The #Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced today that Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery #Gerasimov will take over as theater commander as part of a major reshuffle of the Russian command structure for the war in #Ukraine.
2/ #Gerasimov’s appointment is likely meant to support an intended decisive Russian military effort in 2023, likely in the form of resumed Russian offensive operations.
3/ Gerasimov's appointment over #Surovikin, a favorite of Russian milbloggers and #Wagner Group financier Yevgeny #Prigozhin, is also highly likely to have been in part a political decision to reassert the primacy of the Russian MoD in an internal Russian power struggle.
4/ #Gerasimov will likely preside over a disorganized command structure plagued by endemic, persistent, and self-reinforcing failures that he largely set into motion in his initial role before the invasion of #Ukraine. isw.pub/UkrWar011123
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#Russian forces’ likely capture of #Soledar on January 11 is not an operationally significant development and is unlikely to presage an imminent Russian encirclement of #Bakhmut.
2/ While all available evidence indicates Ukrainian forces no longer maintain an organized defense in #Soledar, Russian information operations have overexaggerated its importance, which is at best a Russian Pyrrhic tactical victory.
3/ ISW continues to assess that the capture of Soledar—a settlement smaller than 5.5 sq mi—will not enable Russian forces to exert control over critical Ukrainian ground lines of communication into Bakhmut nor better position Russian forces to encircle the city in the short term.
Igor Girkin, former commander of Russian militants in Donbas and a prominent milblogger, heavily implied that he would support the removal of Russian President Vladimir #Putin from office, his most direct criticism of Putin to date. isw.pub/UkrWar011023
2/ Girkin criticized Putin for appointing and refusing to remove Russian military leaders who oversee frequent and disastrous military failures, in reference to Lapin’s appointment.
3/ Russian milbloggers have historically criticized Russian military leaders and MoD officials while upholding Putin as an effective wartime leader, as ISW has previously reported.
The Ukrainian General Staff deviated from its normal reporting pattern about Russian forces in #Belarus and near #Ukraine’s northern border on January 10, an indicator of possible Russian preparations for an offensive in northern Ukraine. isw.pub/UkrWar011023
2/ The Ukrainian General Staff excluded its usual statement that #Ukraine has not observed Russian forces forming strike groups in #Belarus or northern Ukraine. for the first time since it reintroduced discussing Russian forces in Belarus on November 20.
3/ This could indicate that the Ukrainian military has observed Russian forces forming strike groups in northern Ukraine.
2/ The Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies confirmed that Ukrainian troops captured Pidkuichansk, 8km northwest of #Svatove, on January 8.
3/ Geolocated footage shows a Russian tank from the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division firing on Ukrainian positions west of Ploshchanka and approximately 17km NW of Kreminna, indicating that Ukrainian troops have advanced closer to R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway.
Russian forces have not captured the entirety of #Soledar despite false Russian claims that the city has fallen and that #Bakhmut risks imminent encirclement. Russian sources claimed that Wagner Group forces advanced into the west of Soledar on January 10. isw.pub/UkrWar011023
2/ #Wagner Group financier Yevgeny #Prigozhin refuted these claims, remarking that Wagner Group forces are still fighting against concerted Ukrainian resistance. @TheStudyofWar has only observed visual confirmation of Wagner Group forces in central Soledar as of January 10.
3/ The reality of block-by-block control of terrain in Soledar is obfuscated by the dynamic nature of urban combat, however, and Russian forces have largely struggled to make significant tactical gains in the #Soledar area for months.
Russian media reported on Jan. 10 that Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin, former commander of the Central Military District (CMD) & Russian forces in eastern Kharkiv & northern Donetsk oblasts, has been appointed Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces. isw.pub/UkrWar011023
Lapin’s previous role as commander of the "Central" group of Russian forces in Ukraine and commander of the CMD was checkered with controversy following the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive that retook large swaths of territory in Kharkiv & northern Donetsk oblasts last fall
The pro-war info space’s response to Lapin’s perceived command failures served as a catalyst for a fracture between a faction led by Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov & Wagner's Prigozhin—the siloviki—and the Russian MoD establishment that milbloggers widely claimed Lapin represented