I’ve written a longread on the ‘Russia question’ in the #DRC#Congo. My main point: #Russia was (is?) being considered as a serious partner by the Tshisekedi admin., not primarily due to Russia, but due to (perceived & real) Western policy failure(s). lawfareblog.com/democratic-rep… 1/n
First, #Russia has been trying to gain influence in the #DRC, similar to how this was done in #CAR. E.g. in February 2021, it donated a large consignment of weapons ( 10,000 Kalashnikov rifles and around 3 million cartridges of ammunition) – which is how Wagner entered #CAR (2/n)
Another similarity: the number two of the Russia Embassy in Kinshasa, Viktor Tokmakov, was moved from Bangui to Kinshasa, and was widely considered the organizer/go-between for Wagner in #CAR. jeuneafrique.com/1371557/politi… (3/n)
Second, my main point: anti-Western sentiments in the DRC are at least as important as Russian attempts to curry favor in Kinshasa. These sentiments have been magnified by the M23 rebellion and perceptions of Western complicity in this crisis. lawfareblog.com/democratic-rep… (4/n)
Particularly the UN notification regime was a major source of frustration for many Congolese. Many considered this an “embargo, but framed differently.”, infringing on the DRC’s sovereignty, and a strategy of the West to control the #DRC. (5/n)
Many feel this would be much easier with #Russia – a message which Russia actively contributed to, e.g. by calling the notification regime an ‘arms embargo’ (yet, it didn’t vote against the notification regime when voted at the security council).
Particular policy choices and statements further led to anti-Western feelings in Congo. There was the statement of U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres, that the UN peacekeeping forces MONUSCO are “unable to defeat M23.” lalibre.be/international/… (7/n)
Or, there was the EU's decision, through its European Peace Facility, to give 20 million euros to the Rwandan Defense Forces for their deployment in Mozambique – at a moment when evidence pointed at Rwandan involvement in the #M23 rebellion. consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press… (8/n)
In this context, Russia has become both an avenue to protest the West and an instrument to exercise pressure. Several diplomatic sources relayed an incident in which President Tshisekedi threatened EU diplomats with the ‘Russia option’ after the 20 million support to Rwanda. 9/n
Interestingly, a recent @ebuteli opinion poll also showed the overly strongly favorable attitude of the Congolese towards Russia – much more than towards any other state or organization.
Why hasn’t the Tshisekedi government more overtly shifted to Russia? Interviews with a variety of security actors shows also there an overly very positive view of Russia. 11/n
Regime insiders and analysts cited one name—or, better, one scenario—over and over: the “Lumumba scenario”, to summarize the President’s fear to engage in a more in-depth Russian partnership, as it could undermine his power-base. (12/n)
It however remains be seen how, and if, the DRC’s relationship with the West will hold up with looming concerns over corruption and other governance issues, but particularly how the elections will play out. lawfareblog.com/democratic-rep… END
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My latest for @Africanarguments, with Catherine Windey and @olivierabahati1: “Congo’s oil auction: foiling climate colonialism or filling the coffers?” (Long!) thread. africanarguments.org/2022/08/congo-… (1/N)
On 28-29 July, the #DRC government put up 30 oil and gas blocks up for auction; with many of them overlapping with protected areas in the world’s second-biggest rainforest including the #Virunga UNESCO World Heritage site. greenpeace.org/africa/en/pres… (2/N)
Is there a real risk of oil drilling in these areas? We argue that this most probably is not the case, as the auction has two other aims: producing rents; and reclaiming its sovereignty, particulary in the environmental sector. africanarguments.org/2022/08/congo-… (3/N)