1. Something that repeatedly struck me listening to #EmergenciesActInquiry testimony. References kept being made about the huge followings the convoy organizers had on social media. There are many ways foreign adversaries & “foreign actors” can give in-kind ‘donations’ #CdnNatSec
2. “Backing” is one way of giving covert assistance to operations like #FluTruxKlan. Troll factory operations of threat actors can “back” social media accounts, boosting their megaphone & exploiting algorithms so that many people view these accounts as important. @POECommission
3. 1,000s of 🤖 can be used to bridge groups together, creating complex networks that appear organic, but are not. Once these networks are formed, an echo-chamber follows. Disinformation is then fed into the network. This is a malign “donation” that ultimately translates into💰.
4. Taking a narrow & traditional view of both “foreign actors” & how malign influence ops are financed, is inadequate & will fail to grasp the entirety of the situation & may falsely appear as “grassroots”. #CdnNatSec #POEC #EmergenciesActInquiry @POECommission #EmergenciesAct
5. Add to this picture the behind the scenes plotting & “collusion” of domestic political operatives in these types of schemes & you have an incredibly complex web to untangle. @POECommission #EmergenciesActInquiry #EmergenciesAct #POEC #cdnpoli @csiscanada 
6. Whether domestic extremism is ideologically, politically or religiously motivated, it doesn’t exist in a vacuum & doesn’t exist apart from foreign adversaries opportunistically exploiting these groups & “helping” them in one form or another. @POECommission #EmergenciesAct
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