Thread by @WarintheFuture

In 1914-1915, a scandal erupted in England about the shortage of high explosive shells for the western front. There was a lag in industry expanding to satisfy the enormous consumption of munitions in the war. Something similar is occurring now with #Ukraine. 1/24

2/ Importantly, the WW1 shell crisis was also a symptom of a military institution that had failed to anticipate the challenges of modern war. The current shortage of munitions should be understood as a government & military failure to anticipate. smh.com.au/world/europe/a…

3/ Consequently in 2023, the Ukrainian Army may run out of munitions before it runs out of fight. Based on current usage of ammunition in the war, production of munitions is increasingly lagging battlefield needs.

4/ Interestingly, Russia also finds itself in a similar predicament. This is good. defenseone.com/threats/2022/1…

5/ Back to Ukraine’s needs. Most of Ukraine’s usage of NATO 155mm artillery ammunition has been drawn from war stocks, not production lines. These stocks are finite.

6/ Ukraine fires up to 5000 artillery rounds each day (the Russians fire more). With the US producing just 14,000 shells per month (European figures are probably similar), there is a drastic shortfall in this vital ammunition type. rusi.org/explore-our-re…

7/ Despite a ramping up of US production, quantities won’t increase until 2024. And, as a NATO official, quoted in the New York Times describes, 20 of NATO’s 30 members are “tapped out” in regards to supplying ammunition to Ukraine. defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/…

8/ The situation for air defence missiles & precision weapons is also trending towards shortages in 2023 if fighting continues & production doesn’t increase. Provision of systems such as JDAMS may help, but the long & the short of it is that ammo production must increase.

9/ Huge ammunition consumption rates were thought to be a relic of the past. Scarcely a single Western government since the end of the Cold War has imagined that large scale production of weapons and ammunition would be required again.

10/ This is the genesis of the failure in policy & military strategy that has led to the current predicament. Weapons are produced too slowly, and in smaller quantities, than what is required in this new era of industrial scale warfare.

11/ As Alex Vershinin at @RUSI_org has written, “the war in Ukraine demonstrates that war between peer or near-peer adversaries demands the existence of a technically advanced, mass scale, industrial-age production capability.”

12/ At least the Europeans and Americans have an industrial base that can be expanded to produce (eventually) the quantity and quality of munitions required for modern combat. Not so in Australia. So, what do the lessons of Ukraine mean for Australia?

13/ Currently, our precision weapons and heavy calibre ammunition are all manufactured overseas and imported. In short, if we don’t already stock it or build it, once a war begins Australia is on its own. And our current war stocks are tiny.

14/ The capacity to manufacture even basic artillery shells & fuses is complicated by complex supply chains for the many components. The situation is worse for precision weapons. For example, the Saab Next Generation Light Anti-Tank Weapon relies on suppliers in a dozen nations.

15/ Therefore, it takes careful, advanced planning to prioritise which munitions and weapons might be needed, and which ones should be produced indigenously. It is not a manufacturing capability that can be turned on and off like a light switch.

16/ Australia’s official history of WW2, records that it took from 1939 to 1943 to transition industry to military production. It required a balancing act to ensure the right numbers of qualified workers were available. awm.gov.au/collection/C14…

17/ Such challenges are only magnified today. An outcome of the Defence Strategic Review should be a focus on indigenous production of munitions and other modern weapons.

18/ With creative thinking, we could imagine an Australian defence industry able to produce small, medium and heavy calibre ammunition as well as a variety drones for ground, air and maritime operations that have both military and civil applications.

19/ This industrial capacity should be underpinned by increased government investment and incentives for indigenous R&D. Australia should – by itself or in partnership with others – invest in developing a new generation of precision weapons that are cheaper & quicker to build.

20/ Imagine what Australia inventiveness might produce if we invested in development and production of the physical and cyber weapons of deterrence and war here. Nations like Sweden, Israel and Taiwan already to this – why can’t we?

21/ The latest fad among a small cabal of Canberra platform junkies is advocating for stealth bombers. Unless Australia is looking to fight, without our American friends, against China or Russia, these are an extraordinary waste of money.

22/ We should instead be thinking about sustainable, networked and survivable weapons. What wins wars is the will of people, an adaptive approach to strategy and munitions development - and effective, mass production of weapons.

23/ It is not a cheap undertaking. A changing and more dangerous strategic environment at home, and the lessons of Ukraine, shows we need such a capacity – if the government can explain the case to the Australian people. smh.com.au/world/europe/a…

24/ Thank you to the following whose images and links were used in this thread: @smh @RUSI_org @DefenseOne