#China releases its comprehensive official position paper on #Ukraine today.
It seems like: 1) a very thinly veiled attempt to help Russia achieve an upper hand over Ukraine, though 2) superficially disguised as a call for peace to deflect Western criticism. A short🧵
2/ Paper's Point 2 calls for 'prevent #bloc confrontation"' (防止形成陣營對抗).
What does that mean? It means nobody should help Ukraine. Russia is on its own and has essentially no 'bloc' or other countries overtly helping it. But Ukraine does...
3/ Ukraine gets significant ongoing assistance from Western countries.
So when China says the Ukraine-Russia war should not be a contest between 'blocs', China is effectively saying Ukraine shouldn't get support from other countries in the Western camp.
4/ That reduces the war from a #multilateral confrontation (West vs Russia) into a #bilateral confrontation (Ukraine vs Russia).
In that one-one one scenario that China is calling for, Russia will be a lot more likely to prevail over the smaller Ukraine.
5/ Likewise Point 3 calls for working towards 'ceasefire' (最終達成全面停火). Ofc everyone wants it, question is "ceasefire on whose terms?"
By saying the war should be a bilateral contest, one Russia is more likely to win, China is making ceasefire on Russia's terms more likely
6/ Point 10 is the most obvious. China again calls for end to any and all unilateral sanctions, and says the only appropriate sanctions are ones authorized by United Nations Security Council.
7/ As a UNSC permanent member, Russia can veto UNSC votes. So if only UNSC-approved sanctions are ok, there won't be any. i.e. China's statement is saying there shouldn't be any sanctions against Russia, regardless of Russian behavior.
8/ In short: Logically, since ceasefire on Russian terms would be a probable natural outcome of China's proposal, this Chinese official statement is Beijing's way of saying let's all standby and, thru our inaction, enable Russia to win its war of aggression against Ukraine.
9/ Reminder that this is consistent w. prior Chinese statements.
E.g. Point 2 says: "The legitimate security interests and concerns of all countries must be taken seriously and addressed properly."
Which legitimate security interests? I wrote abt it b4:
"China understands and supports matters concerning Russia's core interests."
"As US & NATO crept up onto Russia's doorstep, Russia undertook actions it deemed appropriate. China understands this and has provided concrete #support in various ways".
11/ "China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis" paper appears to be one such support. If ppl misread it as China's commitment to neutrality on Russia-Ukraine, all the better.
As US alleges China is providing 'non-lethal support' for Russia, China's MFA fires back and blames US for giving weapons to Ukraine.
This is in line with longstanding Chinese view. PSA: Back in Sept 2022, China effectively said that Russia's war against Ukraine is a #JustWar./1
2/ The closest thing to a direct official Chinese judgment of the nature of that war so far (AFAIK) comes from China's #3 leader, National People's Congress Speaker Li Zhanshu.
3/ When Li Zhanshu visited Russia in Sept 2022, he told Russian Duma's speaker that "China understands and supports matters concerning Russia's core interests."
("在涉及俄罗斯核心利益和一些重大关键问题上,中方对俄罗斯表示充分的理解和支持。")
2/ But Beijing wants to 'soften' without appearing 'soft'. So it chooses a particular timing for extending olive branches towards Taiwan (like partially lifting some trade sanctions).
Taiwan's opposition party KMT is currently touring across China.
3/ So Beijing is very publicly announcing quite a few good news on Taiwan just before as well as during the (Beijing-friendlier) Taiwanese opposition's visit, to let the latter take the credit for bringing a thaw to cross-Strait relations.
At China's CCP Party School annual high-level cadet training, Xi Jinping unveils a new term '#ChineseModernization', & juxtaposes it w. 'Western modernization'.
Underlying message: Chinese exp isn't a bad mutation of standard (Western) modernization, but an equally valid variant
2/ This certainly sounds like a new ideological doctrine in the making. A natural question to ask is: does this entail a new, more aggressive international messaging campaign will follow?
3/ Probably not. Because this new term actually carries a clearly more limited international ambition and an obvious inward-facing domestic orientation.
'Chinese modernization' narrative is explicitly not designed for export.
#Taiwan's opposition KMT Vice Chairman meets with #China's new Taiwan Affairs Director Song Tao in Beijing.
KMT faces the 'Dove's Dilemma': playing the role of peacemaker without being seen as kowtowing to an adversary. Beijing tries to help, though within limits./1
2/ In the 2 weeks leading up to KMT's visit, 1) Beijing's Customs approved 63 Taiwanese companies previously banned from exporting to China; 2) BJ's TAO & Civil Aviation Association twice called on Taiwan to restore direct flights with 16 Chinese cities.
3/ By lowering cross-strait tension & creating more positive atmosphere, Beijing's announcements made Taiwan's opposition party's '#negotiating for peace' with Beijing looked more politically palatable in Taiwan. (without these it might have seen more like 'begging for peace').
How does Taiwan read the Australia-France 2+2 ministerial consultations joint statement?
Taiwan's official Central News Agency published a long analysis comparing 2021 and 2023 AUS-FRA joint statements. It notes 3 significant changes. A thread🧵