China's cabinet & CCP party issue a new directive that calls for "resolute opposition and boycott of erroneous Western concepts such as 'constitutional rule' and 'separation of powers'".
2/ This likely forebodes more constitutional reform to come at next week's annual two sessions (China's parliament session).
Specifically it hints at further enshrining of Xi and Xi Jinping thought into the constitution.
3/ Namely either 'two establishes' and/or 'two safeguards' (兩個確立 and 兩個維護) may make their way into China's constitution. The latter had already being incorporated into the party charter at 20th PC last October.
4/ Timing is instructive: This story came out on Feb 26, i.e. the first day of CCP's Second Plenum, a meeting that greenlights agenda of the NPC parliament session next week.
5/ Chinese politics work in 5-year cycles.
And this year's NPC session, the first after leadership turnover, is expected to make significant constitutional revisions --- at the same point in the cycle 5 years ago, the NPC abolished term limits for China's presidency in 2018.
6/ Reasonable to expect something equally big.
Baseline expectation is probably NPC will incorporate the 'two safeguards' into constitution. (safeguard Xi's core status within the party; and party's central leadership of the country).
7/ It would be a homerun for Xi if they go beyond that & add 'two establishes' into the constitution, too.
Main difference btw them is that 'two establishes' contains an additional #ideological component. It says establishing Xi as core leader + XJP Thought as guidance thought
8/ A primer on Wiki.
'Two establishes' got a lot of hype, but eventually didn't make it into the CCP party charter at the 20thPC. Instead, 'Two safeguards' did. Some China hands at the time called it a consolation prize (but a huge one at that though).
#China releases its comprehensive official position paper on #Ukraine today.
It seems like: 1) a very thinly veiled attempt to help Russia achieve an upper hand over Ukraine, though 2) superficially disguised as a call for peace to deflect Western criticism. A short🧵
2/ Paper's Point 2 calls for 'prevent #bloc confrontation"' (防止形成陣營對抗).
What does that mean? It means nobody should help Ukraine. Russia is on its own and has essentially no 'bloc' or other countries overtly helping it. But Ukraine does...
3/ Ukraine gets significant ongoing assistance from Western countries.
So when China says the Ukraine-Russia war should not be a contest between 'blocs', China is effectively saying Ukraine shouldn't get support from other countries in the Western camp.
As US alleges China is providing 'non-lethal support' for Russia, China's MFA fires back and blames US for giving weapons to Ukraine.
This is in line with longstanding Chinese view. PSA: Back in Sept 2022, China effectively said that Russia's war against Ukraine is a #JustWar./1
2/ The closest thing to a direct official Chinese judgment of the nature of that war so far (AFAIK) comes from China's #3 leader, National People's Congress Speaker Li Zhanshu.
3/ When Li Zhanshu visited Russia in Sept 2022, he told Russian Duma's speaker that "China understands and supports matters concerning Russia's core interests."
("在涉及俄罗斯核心利益和一些重大关键问题上,中方对俄罗斯表示充分的理解和支持。")
2/ But Beijing wants to 'soften' without appearing 'soft'. So it chooses a particular timing for extending olive branches towards Taiwan (like partially lifting some trade sanctions).
Taiwan's opposition party KMT is currently touring across China.
3/ So Beijing is very publicly announcing quite a few good news on Taiwan just before as well as during the (Beijing-friendlier) Taiwanese opposition's visit, to let the latter take the credit for bringing a thaw to cross-Strait relations.
At China's CCP Party School annual high-level cadet training, Xi Jinping unveils a new term '#ChineseModernization', & juxtaposes it w. 'Western modernization'.
Underlying message: Chinese exp isn't a bad mutation of standard (Western) modernization, but an equally valid variant
2/ This certainly sounds like a new ideological doctrine in the making. A natural question to ask is: does this entail a new, more aggressive international messaging campaign will follow?
3/ Probably not. Because this new term actually carries a clearly more limited international ambition and an obvious inward-facing domestic orientation.
'Chinese modernization' narrative is explicitly not designed for export.
#Taiwan's opposition KMT Vice Chairman meets with #China's new Taiwan Affairs Director Song Tao in Beijing.
KMT faces the 'Dove's Dilemma': playing the role of peacemaker without being seen as kowtowing to an adversary. Beijing tries to help, though within limits./1
2/ In the 2 weeks leading up to KMT's visit, 1) Beijing's Customs approved 63 Taiwanese companies previously banned from exporting to China; 2) BJ's TAO & Civil Aviation Association twice called on Taiwan to restore direct flights with 16 Chinese cities.
3/ By lowering cross-strait tension & creating more positive atmosphere, Beijing's announcements made Taiwan's opposition party's '#negotiating for peace' with Beijing looked more politically palatable in Taiwan. (without these it might have seen more like 'begging for peace').