russia's losing war, and how Putin might reverse things. 1/5 🧵 Image
2/ Russia is losing its war on Ukraine. But a losing trajectory is not a settled outcome. Part 2 of Losing on Every Dimension examines the five "reversal conditions" that could still rescue Putin, and what the West must do to lock in his defeat.
3/ The most revealing point about these five reversal conditions. With one exception, none lies within Russia's own control: a US settlement, the oil price, China's treasury, North Korean manpower, and Western fatigue. Russia's escape from defeat depends on the decisions of others.
Read 5 tweets
Jun 8
For the first time since the invasion, Russia is losing more troops than it can recruit. Net territorial movement over the past three months has favoured Ukraine. Part 1 of my new assessment, I explore how Russia is "Losing on Every Dimension" - military, cognitive, moral, industrial and economic. 1/7 🧵Image
2/ MILITARY. In 2025 Russia paid roughly 200 casualties per square mile taken. In the first five months of 2026, with a net gain of 17 square miles, it paid over 9,600 per square mile. The meat grinder is grinding through Russian men faster than Russia can produce them. Tactical operations are now unified with mid-range and long-range strikes.
3/ COGNITIVE. Russia's narratives are decoupling from a battlefield made visible by open-source reporting. When Putin has to ask Ukrainian permission to hold parades, and cannot hold an international forum without a Ukrainian attack, his narrative about inevitable war crashes.
Read 7 tweets
May 28
Our darker angels have returned. For a decade, influential scholars argued that major war was on an irreversible decline. Pinker's 'Better Angels' thesis became almost orthodoxy in parts of the security studies world. But, as @lawdavf has written, war has a future. 1/4 🧵 Image
2/ Fast forward to 2024. PRIO records 61 state-based conflicts — the highest since World War II. 129,000 battle deaths. The fourth most violent year since the Cold War. The 2024 data from SIPRI and PRIO is unambiguous: a historic peak in state-based conflicts, the fourth most violent year since the Cold War, and a Russo-Ukrainian war that has now consumed an estimated 500,000 lives.
3/ The analytical failure wasn't just academic. Governments that accepted the 'war is fading' narrative underinvested in defence, deterrence and industrial capacity. Ukraine paid some of the price. But most Western nations are still underinvested in force structure, defence industry, war stocks and most importantly, national will to resist authoritarian aggression.
Read 4 tweets
May 11
China fields a military where 70-80% of soldiers are only children. Every battlefield death risks extinguishing a family line. This demographic reality shapes Xi's strategic calculus in ways Western analysis should pay more attention to. My new piece explores this. 1/5 🧵mickryan.substack.com/p/one-child-on…Image
2/ China's one-child policy ended in 2015. Its military consequences are only beginning. By 2015, ~70% of PLA soldiers and 80% of combat troops came from one-child households. There is almost no historical precedent for a major military force comprised almost entirely of only children.
3/ The research is sobering. Only children are measurably less trusting, less resilient, less risk-tolerant, and less competitive than those with siblings. These are not ideal traits for combat. They are increasingly the defining traits of the PLA's human capital.
Read 5 tweets
Apr 16
Some initial thoughts on the new Australian National Defence Strategy released today in Canberra. Overall, the focus and trajectory of Australia's defence strategy remains consistent with the 2024 version. There are some notable things worth highlighting. 1/15 🧵🇦🇺 Image
2/ The new NDS shifts more towards a true 'defence' strategy rather than just a 'military' strategy that was described in the 2024 version. There is stronger language around national civil preparedness, fuel security, and economic security. This is good. But these are also topics that should be in a National Security Strategy - if Australia had one!
3/ Spending. There is an uptick in spending. This is a positive. There is a claim that we might get 3% of GDP on defence at some point in the future. The reality is that because we are well short of this now, trying to fund both AUKUS and the ADF at the same time with current spending is challenging (nice word for not possible), and conventional military capabilities are degrading - and not modernising fast enough.
Read 15 tweets
Mar 22
“The advantages of threatening an American ground intervention are real. The advantages of actually committing boots on the ground are also real but more limited. The disadvantages could be numerous.” My weekly update on Iran, Ukraine and the Pacific. 1/6 🧵 Image
2/ Ukraine has achieved something significant in the south. Ukrainian attacks there have disrupted Russian offensive planning, consumed Russian reserve forces, and demonstrated that Ukrainian combined arms operations can impose genuine operational costs. But there is also a trade-off in these southern operations. Gains in the south have come at some cost to northern Donetsk, and Russian forces retain the initiative on what is Russia’s main effort on the ground: the envelopment of Ukraine’s fortress belt and the remainder of Donetsk.
3/ In Iran, the oldest lesson in strategy keeps surfacing: military success in the air and at sea does not automatically translate into political outcomes on the ground. Iran has not been beaten. The question being probably being considered in the Pentagon, Congress and the White House is whether ground forces would ensure that the military campaign achieves a decisive political outcome - or whether it would lead to a larger and more difficult American military commitment to the Middle East with uncertain results.
Read 6 tweets

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