More details are emerging about the Ukrainian attack on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in occupied Crimea. Lots more clarity to come in the following days, but a few immediate observations are possible. 1/20 🧵 #Sevastopol
2/ First, it is clear that #Ukraine’s ability to target Russian forces continues to expand beyond the battlefield. Operational and strategic targets are now in their sights, underpinned by good intelligence and long range strike tools like #HIMSRS and maritime drones.
3/ This will place even more stress on a Russian military that is struggling to hold its ground in the areas of #Ukraine they have occupied. Mobilized troops will be little help in preventing the kind of attacks that just occurred in #Sevastopol
4/ Second, Ukraine continues to focus on military targets in these operational and strategic strikes. With these #Sevastopol strikes, Ukraine is degrading the capacity of the Russians to launch sea-based missiles at Ukraine.
5/ Ukraine is also sending the message to Russia, as well as Ukraine’s supporters in the west, that Ukraine is fighting against the Russian military and NOT the Russian people. This is important strategic messaging.
6/ Third, the Ukrainian cost-benefit analysis for this attack would have considered whether Russia would stop grain exports as a result. But, once again, the strategic messaging of Russia doing so is all bad for Russia. washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/…
7/ Fourth, this attack again shows how adaptive the Ukrainians are. They have rapidly developed a new maritime strike capability, adding to their growing long range strike arsenal. navalnews.com/naval-news/202…
8/ Importantly, Ukraine has integrated this new weapon into their operational and strategic strike concepts. Having a new weapon is good; being able to cleverly integrate it into military warfighting concepts is the acme of military effectiveness.
9/ Fifth, Ukraine is serious about taking back its territory in #Crimea. President @ZelenskaUA has spoken about his several times in the past. These strikes are slowly corroding Russian military capacity in Crimea, and force Russia to look at its force deployment priorities.
11/ Sixth, once again the Russians are showing that they are not taking their adversary seriously. The Ukrainians have previously attacked #Sevastopol with a drone, as well as other targets in Crimea.
12/ And, the Russians knew Ukraine has been developing this capability. It has been in the open press. Where did the Russians think they were going to use it?
13/ Therefore the Russian inability to adapt quickly to such overt and obvious threats is yet another indication of their sloppy professionalism and inability to conceive that they are fighting a Ukrainian military that is a world class military institution.
14/ Seventh and finally, both sides are increasingly resorting to remotely operated or autonomous systems in their operational and strategic strikes.
15/ While both sides have used UAVs for recon, surveillance and tactical strike throughout the war, the Russian use of Iranian drones and Ukraine’s use of maritime drones at #Sevastopol is a broadening of their use. @SamBendett is an expert on this topic.
16/ These systems, while cheaper to procure than crewed systems or more sophisticated missiles, still require good intelligence for targeting and post-strike assessment however. This element of long-range strike is not cheap and takes a lot of effort to develop.
17/ Both sides will have to invest even more in counter-drone and counter-autonomy systems. The object is to reduce the cost and manpower requirement of such systems so they are cheaper than the drones they destroy.
18/ As such, the war in Ukraine will be a testbed for these counter-drone systems, in all domains, as a ‘cost imposition’ capability.
19/ Anyway, these are just some very initial thoughts on the implications of the strike on #Sevastopol. We are sure to learn much more in the coming days. End.
This video from @Osinttechnical, despite some poor tactical flying, highlights a larger issue. What is the survivability of rotary wing aircraft on the modern (and future) battlefield? 1/7 🧵
2/ This is not an anti-helicopter tirade. I love our Army RW combat aviators. They have provided sterling and courageous service for decades. But perhaps it is time for a reassessment of their ability to operate effectively in some battlefield functions.
3/ These are platforms that have many easily detectable signatures, particularly noise and the signature of their blades. They are slow moving. And some of them carry a lot of humans!
The winter months approach in #Ukraine. It will have an impact on the war, but it won’t shut down the war as some have theorised. A thread on the likely impact of winter on the war in #Ukraine. 1/25 🧵
2/ Recently, it has become common to compare the coming winter in #Ukraine with the Russo-Finnish Winter War, fought from November 1939 through to March 1940.
3/ The Finns resisted a massive Soviet invasion of their nation, resulting in a peace agreement temporarily ending hostilities. The Winter War is used as a historical example of David versus Goliath, as well as the clever use of terrain and weather by a defending military force.
In the last 48 hours, reports have emerged of a potential Russian withdrawal from its Dnipro west bank defensive positions. While this may fit General Surovikin’s overall strategy for #Ukraine, it will be difficult to execute successfully. 1/24 🧵
2/ Somewhere in the headquarters of a Russian Combined Army Army in south Ukraine, a staff officer is pulling out his doctrinal publication to plan an orderly withdrawal of Russian forces back across the Dnipro. Why are withdrawals conducted and what are some considerations?
3/ Withdrawals, which are considered a ‘retrograde operation’ in US Army doctrine, are designed to allow a force to disengage from the enemy and redeploy on a new mission or to a new location, while minimising casualties.
In the last few days, an interview given by the new Russian commander in #Ukraine, General Sergei Surovikin, was reported in the media. Noting that “the situation regarding the special operation is tense”, an assessment of his campaign options going forward is required. 1/25 🧵
2/ Surovikin clearly understands the political intent for his campaign. As noted in the interview, the desired outcome is “that Ukraine was independent from the West and NATO, a friendly state to Russia.”
3/ Whether this is possible or not from our perspective, these are his marching orders from Putin. cablefreetv.org/the-first-inte…
This week, the Russian military launched a multitude of Iranian suicide drones at #Kyiv. Some were shot down. Others crashed into civilian buildings causing death and destruction. It is a useful start point for a wider examination of autonomous systems in this war. 1/25 🧵
2/ Autonomous systems have featured throughout this war, with both sides employing dozens of military and civil aerial systems.
3/ One expert who has been following trends in autonomous systems well before the war, and throughout the war this year, is @SamBendett. His reports and threads are well worth reading. twitter.com/SamBendett
A little over three weeks ago, I sat in a large conference room in Kyiv and listened to President Zelensky outline how his country, despite the heroic achievements of its armed forces and people, would need a continuing flow of military assistance from the west. 1/22 🧵
2/ At the very top of his priorities was air and missile defence systems to ‘close the skies’ to use his exact words. The past 24 hours has again shown why President @ZelenskyyUa was so strident about this requirement.
3/ In the wake of the attack on the Kerch bridge, Russia unleashed a barrage of 84 missiles and 13 Iranian kamikaze drones on Ukrainian cities. While around half were shot down, many cities were attacked. Russia has done so again today.