The Russian defeats and withdrawals have considerably decreased the length of the front line and I'm only counting the one inside Ukraine. I made some statistics and have given my opinion and prognosis about the upcoming months.
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1/10
The overall length of the remaining front line is around 880 km, but around 380 km are rivers, especially the Dnipro River, making up around 350 km the lion's share. The remaining "water" front lines are the Oskil and Siversky Donets River as well as a few lakes and ravines. 2/10
The Zaporizhzhia front (land based) is currently the smallest, making up only 115 km. It is also currently the quietest front, but Ukraine has massed considerable forces in that sector which might soon commence a full scale offensive. 3/10
The Donetsk front is around 230 km long and currently the most active front. It is also the only sector where Russian conduct offensive operations but with devastating results for them. It is therefore the sector with highest Russian casualties. 4/10
The most Northern fronts are in the Luhansk/Kharkiv sector. It is around 187 km long with some intense battles primarily at the Svatove-Kreminna line. Currently, it is more a stalemate but Russian forces are getting ground down. 5/10
Especially Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia are weak spots of the Russian defense. Both have weakened Russian battle groups and reinforcements made up by conscripts. Kherson is relatively stable thanks to the Dnipro and Donetsk hosts the bulk of the surviving Russian special forces. 6/10
Overall I predict that Ukrainian forces will keep up the pressure on all sectors, including Kherson/Dnipro River and eventually will push at 1 or maybe even 2 front lines. Russia will try to slow down the Ukrainian progress but ultimately will fail to stop AFU. 7/10
The Russian offensives at Bakhmut, Avdiika and Pavlivka are tactical failures and strategically seen total blunders. It is obvious that Ukrainian forces in that sector are ordered just to decimate Russian troops while other AFU units keep pushing in remaining sectors. 8/10
My prognosis is that AFU will reach the Sea of Azov by March-May and little later in summer the administrative border of Crimea. This unfolding military disaster for Russia will likely end with political consequences in Moscow. By that time the Russian defeat is too apparent.9/10
I also do not exclude that the collapse of the Russian regime might happen far earlier. All what I'm certain of is that once triggered it will happen fast. It will be accompanied with a final military collapse of Russian forces in Ukraine, most notably in Donetsk and Crimea.10/10
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As I suspected, Russian authorities confirm that the gas grid got attacked in St. Petersburg. It must have happened in the forests East of Murino. Russia has there high pressure gas pipelines which also feed the gas power station near Lavriki. #Russia#SanktPetersburg
With the train video (Yellow line) it is likely that the explosion happened somewhere in this forest (green circle). It is few kilometers South from my initial estimation. It is still the same pipeline, though.
I believe that Russians have selected this orange area as their long-term defense line, evicting civilians from their homes and use them for Russian occupational troops. That accomplish several aims. (Thread) #Ukraine#Kherson
1.) The defense line is more tenable then the current one. All positions West of the Dnipro River are under constant pressure and Russia cannot sustain the supply lines over the rivers in that sector. Having the defense line on the Eastern bank simplifies the situation.
2.) Besides the obvious that the river poses a natural barrier, when blowing up the dam at Nova Kakhovka the already big obstacle becomes an even more daunting obstacle. Russian troops could focus the defense along a smaller front line, making use of their weak but many troops.
Thread: In February, when Russia launched open war against Ukraine, they used their best troops, the best gear and had first-strike advantage. They odds were totally in favor for Russia. Yet, we know how it ended. Russian troops failed epicily and were compelled to retreat./1
Today, the Ukrainian Army is not only far more capable and prepared, it also has far superior weapons. Aside from the advanced Western weapons, Ukraine captured so many Russian vehicles that the odds totally turned around, plus the terrain still heavily favors Ukraine. /2
The calculation that Belarus might make a difference is even more hilarious. Belarus' army is rather small and their gear mediocre at best. Their troops are totally inexperienced and, worst, absolutely not willing to die for Putin's failed war. They would desert in droves. /3
I'm pretty sure that Russians have already made the decision to withdraw from the Western bank of the Dnipro River. One element for achieving that is deception. The enemy must not know that withdrawal is imminent. Many Russians claimed that they will fight. (they won't) /1
Another critical element is having a capable rear guard. The withdrawing force must be covered for the duration of that process. This rear guard must be committed, agile and equipped with fast vehicles when they have to withdraw. Russia will likely just sacrifice conscripts. /2
The most important element, however, is logistics and the discipline to execute such a complicated objective. Russia has proven in this war that it lacks both of this, on an epic level. Especially considering that the Dnipro River needs to be crossed complicates it even more. /3
Strikes at Belgorod could be an indicator that the Russian build-up in Belarus are being taken seriously by Kyiv and that Ukrainian government sends a message without giving Lukashenko chance to really people behind him. If Luka joins the war, it will end with his downfall.
That being said, it is also reason why I find it hard to believe that Luka could be that stupid. Of course, his independence from Putin and Russia has been heavily curtailed, but if Belarus joins the war, the common Belarus soldier would rebel and defect. #Belarus
Some might ask why Ukraine didn't strike Belarus instead. Well, aside from the fact that it already did at Gomel airport, the Ukrainian leadership is prudent enough to wait for Luka to make the first move. Luka is weakened and any bold move against Belarus might jeopardize it.
The Russian excuses for their constant defeats are very colorful and serve only to cover the real reason. Putin failed epically, 3 days after the initial attack on Kyiv ended in the ditches of Bucha. Everything else is just dragging on the inevitable: The total Russian defeat.
There is really not much more to it. Of course, the chronic corruption, the obsolete fighting doctrine and the quality weapons did their part. But nothing was so devastating for the Russian soldier than seeing their Ukrainian opponents holding the line and fighting back.
For the forced conscripts this will be (and it already is) even more a shock. Seriously, they have neither experience nor the guts to survive what’s coming for them. 22 years of propaganda have totally cooked their brain.