There are many continuities in war. Every new war is an aggregation of the ideas, institutions, technologies, and techniques that have preceded it. A thread on historical continuities after a year of war in #Ukraine. 1/25 🧵mickryan.substack.com/p/a-year-of-wa…
2/ If we peer close enough, we can see the different historical layers that inform, shape, and strangle military effectiveness.
3/ In the Russo-Ukraine War, there are continuities from previous wars that carry through into the strategy, diplomacy, & military operations. There are five important continuities: war as a human endeavor; surprise; alliances; the need for good strategy; and leadership.
4/ War is a continuity in human affairs. Perhaps the most important continuity is that human competition is an enduring element of our existence on this plant. It may recede at times, such as in the wake of the Cold War. mickryan.substack.com/p/a-year-of-wa…
5/ But war is a constant feature of the interplay of nations, groups of nations, and non-state entities. Perhaps the most important lesson from the past year of war in Ukraine is that there are still those who believe war is the best way to get what they want.
6/ This war like all others before it will be settled on the ground. While other domains are vital for strategy and combat, it is on the ground where people live, where territory is taken, where soldiers fight & where politicians set objectives and negotiate termination of wars.
7/ Surprise. Another continuity in war is surprise. This is usually defined as striking at a place, time or location in a manner for which an adversary is not prepared.
8/ Surprise, which is embraced in the Western and Eastern traditions of war, aims to shock an adversary and overwhelm them when they are their weakest, or when they least expect it.
9/ There have many surprises over the past year in the Russo-Ukraine War. Most have been surprised by Russian incompetence; pre-war studies of Russian reform did not comprehend the full range of weaknesses in the Russian military.
10/ We (& Russia) have been surprised by the rcommitment of alliances like NATO and other institutions such as the European Union in their ongoing support for Ukraine. Events like the attack on the Kerch Bridge & the Ukrainian drone boat attack on Sevastopol were also surprises.
11/ No matter how sophisticated or advanced our military and intelligence organisations might be, the agency of humans & their desire to surprise adversaries remains constant. Clausewitz described this as friction, the difference between the theory and practice of war.
12/ Alliances. A 3rd continuity is the importance of alliances. Throughout history, clever tribal leaders and statemen have increased their military potential by entering into partnerships and alliances with their neighbors.
13/ Alliances are also essential in the 21st century. A moribund NATO has been infused with energy and purpose since 24 February 2022. While Ukraine is not a member of NATO, it has demonstrated a resolve that had been absent before now.
14/ It is a demonstration of why alliances – with the right purpose - remain an important part of how the West achieves collective defence for their sovereignty, prosperity and for democracy ideals more broadly.
15/ Good strategy matters. Strategy is a term for which there is no agreed definition. At heart it is about aligning national objectives with the means & ends to achieve objectives. Colin Gray described it as “a bridge between purpose and action”.
16/ There are many examples of effective strategy development and its implementation from the war. There are also examples of poor strategy.Assumptions matter in strategy, and the Russians have so far failed in this regard.
17/ They assumed that the Ukrainians would not fight for long, that their government would collapse, that Ukraine was not a unified state and that the West would not decisively intervene. These failures have had catastrophic consequences for both Russians and Ukrainians.
18/ At the same time, the Ukrainians have been outstanding at integrating all of their national assets into a single unified strategy to repel the Russian invasion. Their strategy of corrosion has attacked all elements of Russian fighting power: physical, intellectual & moral.
19/ Leadership. This is an important continuity. This has been on display most compellingly from Volodymyr Zelensky. He has shown courage, empathy and led those who need him most – the Ukrainian people. He has also reignited an understanding that freedom must be defended.
20/ Zelensky’s words “I don’t need a ride, I need ammunition” electrified his people and his soldiers. In the past year we have seen the birth of someone who has become a very fine wartime leader. president.gov.ua/en
21/ In the past 12 months we have also witnessed the impact of good combat leadership has. Ukrainians have prepared their junior leaders to take the initiative and lead their soldiers by example.
22/ The Russians have demonstrated terrible battlefield leadership at every level. Rob Johnson recently described the Russian approach to their invasion as Dysfunctional Warfare. They have been very poor at combined arms and air-land integration.
23/ There has been a tremendous amount of continuity in this war from previous conflicts. This knowledge is a foundation for recognising where change does occur. It underpins learning and adaptation of tactics, organisations, strategy and equipment.
24/ The changes in the character of war, which have become apparent over the past year of war, will be focus of the next part in this Year of War series. mickryan.substack.com/p/a-year-of-wa…
25/ Thank you to the following whose images were used in this thread: @CNN@DefenceU@RALee85
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As the one-year anniversary of Russia’s 2022 invasion of #Ukraine approaches, the Russian Army has commenced the preliminary phase of its 2023 offensives. A thread on what is occurring, and why the Russians have chosen now to commence them. 1/22 🧵 abc.net.au/news/2023-02-1…
2/ Over the past week, Russia has conducted attacks at Svatove, Soledar, Bakhmut, Dvorichne, Vuhledar and other locations. These are unlikely to be the main campaign that Russian military bloggers hoped for, & that Ukrainian intelligence officials have warned about.
3/ Assuming there is a larger Russian campaign plan at work, these recent attacks are likely to have been probes and ‘reconnaissance in force’ missions to ascertain or test the Ukrainian strengths, dispositions, and reactions.
There is so much to learn from the war in #Ukraine. But, as we approach 1 year since the Russian invasion, we should also be thinking about how our potential adversaries might learn from the conflict. 1/17 🧵 smh.com.au/world/europe/h…
2/ Xi Jinping, and his Central Military Commission, have been paying close attention to the war in #Ukraine. Indeed, the Chinese military have become fast followers of new technologies and techniques in war fighting since their examination of the US in the 1991 Gulf War.
3/ While caution is required to ensure we are not mirror-imaging our Western perspectives, it behoves a clever national security establishment to explore how Ukraine might evolve Xi’s thinking about reunification with Taiwan and other potential military adventures.
Recently there has been more speculation about the timing & size of 2023 Russian offensives in #Ukraine. That the Russians will attempt them is almost a given. Russia has been assembling the pieces of their 2023 offensives since late last year. 1/21 🧵 mickryan.substack.com/p/divining-rus…
2/ Russia has provided a political rationale through Putin’s annexation declaration, the personnel and industrial resources with the mobilisation decree in late 2022, and the changes in command that resulted in General Gerasimov being appointed as unified commander.
3/ The east is the most likely location for Russian attacks, although attacks in the south are also possible. Russian forces might use attacks in the south as feints or demonstrations to draw away Ukrainian forces in the east before launching their main effort in the Donbas.
This is a key part of complicating Russian planning for offensives, and Ukraine winning the adaptation battle. #HIMARS forced Russia to adapt to #Ukraine’s longer range fires. These weapons permit Ukraine to strike even deeper into Russian occupied territory. 1/7 🧵
2/ With longer range weapons, the Ukrainians will be able to counter the Russian adaptations to their logistic system, further straining Russian C2 and resupply operations. It’s what I described as ‘counter adaptation’ in “War Transformed”.
3/ Additionally, it will further constrain Russian ability to concentrate reserve forces away from the front line, and allow the Ukrainians to interdict the movement of Russian reserves that might be responding to Ukrainian offensives and penetrations of the Russian front line.
I think this is an interesting article, mainly because it discusses battlefield learning and #adaptation in #Ukraine. There are many skills needed by military institutions to be successful in combat. But fostering a learning culture is vital. 1/15 bbc.com/news/world-eur…
2/ It is very likely, in the coming weeks and months, that both Ukrainian and Russian military forces will commence offensive campaigns in different areas of #Ukraine.
3/ As I wrote in a recent article exploring the coming campaigns: "Over winter both sides will have been preparing and shaping the environment for these offensives." mickryan.substack.com/p/the-campaign…
In December 2022, @ZelenskyUA proclaimed “we will restore the normality of life in the territory of Donbas and Crimea, which were illegally occupied in 2014 and have been brought to the point of disaster.” How might #Ukraine retake Crimea? 1/25 🧵 mickryan.substack.com/p/all-roads-le…
2/ With all the speculation about the potential locations and objectives of forthcoming Russian and Ukrainian offensives in 2023, there is one strategic objective that may be the culminating point of this war. Crimea.
3/ Whether it is a major military campaign on the ground, a Ukrainian long range strike campaign to make Crimea untenable for Russia, or a forced negotiation, Crimea may be this war’s last campaign. But before examining the ‘how’ of such a campaign, why might #Ukraine conduct it?