The #Kremlin's first reaction is rather expected - downplaying the event in the media, setting up all sorts of commissions, launching criminal proceedings...
But everyone is waiting for #Putin's reaction: after all, the strike on the bridge was considered one of the red lines, crossing which could lead to a "worst-case scenario" - an angry reaction, up to and including nuclear retaliation.
However, experience has shown that (1) Putin always reacts with a delay (until he is up to speed, gets all the reports, consults with others...), and…
(2) Putin "swallows" failures in war, not always reacting violently, and often even trying to pretend that nothing much has happened. That is, the logic of "another terrorist act - bad, but expected".
The exception is the retreat in the Kharkiv region, to which Russia responded with annexation and mobilisation.
On that basis, I dare suggest that Putin personally might, as much as it may seem offensive to him, treat the strike as something predictable that could have happened as it did.
If a missile had flown in and smashed the bridge so that it could not be repaired, so that it would have to be rebuilt, then yes - a turning point.
In this case it would be considered as a sign that the 'enemy' has obtained the capacities which change the nature of the conflict and would oblige Russia to retaliate. The explosion of a truck is not such a case.
Against the backdrop of all this, one big "but" appears: Putin's declining confidence in the army and the intensification of contacts with critics of the army. So there could still be a reaction. We shall see.
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The murder of Daria Dugina will have serious political consequences. 1/7 #Dugin
Firstly, it provokes a radicalisation of the conservative camp, which has lost one of "its own" and craves revenge and a demonstration of its own intransigence and toughness against its enemies. 2/7
It is not certain that it will achieve an increase in the level of repressions, which has its own logic, but the brutality and frequency of horizontal ideological confrontations will increase. And the authorities are not very good at regulating them. 3/7
As far as I understand, the domestic policy overseers initially proceeded from the understanding that they must be prepared for referenda 'by definition' and that a 'command' to launch the process could come at any moment. 1/10 meduza.io/en/feature/202…
But there have not been any specific parametres for future referenda - domestic policy overseers have to act stemming from their own interpretation of Putin's expectations concerning possible dates and borders of annexing territories. 2/10
They simply seek to avoid a situation where the presidential administration will have to prepare something on its knees in a hurry and try to get ready in advance to act immediately as soon as Putin tasks to organises the votes. 3/10
Reports that Yevgeny Prigozhin, also known as “Putin’s chef” and owner of the infamous Wagner Group, is facing resistance in the FSB are very interesting. 1/4 #Russianpolitcs
It has come to light that a number of individuals connected to Prigozhin have been arrested by the FSB for being Telegram Admins. Though the reason for their arrest remains speculation, one of the most interesting stories is being played out behind the scenes. 2/4
Everyone has begun to quarrel with one another. First, a hit on Kirienko, then a campaign against Medvedev and Chemezov. Then comes the harsh retaliation from Chemezov, and at the same time, a blow to Prigozhin. 3/4