2/ First, the headline is the nuclear issue. Putin is walking back some of his more bellicose statements, now claiming that Russia would not use them first. This is positive (if he is genuine), but what does this really mean?
3/ He is enlarging the corner he has painted himself into with his #Ukraine invasion. Currently, he has minimal strategic room for manoeuvre. By ruling out nuclear first use, he further reduces any potential for NATO direct intervention in the war.
4/ He is also, just slightly, easing back his narrative about the conquest of Ukraine being an existential one for Russia. This gives him some wriggle room down the track should he need it.
5/ And he has probably now been presented with modelling from his military that shows the use of a few tactical nuclear weapons would have minimal battlefield impacts but they would have huge, long term strategic effects for Russia and its neighbours.
6/ The second noteworthy statement was that his invasion of #Ukraine is a ‘lengthy process.’ These words, probably chosen well in advance, are designed for a couple of audiences.
7/ The first audience is the Russian population. He is preparing them for other future potential expansions in commitment, possibly including more mobilisation phases. This has been explored in reports from @TheStudyofWar & @criticalthreatsunderstandingwar.org/backgrounder/r…
8/ Another audience would be Russian military and national security officials (as well as people like the head of Wagner). He wants to keep them on side, so Putin is saying that he is in this to win, and won’t be cutting and running. At least that is his plan at the moment!
9/ A third audience is the population of those Western nations who are supporting #Ukraine. He is again asking them if high inflation and high energy costs over the long term are worth their support to Ukraine. washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/…
10/ Finally, he is essentially saying to the governments of western nations “good luck with keeping your populations on side with this war in the next couple years, and good luck with the cost of expanding your munitions production capacity to keep up with #Ukraine’s usage.”
11/ Now, these comments could have just been spur of the moment mutterings of a tired President. But somehow I doubt it.
12/ It again underpins the need for strategic patience from the governments and populations supporting #Ukraine over winter and into 2023. And it reinforces the need to provide every bit of support possible to ensure Ukraine emerges victorious from the Russian invasion. End
There remains much uncertainty about the reported Ukrainian strike on Russian airbases in the past 24 hours. This appears to provide some corroboration. What does this mean for the Russo-Ukraine war? 1/15 🧵
In the wake of the Ukrainian victory in western #Kherson, and in the midst of Russia’s ongoing terror bombing campaign against Ukrainian civil infrastructure, we should look at the man in charge of Russia's campaign. A thread on General #Surovikin. 1/25 🧵
2/ CAVEAT: This thread is NOT about admiring an enemy military commander who has previously demonstrated brutality towards Syrian civilians, his own soldiers, and now against the Ukrainians. It is designed to provide insights into how to defeat him. rferl.org/a/russia-bruta…
3/ Much of the reporting about the Russians in #Ukraine focusses on ‘the Russians’ as some amorphous mass. The reality is, even in barely adequate military institutions, there is organization, control, and command from the top. Military commanders matter.
We are seeing more frequent references to the potential for Chinese action to seize Taiwan from current and former government and military leaders. It appears the clock may be running down on deterring a conflict over Taiwan. 1/23 🧵 smh.com.au/world/asia/rud…
2/ Recently, former Australian PM Kevin Rudd described how the next five years will shape the long-term stability of the Indo-Pacific region & determine the success of U.S. efforts to deter China from taking military action against Taiwan.
3/ In June, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned that the Russian invasion of #Ukraine could be repeated in #Taiwan by China in the absence of unified deterrence by the U.S. and its allies. business-standard.com/article/intern…
There has been a woefully inadequate debate on the lessons of Ukraine in Australia, including land combat. And nearly all commentators on tanks/armoured vehicles in this nation are poorly informed and obsessed with a narrow view of future conflict. 1/25
2/ There is a sense in the current debate that we know exactly what the next war will be. Look at the White Papers of the 1980s & 1990s to see how wrong we got it. We are repeating the same mistake by thinking we can predict the next fight. Apparently it’s only air and sea!
3/ It will result in an ADF that lacks adaptive capacity because we have only prepared it to fight at sea and in the air. Wars might be fought in these domains; they are never won there. But once removed, you cannot rebuild high level land warfighting skills quickly.
This week, despite continuing Russian terror bombing in #Ukraine and an important G20 meeting in Indonesia, the possible demise of Twitter has been dominant in the feeds of many social media users. What would it mean for the war in Ukraine if Twitter dies? 1/23
2/ It is an important question, given the centrality of strategic influence and information warfare to the conflict in #Ukraine. Twitter is the communication tool of choice during crises, and has featured in several previous conflicts. abc.net.au/news/2022-11-2…
3/ But the Ukraine war has seen a Cambrian explosion in the use of social media – especially Twitter – to share images & stories from inside Ukraine, to disseminate situation reports, to build crowdfunding efforts, track war crimes, and for strategic influence activities.
Recently, I have been asked a lot of questions about the impact of winter on the war in #Ukraine. In some respects, this is pretty ironic; I was born & live on the flattest, dustiest & hottest continent imaginable. That said, a thread on the coming winter war in Ukraine. 1/25 🧵
2/ I wrote a short piece on this topic yesterday that you can read in full at my (free) substack. But, because I know a lot of people are on @Twitter but not substack, I thought I would post my thoughts here as well. mickryan.substack.com/p/the-winter-w…
3/ There are many historical insights on this issue. The Indian Army has been conducting high-altitude and very cold operations for a very long time. Korea and WW2 all offer lessons on how wars continue despite the onset of winter.