I think this is an interesting article, mainly because it discusses battlefield learning and #adaptation in #Ukraine. There are many skills needed by military institutions to be successful in combat. But fostering a learning culture is vital. 1/15
bbc.com/news/world-eur…
2/ It is very likely, in the coming weeks and months, that both Ukrainian and Russian military forces will commence offensive campaigns in different areas of #Ukraine.
3/ As I wrote in a recent article exploring the coming campaigns: "Over winter both sides will have been preparing and shaping the environment for these offensives." mickryan.substack.com/p/the-campaign…
4/ Further: "They will have been training soldiers, deploying units, conducting reconnaissance while seeking weaknesses to exploit in the offensives to come."
5/ Perhaps one of the most important endeavours of both sides since their major campaigns in 2022 will have been their programs to examine the key lessons from operations in 2022, and then turn them into force-wide adaptations for their 2023 campaigns.
6/ Both sides have adapted during the war. Russia, expecting to undertake a coup de main in the first days of the war, had to adapt from around D+3 to conduct combat operations. It had to reorient the mindset of its troops and adjust its logistics to do this.
7/ Ukraine has adapted its battlefield tactics, and its long range targeting and strike activities. More adaptation will occur if Ukraine receives the 150km range GLSDB. thedefensepost.com/2022/11/29/ukr…
8/ So, a vital undertaking for both sides in the lead up to their 2023 campaigns will have been to assess where they can quickly improve tactics, recon and intel collection & dissemination, force structure, C2, and fire / logistic support.
9/ Some of this learning is done away from the battlefield - particularly the operational analysis and dissemination of lessons through new training, techniques and doctrine.
10/ But ultimately, the most important 'classroom' in this war is combat. Whether it is close combat in urban environments or trench warfare, or long range combat through artillery duels and aerial combat, combat is the great teacher of soldiers.
11/ And therein lies the importance of this @BBCNews article. It gets to the heart of the importance of learning, and of adapting more quickly (and at a higher quality) than the enemy.
12/ A Ukrainian soldier quoted in the piece states: "We understand that Russia is learning every day and changing their strategy. And I think we need to learn faster."
13/ He has described a key battlefield advantage that both sides will want to build and sustain in the lead up to, and during, the 2023 offensives: the ability to learn, to share lessons and adapt at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, and do it faster than the enemy.
14/ As Barno & Bensahel write: “preparing to adapt in the next war is just as important as preparing to fight itself.” So while tanks and munitions are vital, winning the adaptation battle, built on tactical & institutional learning, is a core part of war. End.
15/ Thank you to the following whose links and images were used in this thread: @BBCNews @DefenceHQ @DefenceU @DefensePost @TDF_UA

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Mick Ryan, AM

Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @WarintheFuture

Jan 30
In December 2022, @ZelenskyUA proclaimed “we will restore the normality of life in the territory of Donbas and Crimea, which were illegally occupied in 2014 and have been brought to the point of disaster.” How might #Ukraine retake Crimea? 1/25 🧵 mickryan.substack.com/p/all-roads-le…
2/ With all the speculation about the potential locations and objectives of forthcoming Russian and Ukrainian offensives in 2023, there is one strategic objective that may be the culminating point of this war. Crimea.
3/ Whether it is a major military campaign on the ground, a Ukrainian long range strike campaign to make Crimea untenable for Russia, or a forced negotiation, Crimea may be this war’s last campaign. But before examining the ‘how’ of such a campaign, why might #Ukraine conduct it?
Read 25 tweets
Jan 25
One of the best ways to defeat an adversary is to target their #strategy. To do that, we must understand it. Therefore, in my latest article, I explore Russian strategy, and its various components, for its continuing #Ukraine invasion in 2023. 1/25 🧵🇺🇦 mickryan.substack.com/p/thinking-abo…
2/ The plan for a ten-day lightening conquest of Ukraine, as described in a recent RUSI report, was – in the main – a failure. The Russians did make considerable gains in the south and the east, but their northern campaign was a military disaster. rusi.org/explore-our-re…
3/ Despite battlefield setbacks in the north and northeast of Ukraine, Putin and his defence and intelligence chiefs proceeded to assemble an alternative theory of victory for their invasion and attempted takeover of #Ukraine.
Read 25 tweets
Jan 19
From the beginning of the Russian invasion, arguments over provision of different weapons & technologies to #Ukraine have been waged in Europe and the US. Perhaps the most long-standing, and important, is provision of American or European tanks. 1/22 🧵🇺🇦
2/ My aim in this thread is not to argue whether they should be provided. I think it is obvious they should. If Russia can deploy T90s or even its new T-14s (according to British Intelligence), why are we denying similar capabilities to #Ukraine?
3/ The objective here is to explore the considerations for the introduction of western tanks into the Ukrainian armed forces. The need is well established. Tanks are a valuable part of the modern combined arms team. Tanks save lives!
Read 22 tweets
Jan 19
This week - big additional commitments to #Ukraine from Canada, the UK, Poland, Estonia, Sweden & the Netherlands. Another big package from the US coming soon. Since the October 2022 announcement, nothing new from Australia. 1/6 🧵 reuters.com/world/europe/d…
2/ On total bilateral commitments Australia just scapes into the top 30 beneath Latvia and Lithuania according to the @kielinstitute app.23degrees.io/view/DUeaa54W7… #ukrainesupporttracker
3/ This is parsimonious and short sighted from the world’s 13th biggest economy. Lighting up the Sydney Opera House, and kind words, will not help Ukrainian civilians injured and killed by Russian attacks.
Read 6 tweets
Jan 18
Over the northern hemisphere winter, eastern Ukraine has been the scene of bitter and intense combat. The offensives around #Bakhmut & #Kreminna highlight the different strategic & cultural approaches that Ukraine and Russia have applied in this war. 1/23 🧵🇺🇦
2/ Both offensives have featured trench and urban warfare, artillery duels, very short-range engagements between infantry and tanks, as well as long range strikes on supply and headquarters locations. But there are differences. abc.net.au/news/2023-01-1…
3/ One of the key differences is an asymmetry between Russian and Ukrainian operational thinking. For this Russian offensive, there has been a focus on securing towns like #Bakhmut & #Soledar that have limited strategic utility.
Read 23 tweets
Jan 16
Recently, comparisons with the WW1 stalemates on the western front from 1915 have been used by some observers of the war in #Ukraine. It makes for good headlines but there is one problem; it just isn’t true. 1/22 smh.com.au/world/europe/n…
2/ At the beginning of 1915, the war on the Western Front had reached a stalemate. There were technical, strategic and doctrinal reasons for this. The machine gun changed tactics and killed soldiers by the thousands, as did more accurate and concentrated artillery.
3/ Poor communications hampered the coordination of the different elements of the massive armies. A lack of protected mobility meant that even when a breach was made in enemy lines, the enemy could more quickly fill the gap than the attacker could exploit it.
Read 22 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(