Li still lists 'oppose Taiwan independence' ahead of 'promote unification' (反獨, then 促統). Which suggests China is largely playing defense on Taiwan during Taiwan's presidential campaign year. /4
Similarly Li lists cross-strait relations' 'peaceful #development' ahead of '#unification', which suggests Beijing's desire to maintain stability on the Taiwan front as it tackles other more pressing priorities like great power relations and domestic economic recovery. /5
How to develop cross-strait relations then? Li then proceeds to paint the stages of cross-strait relations', and it's a bit boiler plate: /6
1. Promote economic & cultural cooperation (for Taiwanese in Taiwan) 2. Better institutions & policy incentives to promote welfare for Taiwanese (more for Taiwanese living in China) 3. Promote shared Chinese culture (soft power) 4. Jointly promote China's Great Rejuvenation. /7
Outgoing Premier Li Keqiang's farewell speech is not designed to break new grounds. On Taiwan, he sounds a softer tone, and merely reaffirms existing principles, e.g. 'upholding One China Principle and the 1992 Consensus' - the language in Xi's 2017 19th Party Congress address./8
We see similar light touch if not strategic 'left blank' (留白) on March 4th, in outgoing #4 leader and Taiwan policy chief Wang Yang's farewell work report to CPPCC -- when he made no mention at all about Taiwan policy guiding principles. /9
An analysis of Wang Yang's speech from Taiwan's newspaper giant UDN. /10
Outgoing officials like Li & Wang have the option of pulling a Nancy Pelosi and made a tougher farewell move just before they retire, and give their successors more room to maneuver. But Beijing is refraining from that, preferring to not risk any more Taiwanese blowback. /11
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My quotes for @CNN, on US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy’s changing his Taiwan trip into a in-person meeting with #Taiwan’s President @iingwen in California.
@CNN@iingwen Tsai’s potential meeting with Kevin McCarthy in California is not necessarily a “replacement or downgrade, but an add-on”, or a bonus.
McCarthy could always visit Taiwan at a later date. 2/
Taiwan is balancing multiple needs here.
1. A visit by yet another US House Speaker (after Nancy Pelosi) could #normalize high-level visits by American officials, and consolidate earlier gains. /3
China's cabinet & CCP party issue a new directive that calls for "resolute opposition and boycott of erroneous Western concepts such as 'constitutional rule' and 'separation of powers'".
2/ This likely forebodes more constitutional reform to come at next week's annual two sessions (China's parliament session).
Specifically it hints at further enshrining of Xi and Xi Jinping thought into the constitution.
3/ Namely either 'two establishes' and/or 'two safeguards' (兩個確立 and 兩個維護) may make their way into China's constitution. The latter had already being incorporated into the party charter at 20th PC last October.
#China releases its comprehensive official position paper on #Ukraine today.
It seems like: 1) a very thinly veiled attempt to help Russia achieve an upper hand over Ukraine, though 2) superficially disguised as a call for peace to deflect Western criticism. A short🧵
2/ Paper's Point 2 calls for 'prevent #bloc confrontation"' (防止形成陣營對抗).
What does that mean? It means nobody should help Ukraine. Russia is on its own and has essentially no 'bloc' or other countries overtly helping it. But Ukraine does...
3/ Ukraine gets significant ongoing assistance from Western countries.
So when China says the Ukraine-Russia war should not be a contest between 'blocs', China is effectively saying Ukraine shouldn't get support from other countries in the Western camp.
As US alleges China is providing 'non-lethal support' for Russia, China's MFA fires back and blames US for giving weapons to Ukraine.
This is in line with longstanding Chinese view. PSA: Back in Sept 2022, China effectively said that Russia's war against Ukraine is a #JustWar./1
2/ The closest thing to a direct official Chinese judgment of the nature of that war so far (AFAIK) comes from China's #3 leader, National People's Congress Speaker Li Zhanshu.
3/ When Li Zhanshu visited Russia in Sept 2022, he told Russian Duma's speaker that "China understands and supports matters concerning Russia's core interests."
("在涉及俄罗斯核心利益和一些重大关键问题上,中方对俄罗斯表示充分的理解和支持。")
2/ But Beijing wants to 'soften' without appearing 'soft'. So it chooses a particular timing for extending olive branches towards Taiwan (like partially lifting some trade sanctions).
Taiwan's opposition party KMT is currently touring across China.
3/ So Beijing is very publicly announcing quite a few good news on Taiwan just before as well as during the (Beijing-friendlier) Taiwanese opposition's visit, to let the latter take the credit for bringing a thaw to cross-Strait relations.
At China's CCP Party School annual high-level cadet training, Xi Jinping unveils a new term '#ChineseModernization', & juxtaposes it w. 'Western modernization'.
Underlying message: Chinese exp isn't a bad mutation of standard (Western) modernization, but an equally valid variant
2/ This certainly sounds like a new ideological doctrine in the making. A natural question to ask is: does this entail a new, more aggressive international messaging campaign will follow?
3/ Probably not. Because this new term actually carries a clearly more limited international ambition and an obvious inward-facing domestic orientation.
'Chinese modernization' narrative is explicitly not designed for export.