Spain used a 4-3-3 structure and built play patiently from the back, despite Germany pressing aggressively from their 4-2-3-1. They moved the ball around the back line to isolate Thomas Müller, before a centre-back stepped out with the ball into midfield... 🧐🧵
Olmo continued to move inside and Asensio dropped deep, in the process pulling Süle out of his position in Germany’s back line. This helped Spain to build out from the back and get around Germany’s increasingly effective high press... 🧐🧵
In the second half, Germany continued to press aggressively, and Asensio proved key to Spain’s progress by dropping deep. He moved into the space behind Germany’s double pivot, who tightly marked Spain’s number eights, Gavi and Pedri... 🧐🧵
When introduced, Morata dropped short to link like Asensio but also threatened Germany in behind. Alba pushed forward much earlier than Carvajal, with Pedri happy to drop in and cover, while Gavi was more advanced on the right, ready to overlap around the right midfielder... 🧐🧵
Germany were set up in a 4-2-3-1. They initially posed a threat on the break, with Gündogan dropping to link play with the midfield runners. Once they managed to established spells of possession, Gündogan again dropped away from his number 10 slot, rotating with Goretzka... 🧐🧵
Germany pressed high. Musiala jumped out to Spain centre-back Rodri, and in doing so formed a front line of two with Müller. This allowed Müller to focus on Aymeric Laporte and try to limit the Spain centre-back's opportunities to step into midfield with the ball... 🧐🧵
In the second half, Germany went more attacking by pushing both full-backs forward, while the double pivot provided cover underneath the attacks. Both wide midfielders moved inside, with Musiala often drawing several Spanish players towards the ball... 🧐🧵
Gnabry was moved to the left after Sané was introduced, with Musiala moving to a ten. Füllkrug was introduced as a more traditional nine, and he was able to pin the Spanish centre-backs far better than Müller. Sané then linked well with Musiala in central areas... 🧐🧵
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Traditionally, full-backs are the widest players in a back four, and as a result they attack and defend mostly in the wide areas. However, full-backs who move inside into central spaces are known as ‘inverted full-backs’. This movement adds an extra presence centrally... ↩️🧐
Although Pep Guardiola is the coach most associated with the inverted full-back, Johan Cruyff used them with Barcelona many years before. Then, he often converted the 4-3-3 into a 3-4-3 diamond, with one full-back inverting into central midfield... ↩️🧐
Manchester United were set up in a 4-2-3-1 shape, but Fred pushed forward from the double pivot to become a number 8 and give them a stronger attacking presence in central midfield. Bruno Fernandes then adapted his positioning, moving into the left inside channel... 🧐🧵
The hosts eventually pushed both full-backs higher, primarily working around the outside of Tottenham’s wing-backs. United’s wingers then came inside, with the freedom to rotate with Fred and Fernandes, as long as both inside channels were always occupied... 🧐🧵
Barcelona were set up in a 4-3-3, against a Madrid 4-4-2 defensive block. Torres moved inside to support centre-forward Aubameyang. De Jong and Pedri widened to support through the inside channels, with Busquets left as the single pivot ahead of the two centre-backs... 🧐🧵
Busquets dropped into defence to draw one of Madrid’s central midfielders up, and Pedri drifted wider to drag the other out. This often left De Jong as the free man to receive in the inside channel when Barcelona’s back line could access him... 🧐🧵
4-4-2 is made up of three distinct lines. The back four including two centre-backs and two full-backs. Ahead of them, a midfield four features two players in the middle and one on each side. Then the front two in attack who provide both height and goalscoring threat... 4️⃣4️⃣2️⃣🧵
In the 1950s, Viktor Maslov developed another variation of the 4-2-4, in which the two wingers dropped back alongside the two central midfielders. So originated the 4-4-2, which worked to overload opposition midfields with traditionally fewer numbers... 4️⃣4️⃣2️⃣🧵
How Diego @Simeone’s #AtleticoMadrid knocked Manchester United out of the Champions League through attacking in a 3-5-2 and left-sided counter-attacks... 🧐🧵
United were set up in a 4-2-3-1, up against Atlético’s 5-3-2 defensive block. The hosts built around Atlético’s front two and progressed down the flanks. A strong spell in the first half came as a result of Ronaldo dropping out to combine between a full-back and winger... 🧐🧵
When Ronaldo drifted out to the left, left-back Alex Telles was more aggressive with his positioning. He overlapped to support Jadon Sancho, who made direct runs in behind, especially after moving into the inside channel... 🧐🧵
Guardiola set his team up in their familiar 4-3-3, against United’s 4-4-2 block. City focused on building through the inside channels. De Bruyne and Silva received in between the United winger and central midfielder, before connecting with the wide attacker and full-back... 🧐🧵
Walker held his position at right-back, acting as cover against any United counter-attacks, while Cancelo combined with Silva and Grealish on the left. Foden’s supporting movements to that side led to multiple quick combinations that broke through United’s deeper block... 🧐🧵