On Dec 6th, #Libya 's #HoR adopted a law establishing a constitutional court to be based in #Benghazi & transforming the Tripoli-based Supreme #Court into a Cassation Court. Background, validity, & implication: 🧵
I-Background:
1.a)In legal terms, the origin of Libya’s current crisis goes back to a ruling by the supreme court’s constitutional chamber issued in Nov. 2014 and annulling HoR election.
1.b) From a legal standpoint: the current HoR is not the elected house parliament of Libya, but a body revived by the LPA as a party to a conflict and partner in a process together with the HCS also revived by the same Agreement.
2.Since then, many constitutional challenges were launched before the same constitutional chamber against measures and acts taken by the HoR and its Speaker. But the chamber remained closed.
3.Last August, as chief justice Hafi entered and arm-wrestling w HoR Speaker, he re-opened the constitutional chamber thus making the risk for HoR very concrete. In retaliation, he was removed. HoR speaker continued his offensive against the judiciary.
4. This had resulted in appointing a new head of the High Judicial Council based on a law that was never passed; appointing a new General Prosecutor. Establishing a constitutional court is only the logical culmination of that strategy.
5.HoR Speaker’s strategy is consistent & effective: induce, every now and then, a new destabilizing element, fact, act, & gradually bring all institutions under his authority. With a constit court he would have designed & selected, his exercise of power will remain unfettered.
II- VALIDITY:
6.a)The too many procedural flaws put aside, the Supreme Court, including its constitutional chamber, was established by a constitutional provision and could be altered only by a constitutional amendment, not an ordinary law. Quick explanation: 👇
6.b) The current supreme court was established by the 1951 constitution, & ORGANIZED by a 1953 law. Those provisions were not annulled by 1969 Const Decl (Cf.art 33-34). This is why the 1982 law did only RE-ORGANIZE the court, based on the same constit framework.
7. Assuming it could be established by ordinary law, it is obvious that this court will address acts & “legislations necessary for the transitional period”. Accordingly, such a law would fall under LPA art 23-1 & would therefore be a shared competence between the HoR-HCS.
8. By establishing a constitutional court, the HoR tries to evade the many constit challenges launched against it before the Supreme Court. It does so by selecting its own judges. A well-established principle of law states: no one should be a judge in his own cause.
9. HoR Speaker’s single argument is ludicrous: this is implementing the CDA draft as agreed btw HoR-HCS committee. On this issue, “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”, & those talks had famously failed. Further, HCS itself rejected the move & suspended contacts w HoR.
III- IMPLICATIONS:
10.HoR has established chaos at the apex of the judiciary, the only branch that resisted the dynamic of institutional splits so far. It has thus killed constitutional review in Libya, one of the most important tools 2 protect people’s constitutional rights.
11.This is also another step in politicizing the judiciary, a development that will have long-term and long-term and devastating effects on Libyans, ordinary Libyans who rely on courts to protect their fundamental rights.
12.a)It has been a dramatic mistake for international actors to engage the Supreme Court and the High Judicial Council in political talks.
12.b) This court is a guardian of the constitution. Its very jurisdiction and power run counter to the quid pro quo political logic.
13. Further, the law governing the Libyan political process consists of 3 docs: the ICD, LPA, and LPDF Roadmap. A closer look at them, and analysis of their interaction, would reveal that the keyword is mutual consent, not legal validity.
14.a)This is a reminder that involving the judiciary will not only be damaging but also pointless.
14.b) Looking at comparative practice, nowhere in conflict-affected countries, was the conflict sorted out by a court ruling. Instrumentalizing and politicizing the judiciary will only have.
15.International community, and the mediation, in particular, should help preserve the unity, integrity, and dignity of the judicial function in Libya for the sake of the Rule of Law in this country.
1/21 Libya’s supreme court ‘’re-activated’’ its Constitutional Chamber, ‘’closed’’ since 2016. While a good news for RoL & constitutional supremacy in principle, this decision might contribute to weaponizing the judiciary. Background and consequences:
2/21 Constit chamber was ‘’closed’’ in 2016 by a decision of the Court’s General Assembly. The decision was annulled by Tripoli’s Admin Court but chamber remained illegally ‘’closed’’. Credible observers contend that its closing was ‘’strongly encouraged’’ by some internationals.
3/21 WHAT TRIGGERED TODAY’S MOVE? HoR launched an offensive to take control of the Supreme Court & High Judicial Council: 1. Last December, it ‘’re-constituted’’ the High Judicial Council vesting its chairmanship in pro-HoR Mohamed Al-Ghwi (instead of Chief Justice El-Hafi);
1. #Libya’s #constitutional basis (not) agreed upon btw #HoR-HCS was released cutt.ly/LZhfoMJ. “Embarrassing” doc: creates more prb than CDA draft & reveals hasty drafting. Instead of bringing 2 houses together, it is now dividing each of them. Observations on this doc:
2. Note: The text was supposed to be an amended version of the CDA’s draft constitution. Unless explicitly mentioned, the below observations deal only with amendments inserted during the two houses' Cairo-Geneva talks.
3. Art 2 on minority languages makes them official “in areas where they are spoken”. Not acceptable to minority groups who want them official languages of the State. CDA original text remained constructively vague and envisioned a parliamentary session to deal w the matter.
1. KS text is now THE #constitution of #Tunisia. The electoral body, #ISIE, just announce the referendum results: a 27% turnout and 94% of them approving the proposed text. A few takeaways:
2. Does this mean that almost 75% of Tunisians oppose(d) this constitution? Does it change the fact that this constitution is the culmination of an authoritarian, unilaterally, and unconstitutionally conducted process? In my humble view, the response to both is NO.
3. While 27% turnout is very low from a comparative perspective, note that the last Algerian referendum, in 2020, saw only a 23,84% turnout. A major French constitutional reform enjoying the consensus of almost all political parties registered only 30% turnout in 2000.
1/7 Recently published consultative committee's draft sheds new light on president KS draft #constitution 4 #Tunisia. Discrepancies btw both show that problematic provisions are conscious choices. Below table shows revealing differences btw committee's text & president's draft
2/7 The Chair and a member of the committee that developed the initial draft distanced themselves from President's proposed text. Cf. Text of their draft, letter by the chair, Pr.Belaid, & Pr. Amin Mahfoudh: bit.ly/3IcfADv & bit.ly/3uoHV3L
3/7 One point attracted activists' and commentators’ attention: the constitution entering into force following the referendum, i.e. implicitly, regardless of the result. Understandable concern esp. when we compare this wording with the one proposed by the Consult. Com.
1. #Tunisia draft #constitution by Kaiss Saied’s is out. Below are initial remarks on the content of this text in particular on the political system, preamble, rights and liberties, and a few institutional design aspects:
2. POLITICAL SYSTEM:
The polit syst is a ‘presidentialist’ one following the tradition of post-independnce authoritarian Arab & African constit. It rests on 1 central, the president, around which a multitude of bodies gravitate while being, one way or the other, submitted to it
3. A bicameral and weakened parliament: A new chamber represents regions and provinces. Not clear from the text whether the law-making chamber is elected directly or not! One needs to wait for the electoral law.
1/14 Despite reports & statements, the #HoR-HSC Cairo meeting failed to reach a compromise on a constitutional basis for elections in #Libya. They have never been as far from this goal. But, their own measure of success is a different one from facilitating lections. THREAD
2/14 elections failed so far over only 2 provisions: eligibility conditions, & sequencing of elections. Current talks chose to use the draft constitution as an interim basis for elex and, to that effect, sought to amend its ‘’divisive issues’’. This was a recipe for failure:
3/14 By using the CDA draft, HoR-HSC automatically added a long -and ever-extending- list of unsurmountable issues. These include (in addition to eligibility and elections sequencing):
headquarters of the 2 parliament chambers;
Senate composition; &
decentralization.