#Armenia_Azerbaijan: The decision of the International Court of Justice asking Baku to release the Lachin corridor for the movement of goods to Nagorno Karabakh is a tough pill to swallow, partly also for the EU. Focused on gaining access to Azeri gas, Brussels has been⤵️
soft-spoken about the Lachin corridor for months. Now the EU is forced by the ICJ to toughen the tone in towards Azerbaijan. It is curious to see that Russia is not mentioned in the EU statement, although Baku has been arguing that Russian peacekeepers are to be blamed.
#Ukraine_Moldova: Zelensky has officially confirmed that Ukraine does not plan to attack Transnistria because it respects the independence of other countries. Several observations: 1) Once again, Zelensky's statement confirms that Kyiv avoids costly expansion of its military⤵️
capabilities outside of its focus on southeastern Ukraine against the Russian occupation. This is not to mention the serious reputational costs of Ukraine's support in the West (something that highlighted before in my comments and articles); ⤵️
2) Russian attempts to divert attention from Russian aggression in Ukraine to a fabricated story about an alleged “Ukrainian aggression” against Moldova failed. However, such stories become more frequent. The more repetitive they are, the greater the negative impact on public ⤵️
#Russia_Sanctions: Russia's military potential is slowly degrading, with a lack of access to some 9,000 components for military equipments. With the adoption of the 10th EU sanctions package, there is more uniformity among Western nations. The following trends are to be watched⤵️
from now on: 1) An increased focus on export control of low technology (microchips that can be removed from electrical appliances in the kitchen); 2) extension of the classification of restricted dual-use goods for export to Russia; 3) application of financial sanctions to ⤵️
third countries that operate with Russian financial institutions (mainly from Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the South Caucasus and Central Asia); 4) starving Russia financially though trade means (embargoes, high tariffs, etc.); 5) enforcing the sanctions and counter ⤵️
#GlobalSouth: A large part of the Global South votes for Ukraine in the UN Assembly. This seems to be caused by the exposure of the issue of Russian aggression & the reputational costs associated with it. In practice, the Global South does not join in sanctions against⤵️
Russia and does not provide military aid to Ukraine. The self-exclusion of those from Asia, Africa and South America from international efforts to stop Russian aggression stems from biases inherent in the construction of global politics:⤵️
1) anti-Americanism (revolving around critical perceptions of respect of int law during military actions in Iraq, Libya or Serbia); 2) anti-colonialism (the fact that Europe & the US were involved in colonialism seen through the imagery of slavery, involving the African pop);⤵️
#China_Ukraine: Beijing has finally released its vision of what a peace deal between Russia (aggressor) and Ukraine (victim) should look like. Here are my main remarks: 1) The first two points out of 12 are a mix of Chinese and Russian geopolitical interests involving the⤵️
principle of sovereignty (Taiwan question) and “Cold War” mentality (indirectly against opposition to enlargement of NATO and the geographic extension of the US). military cooperation); 2) The cessation of hostilities ranks only third in Chinese documents and lacks⤵️
the essentials: the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Russian forces; 3) China insists that peace talks begin as the next step, without restoration of the pre-war status quo with Ukraine's legitimate control over all its territories (2013);⤵️
#Russia_Sanctions: The adoption of the 10th package faces a delay. The EU has wanted to turn it into a symbolic gesture before the commemoration of 1 year of the outbreak of Russian aggression against Ukraine (today): Here are some of the reasons:⤵️
1) Poland demands tougher sanctions instead of mimicry (especially with regard to the quotas on synthetic rubber); 2) Opposition to penalize Rosatom executives for fear that it could affect Russia's supply of civil nuclear technology (in previous attempts it was Hungary);⤵️
3) Reluctance to include Russian diamond producer Alrosa (Belgium is protecting its diamond industry in Atwerp).
#Moldova: The Russian MoD insists that Ukraine is preparing to enter the Transnistrian region, allegedly using UAVs & building artillery positions on the border with Moldova. Why would Ukraine discredit itself, when the UN Assembly voted a resolution demanding Russia to⤵️
unconditionally withdraw its forces from the territory of Ukraine (141 countries, 7 against and 32 abstentions)? It makes little sense for Kyiv. Any kind of military action, without an attack from the Transnistria region, can trigger escalations that would not necessarily cover⤵️
Ukraine alone. Moldova is completely vulnerable to missile attacks and the Russian MoD stressed that if Russian peacekeepers are in danger, Russia's reaction will follow. As I wrote today, the OSCE and the EU should contact Chisinau and Kyiv to⤵️