Some weeks back Dave asked a good question, and I've given some time to think on it. What I've arrived at is exploring how info is used, how I use it, and why context matters.
Spoiler: I'm not publishing a list. *You* need to define that.
First, it's important to ask the question "Why are we here?"
I suppose the answer comes in many forms: political leanings and motivations, military & conflict analysis, offering moral support, news updates, and an intrigue in events beyond one's borders.
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For any answer, what does that tell us about what information we seek, what it means, and where it comes from?
It would be foolish to assume everyone is out for the #facts. This flies in the face of personal & collective biases, and dampens the emotions that come with them.
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Regardless of sentiment, what really matters is how information is framed, crafted, and distributed (i.e. what to 'look for').
IMO objectivity is not a given—it is a skill, honed over time, and requires consistent self-evaluation, course-correcting, and empathy.
It is remarkably easy to assert what others want to hear. It's low-effort and feeds on prevailing biases that are themselves self-reinforcing.
It's haphazard judgement, requires speculation, misdirection, or arrogance to maintain a narrative, and is often unfounded.
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On the contrary, it is not easy to craft a story about what may be happening, and that details are messy, murky, and intertwined.
It may take many stories and deep research to result in a clear picture, but it demonstrates great judgment and intentionality.
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The level of ⚡️ information⚡️ made available matters too. Rapid generation of claims (which this platform excels at amplifying) too often is given credence as "the whole picture."
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Claims are *always* only kernels of information. They require context, and if the authors don't do that themselves, then it means they aren't there for that purpose (not always bad), or don't care (deceitful & likely misinformation).
After nine months of war monitoring I've curated a source list (for myself) providing for how to understand what is happening through knowledge and context-building, and using the different approaches above. Combined, they enable information synthesis.
I encourage this.
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Across platforms I observe a few hundred accounts (~90 on telegram), usually sifting through days or weeks of posts.
Producing good intel on breaking events isn't an objective; other accounts do that really well, and are timely.
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Rather, I seek themes, trends, and stories. I'll look for changes in tone, and cross-reference posts or articles going months back.
More than what is being said, how are sources *thinking* and how is information evolving?
From this experience I can offer one this: in seeking good info, review a contributor's history.
→ Do they make an effort to elaborate when needed?
→ How are sources cited, if at all?
→ Do they make corrections, and are corrections timely?
→ Is there collaboration?
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This brings me to another question: is this OSINT, and do I do it?
It believe it is, and that I do.
Does an (osint) handle make it the case? No, it doesn't, and @SecretNofun should be thrilled to hear this (also I'm not 13 and retweeting blindly, sorry to disappoint).
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There's (obviously) additional context implied in this statement since open-source intelligence necessitates synthesis for actionability.
So I will offer that, providing context for who I am, and in doing so answer the question of why *I am here:
👀👀👀
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My background evolved through landscape architecture, as an ecologist, and now in data economics.
I am trained to think spatially, assessing aspects of time, space and form (i.e. reality) & through systems-to-details observation, and in developing concrete implications.
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I have no military background. I am, however, a voracious reader; if an article on force design catches interest I will churn through it and a dozen others.
This (at least) offers a partial picture of my reason for being here, and how I craft and present information.
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I made the point early on that I'm not interested in a following, and this remains true.
However, I am aware it comes with the platform, and with a larger the following so comes the likelihood of amplification.
The more follows, the more seriously I take this—even if this means posts slow to a crawl.
I am intent on getting info correct myself, and *magnetizing* others to those who put the work in to produce *trustworthy* info. This is the long game.
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Your end of the deal?
Point out when and how I get things wrong, and I will correct them. Period.
So @DaveG437 I didn't necessarily answer your question, but hope I've laid out a way forward for thinking about what information matters, how to find it, and why.
19/19
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An expansive and comprehensive essay by @LawDavF illustrating the difficultly of the entrenchment of Russian leadership, and their inability to see the reality of the war's progression.
This brings me back to a discussion from @keithgessen featuring Hein Goemans on the elements that make up war termination theory, and how the war in Ukraine is a case where the forces at play make envisioning an end so difficult.
"As for domestic politics, Putin was exactly the sort of leader that Goemans had warned about. Despite his significant repressive apparatus, he did not have total control of the country.
"If he started losing, Goemans predicted, he would simply escalate."
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"Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin himself observed in October that #Wagner forces operating in the #Bakhmut area advance only 100–200 meters a day."
Bakhmut is a working case study on the rigid organizational frameworks that define Wagner, and its associated antagonists, enabling what can only be described as a phenomenally insane operational effort.
(a long thread on Wagner as an organization is in the works)
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Bakhmut has been the focus of relentless & mostly futile assaults by Russian forces (esp. Wagner) for months on end.
The sheer extent of unrelenting violence exhibited on a (relatively small) battlefield is telling of both armies' present momentum and objectives.
Either this is: very confusingly worded; is misstating the equipment used; or is based on information that few—if any—have in the open-source community.
One odd detail is the reported 10km distance SPG/s were transported.
The geography of the Danube Biosphere Reserve warrants waterborne transport (deltaic marshland), but the distance of a geolocated firing position from a presumed launch-point at #Vylkoev exceeds 10km.
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In theory, there can be a period between February and March when prevailing surface temperatures enable over-freezing of the marshlands, enabling cross-country transport.
But salinity in brackish marshlands, human-landscape influence, and few sand bars challenge this theory.
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"...responses from milbloggers with Kremlin & external affiliations about ongoing mobilization issues further illustrates extent of erosion of morale & increase in confusion among the pro-war nationalist community."
Ongoing and increasing confusion and discontent within Russian information spaces is an emergent property of mobilization efforts, and an overall flagging war effort.
This was observed—if not fully-expected—through early analysis of actualized mobilization:
Rumors beginning Nov 11/12 are outcomes of channels (Russian/Ukrainian, official & non-official) essentially repeating, then refuting, similar claims. Some of those claims were repeated verbatim.
This thread tracks those claims in high-detail, and with all sources of claims.
Second, you reference a Nov 22 statement by Vitaly Kim as confirmation.
However, he states "we have three settlements left" which implies they remain legally-occupied as part of Mykolaiv thus there is no proof of their release by the AFU).
"we have three settlements left...so that we can legally exit the state of the warring region."
This means three settlements within *Mykolaiv Oblast* remain occupied, thus the Oblast remains considered as formally occupied.
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This implies that the settlements: Pokrovs'ke, Vasylivka, and Pokrovka are not under Ukrainian control. This further indicates that ground operations further east (as Chuck states) are unlikely.
The geolocation of damage on Pokrovs'ke is included.