- in short: no intel, no experience.
- 🇺🇦 is strong & well armed with Soviet & Western weapons, linked with contemporary centrix-based comms supported with AI.
2/n - 🇺🇦 operates along the 🇺🇸 concept of multidomain battle (air, land, sea, space, cyber) with live intel, uninterrupted combat readiness inside the OODA loop.
- 🇷🇺 noticed that the tactics 🇺🇦 employs is not what 🇷🇺 expects.
3/n - 🇺🇦 artillery (10-12 pieces) disperse into autonomous groups with 2-4 pieces each (on an area up to 100 sq kms); no 🇺🇦radio activity whatsoever.
- autonomous means each 🇺🇦 group cdr is authorized to plan its operations independently from other groups.
4/n
- they frequently change positions even without opening fire.
- each arty piece has its own C2 post (24/7) connected into Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS); cdr may receive time windows to execute the mission. His decisions are not influenced from above.
5/ - 1-5 shells per one arty piece and scoot.
- М-777 timings in minutes: from marching to combat mode (4), 5 shells fired (1), from combat to marching (3). 8 minutes total.
- 🇷🇺 arty response time must be shorter than 3 ½ minutes. Next to impossible.
6/n - 🇷🇺 aerial recce data is employable only in 50% and doesn’t reach the 🇷🇺 maximum arty range.
- acoustic recce can’t precisely locate the rocket arty (MLRS like #HIMARS) positions.
7/n - 🇷🇺 radars when challenged to pinpoint the starting positions of Excalibur or HIMARS must measure the trajectories at least twice - in early moment/s and at least 5kms after the first measurement.
- Zoopark-1M can spot a 155mm projectile up to 25km distance but not further.
8/n - 🇷🇺 afraid of AN/TPQ-47 & AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR that can pinpoint an #Iskander firing position from 300km.
- 🇷🇺 assessment: Zooparks can locate barrel arty up to 30km, MLRS to 70km & SRBMs up to 150km. Situation will improve when new 🇷🇺 radars Yastreb-AB (Ястреб-АВ) are fielded.
9/n - 🇷🇺 arty lacking navigation, automatic positioning readout, digital comms, automatic reloading & precision ammo as well as passive radars
- 🇷🇺 propose to divide the CBF AOR into three layers: 1. close, 2. medium & 3. remote. 1: 122/152 mm 2S1/2S3 with “Aistenok/Аистенок.
10/n 2. 152 mm MSTA-S (or Koalitsya-SV, 2S5 Giatsint) with Zoopark-1M, AZK-7M, KZTR Penicilin (Пенициллин). 3. SRBMs Iskander, BM-27 Uragan, BM-30 Smerch with satellites imagery & UAV Forpost.
Source: 🇺🇦. bit.ly/3UgTbJz
🧵 1/n
Kadyrov’s army
- no tanks/artillery/AD
- backbone: MRAP/BTR/BMP
- 3 helicopters (unarmed). NFI.
ORBAT:
- 141 special "Kadyrov" regiment North
- 249 separate special battalion South
- special QRF (СОБР) "Ahmat"
2/n - special mobile unit (ОМОН) "Ahmat-Grozny"
- special "Kadyrov" police regiment
- From June 2022 4 more battalions were established:
"North-", "South-", "West-" & "East-Ahmat"
(1/3)
@InformNapalm hints:
- 🇷🇺 GRU plans to de-Lukashenko-ize Belarus
- if true, chaos likely
- 🇷🇺 perceives Union 🇷🇺/🇧🇾 State as disfunctional
- #Lukashenko may be replaced by Gen. Alexander Volfovich or Gen. Stanislav Zas (CSTO)
- both top-brass 🇧🇾 are seen as pro-Russian
(2/3)
- remarkable & unexpected death of 🇧🇾 MFA Vladimir Makei who was completely healthy as a horse
- reportedly VM served as a secret communication channel for Lukashenko with the West (via Austria).
- now these links are cut-off.
- VM considered as independent from Moscow
🧵 #Russian tactical radios 1/ Long story short: it is FUBAR.
But if you want some more details, enjoy. But keep in mind it is not a comprehensive 🧵. The more I read in 🇷🇺 forums, the more questions arise. I hope some readers have better knowledge than me and answer them. 👉2/
2/ who is the architect of 🇷🇺 signals troops and where is he now? His name is GenCol Khalil Arslanov (2013-2020). And his position was Chief of Main Signals Directorate of the Russian General Staff. Now accused for corruption, but his court case is classified from June 2022.
3/ The responsible the purchase of the Azart digital radios confessed that the contract (18.5 billion RUR) was artificially increased by 6.7 billion RUR.
And in reality the radios were purchased in 🇨🇳, only cosmetic touches were added in Russia. Here export & military versions.
#Russian mobilization system (1/3). Shortly.
1.Soviet model disbanded in 2009
- “mobilization” officers’ specialties erased
- military universities stopped teaching “mobilization”
- voenkomats re-subordinated to civilian administrations
(2/3)
- numerous “mothballed” units/depots disbanded
- training area sold, ammunition for sale/training/utilization
2.mobilization system restored in 2018
- 🇷🇺MoD attempt to reverse the losses
- but to restore was much more difficult than liquidate
(3/3)
- current production went to active army, not depots
- regions or PMC started to buy en masse defense production
- still the system is saturated with corruption
The system was maintained for 50+ years, vanished for 10, now it is a makeshift & impromptu patchwork.
- #RussianArmy unable to gain advantage over technologically comparable enemy
- trained to parade & prevent, not win the war
- inadequate ORBAT (because not necessary in daily/parade routine) without:
2/n - modern signals units
- reconnaissance units
- UAVs
- direct link to 🇷🇺 satellites
- ammunition, especially precise
- sights/scopes/optics/NVGs/thermal
Inadequate/limited training w/o
- night livex
- medical
- maintenance/logistics/repair scenarios
3/n
- camouflage/concealed deployment
- all directions manouvre (withdrawal/retrograde/flanking/encircling)
- rear area security
- liaison officer exchange & General Staff attached monitors
1/n #Russian defense tactics in short headers:
- based on strengthened separated (200-900m) points
- the "empty" spaces covered by artillery & obstacles (mines)
- but not in Donbas, where the 🇷🇺 defense is much denser & cover/protect one another with fire
2/n - 🇷🇺 defense are often along rivers but once 🇺🇦 bridgeheads are established, 🇷🇺 unable to defeat them
- 🇺🇦 can and 🇷🇺 can’t maneuver their center of gravity
- 🇷🇺 artillery is not flexible
- 🇷🇺 units/commanders like having a significant space in front of them (no man’s land)
3/n - this no man’s land serves as observation & artillery strike area
- 🇷🇺 need this to recognize 🇺🇦 avenues of approaches
- 🇷🇺 arty not prepared to strike in the depths of own formation
- 🇷🇺 units also untrained to fight inside large forests
cc @STRATPOINTS_EU@TheStudyofWar