2/12 Average daily losses of the main attacking country: 1. Germany (World War II) - 2415 killed soldiers per day. 2. USSR (Finnish War 1939) - 1440 3. Germany (World War I) - 1280 4. Russia (Ukrainian war 2022) - 380 (about 650 per day after mobilization).
3/12 5. North Korea (Korean War 1950) - 337 6. Russia (Russian-Japanese War 1904) - 115 7. Russia (First Chechen War 1994) - 22 8. USA (War in Vietnam 1964-75) - 20 9. USSR (Afghan War 1979-1989) - 4 10. USA (Iraq War 2003-2009) - 2
4/12 As we can see, Russia's daily losses are about 20 times greater than the US's losses in Vietnam and Russia's losses in the First Chechen War.
5/12 Obviously, the duration and success of war depend on resources. And one of the most important resources of war is soldiers.
6/12 In order to calculate the potential of a war, the ratio of average daily losses (killed and wounded) to the total number of engaged troops was chosen.
7/12 Example:
The strength of the USSR army in the war against Finland in 1939 was 1 million soldiers.
Average losses - 3365 soldiers per day.
Loss intensity = 3365/1000000=0.336% per day
8/12 Below is an indicator of the intensity of losses of individual countries (attacking side) in various wars.
This indicator shows a fairly clear dependence of the duration of wars (wars that do not achieve complete success) on the intensity of losses.
9/12 Protracted wars are characterized by a loss intensity of less than 0.05% per day. With a loss intensity of more than 0.3% per day, the war usually does not last more than 2-3 months.
10/12 Ru current rate of loss is about 0.144% per day. This may indicate that Russia will be able to continue the war for about two years. Prolonging the Russian war requires significant qualitative changes on the battlefield. Including the effectiveness of the use of soldiers
11/12 Given the relatively small number of forces, such dynamics of losses are unlikely to allow conducting a multi-year campaign.
12/ It is worth noting that the increase in the size of the army, after partial mobilization, led to a proportional increase in the rate of losses. If in the summer the number of killed soldiers was estimated at 200-300 per day. After November, this indicator exceeds 500 per day
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Phase I - Blitzkrieg
Initially, the Ru attack was planned as a large-scale rapid operation from the air, land and water. It was planned in 4 acts:
Act 1: A large-scale missile attack was supposed to suppress the Ukrainian air defense system and create chaos in defense management
Act 2: The main role was planned for amphibious operations. Which were to quickly capture key objects and capture government buildings in the main cities - Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa
Ru planned to use hundreds of helicopters, at least 18 large Il-76 planes and a naval landing force
2/17 Now I only have electricity for 4-6 hours a day, so I can't spend as much time on Twitter as I used to.
But I finally got to my calculations and clarified them to give you a clear picture (it may not be perfect and contain errors, like any analytics).
3/17 In general, the gap between Ukraine and Russia in military power is gradually decreasing.
This happens both because Russia has heavy losses and because Ukraine maintains or even strengthens its power due to the help of allies and war trophies.
2/20 Russia's direct military costs for the 9 months of the war, are about $82 bln. This estimate includes direct costs that are necessary to support military operations. The estimate does not include others defense spending or economic losses forbes.ua/war-in-ukraine…
3/20 In 2021, all budget revenues of Russia amounted to $340 billion. That is, the Russian Federation has already spent a quarter of last year's revenues on the war against Ukraine.
The number of weapons that the West has/supplies to Ukraine
How many Western countries have weapons and how many of these weapons were transferred to Ukraine during the 8 months of the war?
1/17 #russianinvasion#UkraineRussiaWar#Artillery#atacmsforukraine
2/17 NATO transferred 1.4-3.6% of its heavy weapons systems to Ukraine. The highest percentage is for artillery - about 3.6%.
3/ The need for artillery remains the most acute because Ukraine has minimal stocks of shells for Soviet artillery systems of 122/152mm caliber.
The transition to NATO artillery began in April. And in half a year, Ukraine received about 400 artillery systems of 105/155mm caliber
Comparison of Russian and Ukrainian attack schemes:
I decided to compare the offensive of Russia in the spring and the counteroffensive of Ukraine in September in order to understand the reasons for such different results 1/17 #RussiaUkraineWar#kharkivcounteroffensive
2/ Russia
From the very beginning of the war, Russia built its offensive operations along the main highways and key population centers. This is understandable because the Russian offensive relied primarily on heavily armored vehicles.
3/ In this war we saw tank columns trying to storm a city without any infantry, air, or artillery cover. Which is an absolutely failed strategy.
The Armed Forces Ukraine currently uses 25 different models of NATO armored vehicles and 15 different NATO artillery systems
To solve this problem, it is necessary to switch to an integrated supply of weapons 1/4 @SpencerGuard@McFaul@CinC_AFU@oleksiireznikov@USAmbKyiv
2/4 Perhaps it is worth switching to a different approach when a country (or a group of countries) completes a separate military unit (starting with a tank and ending with a repair vehicle).
I made an infographic on how it can be based on the example of the USA and Germany.
3/4 For example, it can be 10 new brigades armed exclusively with NATO systems, which will become the basis of a new army and a new offensive in the spring of 2023.
For example, countries can be divided into 3-4 groups to complete such brigades.