1/ ANOTHER 🧵 ON A KEY QUESTION: astute thinkers are asking why community banks matter & how widespread this panic cld become. Dunno--but it *cld* spill over to big banks. One scenario: if FDIC depletes its insur fund, it borrows from US Treasury--which relies on primary dealers.
2/ Many people are saying big banks are safe bc they hedged the interest rate "gap risk" that is now plaguing community banks + they've had fewer deposit withdrawals. Yes, short-term. But here's the scenario:
3/ FDIC insurance fund at 12/31/22 had $128.2bn (per @FDICgov). FDIC can borrow up to $100bn from the US Treasury if it ever needs additional funds. 2 issues:
a) US debt ceiling limit could come into play, &
b) US Treasury relies on primary dealers to handle US Treasury auctions
4/ In a truly systemic run, which I'm sure policymakers have gamed out, Congress wld likely remove FDIC $100bn borrowing cap. But here's where the big banks come in--as primary dealers, they're *required* to bid on US Treasury auctions, which means they risk their balance sheets.
6/ And here's the current list of primary dealers, who *MUST* by law "bid on a pro-rata basis in all Treasury auctions at reasonably competitive prices"
7/ So, I dunno how far this panic will go, but those who think there's a firewall between community banks & big banks are missing a key transmission mechanism: primary dealers. I'm not predicting this will go that far (no one knows). Just laying out the system plumbing. /END
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1/ SVB—WHAT WENT WRONG
* mgmt: debauched its balance sheet
* depositors >$250k: thought their deposit at a fractional-reserve bank wasn’t an unsecured loan to a leveraged borrower (it is)
* Fed as regulator: that morning, the top cop said Fed-supervised banks don’t have bank runs
2/ * Fed FOMC: created the “gap risk” now kneecapping community banks (which met their bank capital rqmts by buying long-term bonds)
* bank risk managers: didn’t realize such gap risk (unhedged risk of a spike in interest rates) would morph into big liquidity risk amid a bank run
3/ * the existence of fractional-reserve banking: means the system is inherently unstable & prone to bank runs bc it’s insolvent as a whole
* banks: didn’t raise equity capital at first sign of trouble
* bond mkt: who knows where true interest rates wld be if not manipulated?
1/ I'VE BEEN THINKING abt #crypto & banking, which is in the news these days (& I'm living it too). I've spent yrs thinking abt the issues. Yes it *IS* possible for trad banks to safely bank #crytpo industry: simply back demand deposits 100% w/ cash held in a Fed master acct.💡
2/ But that's NOT what the US banks banking #crypto generally are doing. Pls see for yourselves by reviewing their financial statements--you'll see, eg, >10yr securities backing demand deposits that customers cld withdraw in minutes🤦♀️. That's a prob but isn't inherent to #crypto!
3/ I just finished updating a balance sheet analysis of the banks that bank #crypto & something jumped out at me--8x, which is a number I've seen before. When any bank puts 8x its shareholders' equity at risk in anything & that thing goes haywire, the outcome is predictable.🔮💡
1/ IT'S TIME FOR ME TO REVEAL A FEW THINGS. I've just published a post "Shame On Washington, DC For Shooting A Messenger Who Warned Of #Crypto Debacle." Link to post is here: caitlin-long.com/shame-on-washi…
2/ First, the revelations. Today, I’m publicly disclosing for the first time that (a) I handed over evidence to law enforcement of probable crimes committed by a big crypto fraud, starting months before that company imploded and stuck its millions of customers with losses, and...
3/ (b) I warned bank regulators of mounting bank-run risk inside banks serving the crypto industry b4 the bank runs ultimately hit.
How many correctly foresaw the crypto lender implosion, warned regulators of impending bank runs & tried to help law enforcement stop a big fraud?
tl;dr--it doesn't kill #crypto custody; it's a move against state-chartered trust companies; there's one big issue, tho, which will trigger huge pushback
2/ THE BIG ISSUE (& I haven't seen anyone point this out yet)=the rqmt for custodians to indemnify for "negligence, recklessness or willful misconduct." All the banking, #WallSt, commodities & #crypto industries will push back together on this bc it could kill custody biz broadly
3/ What's the issue? Proposal wld apply Custody Rule to all asset classes incl commodities & #crypto (ie, not just securities)--OK, fine. But SEC also wants custodians to indemnify FULL asset value for losses in which custodian played ANY role (eg, an oil tanker sinks; cows die).
A KEY from proposed changes to SEC Custody Rule: account must protect customer assets in event of custodian insolvency. This prob means qualified custodians must be under statutory receivership regime to protect segregation in insolvency & state-chartered trust cos in crosshairs
Yep, here's more. Gensler was clear abt this in his prepared remarks & here it is in writing: Assets passing OUTSIDE OF THE BANK'S INSOLVENCY is key. Translation: SEC wants all qualified custodians to be subject to special receivership regime, ie not subject to US Bankruptcy Code
More: lookin' good so far for state-chartered special purpose depository institutions under statutory receivership regimes that keep assets outside of bank's estate (ie, #Wyoming SPDI banks). SEC asks for comment on whether to do away w/ dual banking system but doesn't propose it
1/ THINKING ABOUT all things bond mkt after catching up on morning reading☕️. 15yrs of my #WallSt career was helping pension plans/life insurers fix their past mistakes (most of which made them inherently short vol). Fundamental probs w/ bond mkt structure exacerbated this prob.
2/ The underlying issue pertains to how fin mkts deal with duration. Pensions & life insurers have the longest-duration liabilities in the fin system & yet they scramble to find duration-matched assets to buy bc there’s either a structural shortage of them, or they’re in banks.
3/ In the UK, where mortgages are mostly floating-rate, UK govt issuing long-duration gilts is the primary source of long-duration assets for pension funds. High % of UK pension liabs are inflation-indexed too (far more than in US) & again the offsetting asset comes from UK govt.