One year ago today, the forces of darkness crashed across the Ukrainian frontier to begin what they hoped was a ten-day offensive to destroy the Ukrainian nation and subjugate its people. But the people of Ukraine roared back. A thread on a year of war. 1/25 🧵🇺🇦
2/ If one examines the many observations from this war, there is a big focus on new forms of war that emerge from the Russo-Ukraine War. The reality is that this cruel & vicious Russian invasion has seen more continuity than change in warfare.
3/ This war, like all before it, is an aggregation of ideas, organisations, and technologies from previous conflicts. The continuities of this war are easily identified.
4/ The importance of strategy, underpinned by sound assumptions, has come to the fore as Putin ignored this dictum and found himself in a war that has lasted longer and cost more than he imagined.
5/ The centrality of battlefield logistics & national support constructs has again come to the fore in this war. So too has the importance of narratives, winning national and global influence, and the courage of journalists bringing us the stories of this war.
6/ Alliances, so vital in many previous wars, have proven essential to the survival of Ukraine. NATO has found new purpose, and its members (as well as other nations) have provided massive economic, humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. Russia has no such support.
7/ The need to engage in close combat, the purest expression of human will, has once again been demonstrated. If you want to win wars, all the domains matter. But it is on the ground, where the army, the people and the government are, where wars are won or lost.
8/ And the will and support of the people, so vital in sustaining a national war effort since the earliest times, has stood out. Ukrainians have stood up to fight and defend their nation. Russians have fled their nation or turned to the mindless aggression of Russian state TV.
9/ But two ancient concepts stand out.
10/ First, surprise has been a constant feature of this and other wars. We were surprised at the lack of Russian competence. And we have pleasantly surprised – and greatly inspired – by Ukrainian battlefield prowess.
11/ No matter how good sensor and intelligence networks might be, the agency of human beings and their desire to surprise their adversaries remains constant. Clausewitz described this as friction, the difference between the theory and practice of war.
12/ The second continuity in this war is leadership. This was shown early in the war when western leaders like Biden pledged support for the defence of Ukraine. It has been shown by eastern European leaders in provision of national treasure to support Ukraine.
13/ Battlefield leadership, a key asymmetry between Ukraine and Russia, has also been fundamental in Ukraine’s turning the tide of the Russian invasion in 2022.
14/ And most crucially, the leadership of a former comedian turned President, Volodymyr Zelensky, has united his people, inspired his army and encouraged us all to support his nation and expect more of our own national leaders.
15/ As we step into the 2nd year of the war, we are all changed by its conduct. It is no longer a world where, as Xi’s describes, “the west is declining, and the east is rising”. The Russians & Chinese have been shocked by our unity & determination. This must continue.
16/ The war reignited knowledge that as flawed as our democracies are, they are worth defending against those who propose more brutal forms of governance. It gives new purpose to our nations in resisting the shadowy forces of authoritarian regimes.
17/ It is a world where national resilience, stockpiling and helping oneself before asking for help, is revitalized. Nations are no longer safe assuming large wars are part of the past, and that indigenous defence industry can be replaced with imports from overseas.
18/ It now is a world where robotics and algorithms are no longer discretionary elements of war. Rather than being add-on capabilities in military institutions, they are now central to the conduct of war.
19/ But mostly, it is a world that has come to see - and be inspired by - the courage, the resilience, the pure tough grit of the Ukrainian people and their soldiers.
20/ This year, there have been comparisons between Zelensky and Winston Churchill. This is apt for many reasons. In November 1954, Winston Churchill celebrated his 80th birthday with a speech at Westminster.
21/ Churchill reached back to the early days of the Second World War, noting “it was the nation…that was the lion's heart. I had the luck to be called upon to give the roar.”
22/ This year, we have been reminded what a nation with a lion’s heart looks like. And with its young, charismatic leader, Ukraine and the world were lucky that Volodymyr Zelensky was called upon to give the roar. It has been a roar heard around the world. smh.com.au/world/europe/a…
23/ As we look to the coming year, purpose, production and patience will be vital. We are inspired by the purpose of the Ukrainian nation to defend itself and our ideals. We must support them by increasing defence production across the West.
24/ And vitally, our people and our governments must sustain the strategic patience and stamina that underpins our support for Ukraine. We must stand alongside Ukraine, in Joe Biden’s words, “for as long as it takes.” End
There are many continuities in war. Every new war is an aggregation of the ideas, institutions, technologies, and techniques that have preceded it. A thread on historical continuities after a year of war in #Ukraine. 1/25 🧵mickryan.substack.com/p/a-year-of-wa…
2/ If we peer close enough, we can see the different historical layers that inform, shape, and strangle military effectiveness.
3/ In the Russo-Ukraine War, there are continuities from previous wars that carry through into the strategy, diplomacy, & military operations. There are five important continuities: war as a human endeavor; surprise; alliances; the need for good strategy; and leadership.
As the one-year anniversary of Russia’s 2022 invasion of #Ukraine approaches, the Russian Army has commenced the preliminary phase of its 2023 offensives. A thread on what is occurring, and why the Russians have chosen now to commence them. 1/22 🧵 abc.net.au/news/2023-02-1…
2/ Over the past week, Russia has conducted attacks at Svatove, Soledar, Bakhmut, Dvorichne, Vuhledar and other locations. These are unlikely to be the main campaign that Russian military bloggers hoped for, & that Ukrainian intelligence officials have warned about.
3/ Assuming there is a larger Russian campaign plan at work, these recent attacks are likely to have been probes and ‘reconnaissance in force’ missions to ascertain or test the Ukrainian strengths, dispositions, and reactions.
There is so much to learn from the war in #Ukraine. But, as we approach 1 year since the Russian invasion, we should also be thinking about how our potential adversaries might learn from the conflict. 1/17 🧵 smh.com.au/world/europe/h…
2/ Xi Jinping, and his Central Military Commission, have been paying close attention to the war in #Ukraine. Indeed, the Chinese military have become fast followers of new technologies and techniques in war fighting since their examination of the US in the 1991 Gulf War.
3/ While caution is required to ensure we are not mirror-imaging our Western perspectives, it behoves a clever national security establishment to explore how Ukraine might evolve Xi’s thinking about reunification with Taiwan and other potential military adventures.
Recently there has been more speculation about the timing & size of 2023 Russian offensives in #Ukraine. That the Russians will attempt them is almost a given. Russia has been assembling the pieces of their 2023 offensives since late last year. 1/21 🧵 mickryan.substack.com/p/divining-rus…
2/ Russia has provided a political rationale through Putin’s annexation declaration, the personnel and industrial resources with the mobilisation decree in late 2022, and the changes in command that resulted in General Gerasimov being appointed as unified commander.
3/ The east is the most likely location for Russian attacks, although attacks in the south are also possible. Russian forces might use attacks in the south as feints or demonstrations to draw away Ukrainian forces in the east before launching their main effort in the Donbas.
This is a key part of complicating Russian planning for offensives, and Ukraine winning the adaptation battle. #HIMARS forced Russia to adapt to #Ukraine’s longer range fires. These weapons permit Ukraine to strike even deeper into Russian occupied territory. 1/7 🧵
2/ With longer range weapons, the Ukrainians will be able to counter the Russian adaptations to their logistic system, further straining Russian C2 and resupply operations. It’s what I described as ‘counter adaptation’ in “War Transformed”.
3/ Additionally, it will further constrain Russian ability to concentrate reserve forces away from the front line, and allow the Ukrainians to interdict the movement of Russian reserves that might be responding to Ukrainian offensives and penetrations of the Russian front line.
I think this is an interesting article, mainly because it discusses battlefield learning and #adaptation in #Ukraine. There are many skills needed by military institutions to be successful in combat. But fostering a learning culture is vital. 1/15 bbc.com/news/world-eur…
2/ It is very likely, in the coming weeks and months, that both Ukrainian and Russian military forces will commence offensive campaigns in different areas of #Ukraine.
3/ As I wrote in a recent article exploring the coming campaigns: "Over winter both sides will have been preparing and shaping the environment for these offensives." mickryan.substack.com/p/the-campaign…