๐งต As reported by @PublicTech, the 'National Communications Data Service' will be able to filter out #UK citizens internet connection records (ICR) through a National Service by the end of 2022.
When the Home Office, NCA & 16 leading internet providers were questioned - silence.
๐ด According to @PublicTech, no official announcement was made by the Govt or other authorities about the expansion of these activities into a National Service, which would allow LEA's to access info on sites visited by #UK citizens.
๐ด No correspondence was answered by the @IPCOffice, a statutory body whose role is to โoversee the use of covert investigatory powers by public authorities".
When telcos were approached to comment if they'd support this service & how they'd provide data - silence.
๐ด Most info about the 'National Service' was pieced together by @PublicTech checking procurement documents.
Even though such a programme coming under the Snoopers Charter may help combat terrorism & other NATSEC issues, innocent citizens could also be spied on.
๐ด The Digital Intel sub-division of @BAESystemsInc were awarded ยฃ2m to help develop the platform needed to filter out citizens ICR's.
An ICR won't provide a full browsing history per se, but would contain an IP address & other customer information.
๐ด All of this began in mid 2019 when the @IPCOffice granted approvals to live test the ICR 'filter tool' with two unnamed telcos.
Also interesting is that this 'National Service' has followed a *similar trajectory* to the Online Harms White Paper, now #OnlineSafetyBill
๐ด If we combine the customer data sharing by @O2 Motion Insights with 'SitCen' or the National Situation Room along with what's described above & the #OnlineSafetyBill, it's alarming to see how surveillance has increased over the past few years.
Action must be taken.
As for solutions regarding the NCDS & collection/analysis of ICRs:
VPN/VPN router - this won't offer blanket anonymity but will help encrypt your traffic & mask your IP.
Use multiple privacy focused browsers like @brave, Librewolf & @torproject
๐งต Thanks to info from @PublicTech, we reported on the new 'National Situation Centre' who awarded a six month contract to @Telefonica_En for access to its 'Motion & Data Insights' service.
The data provided to SitCen by @O2 represents around a third of the #UK population.
'02 Motion' claim that customer data is 'aggregated & anonymised'. To our knowledge this data is being shared without customer knowledge or consent.
'Anonymised' could mean either fully anonymised or 'pseudo-anonymised' - where data could be re-identified. This isn't clear.
'SitCen' was created in 2021 to help govt 'anticipate' & track crises, & 'support response to events, e.g. future public health emergencies', as well as terrorist incidents & other NATSEC issues.
With terrorism & NATSEC it would be necessary to be able to identify data, no?
2โฃ There's *no joint ratification or amendment* of point 23 under the existing IHR (2005).
3โฃ Again, no matter the recognition or 'success' as they call it, re: digital #COVID19 certificates, they've been as useless as a chocolate fireguard over the past two years.
4โฃ The WHO published a guide last year on tech specs & implementation of digital documentation.
This acts as *guidance & recommendation*. It cannot be mandated under the IHR, even with a targeted Annex 6 amendment.
This doesn't override the decisions of its member states.
We've noticed a lot of drama re-emerging with the @DCMS IDVT (Identity Verification Technology) & the use of IDSP's (Identity Service Providers) which is something that we & @TruthTalkUK covered since 2021.
Some call it 'the end of freedom', but let's revisit what it is:
Since April 2022, landlords, employers & DBS checks may be conducted by using a IDSP to verify British or Irish citizens ID credentials.
The 'objective' is to improve mobility & to enhance security rather than using less secure methods. This *maybe* useful for remote workers.
The most important thing to note - not only is the scheme *not mandatory*, but other methods of verification must be made available for onboarding such as doing so in person e.g. landlord/employer or using the relevant UK Govt gateway in the process, e.g. DBS.
If you're not concerned about @NHSDigital using the Palantir 'Foundry' system, which will be used to process confidential patient data without your consent, then you should be.
Here's just a few examples of our concern from Palantir's Terms & Conditions, circa. 2020 โคต๏ธ
What is the 'other data' that Palantir may collect from its Foundry software. Where is it stored & does it leave the country where processing occurs.
Will patient data leave the United Kingdom & be processed elsewhere like the #EU or 'other locations'.
Where are these 'other locations'.
Which 'third party' is involved in the 'datacentre security standards'.
On Nov 1st, the Health Sec. @SteveBarclay ordered GP's to comply with Reg.3(4) of COPI 2002 (below) to 'solely process' confidential patient data 'for a #COVID19 purpose' alongside Reg.7 of the Act.
A big concern surrounds those who already 'opted-out' under the National Data Opt-Out scheme.
This doesn't apply in relation to Reg. 3 of COPI where common law duty of confidentiality may be lifted for re: communicable diseases & risk to public health.