According to the leak, Nikolai Patrushev informed #Putin of the reasons for the security services to "neutralize" the #Wagner Group.
The ISW states that it has not observed any information suggesting these discussions took place, nor has it captured any speculation in the Russian information space about them.
The report concludes that #Prigozhin likely "fabricated the alleged plot to advance several information operations on behalf of Wagner and improve his own reputation.”
ISW believes this story portrays Patrushev and possibly the Russian Security Council as enemies of the Wagner Group, believing that Patrushev is a target for Prigozhin.
It is difficult to understand how observers can base their analyses on such questionable grounds.
📌 Information about the alleged Security Council meeting appeared in a Telegram post by General SVR, linked to Valery Solovey, who is known for his often fabled stories. It is surprising that the reputable @TheStudyofWar overlooked this detail. t.me/generalsvr/1464
📌For those familiar with Security Council proceedings, it is highly unlikely that Patrushev would report on the threats posed by #Wagner during an official meeting, particularly over video conference.
While the #FSB might discreetly mention risks associated with Prigozhin in top-secret reports to #Putin, no one would openly suggest neutralizing Wagner, as it is part of Putin's personal agenda and responsibility.
It is true that the FSB has advocated preventing Wagner from recruiting prisoners, as it undermines their efforts to jail criminals and maintain control. Additionally, Valery Gerasimov has requested Putin's assistance in securing the military chain of command and preventing…
…Wagner's constant attacks. However, Putin has not given Patrushev the authority to discuss the political risks posed by Wagner, and this is simply impossible to imagine.
📌Prigozhin has no incentive to fabricate plots against himself, as it would alienate the senior Russian officials with whom he is trying to build relationships. Attacking Patrushev would be a reckless move for Prigozhin, and his comments regarding the rumors support this.
📌There is no indication that Patrushev opposes Wagner, and it is not within his purview to do so. In fact, both share hawkish views with significant ideological similarities and favor escalating the conflict rather than prolonging it.
📌Currently, Prigozhin finds himself in a vulnerable position, facing significant losses among his ranks, difficulties recruiting new members, and limited access to the presidential administration and Putin.
Furthermore, he faces an uncertain future in the ongoing conflict. It would be unwise for him to open a new front of confrontation with Putin's inner circle at this time.
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Today's address from #Putin reveals a political challenge that he will soon have to face. Putin himself has started this war, dragging the whole country into it, but for a year now he has been dodging the necessity to explain how to win. 1/8
All his recent speeches, often long, detailed, and covering many things, do not convey even the slightest bit of clarity. This is not because he doesn't know, but because he doesn't consider it necessary to explain himself (doing so would show his hand). 2/8
Today's speech looks like it is about his personal, civilisational crusade against the West, where #Ukraine is just a minor episode, a secret special operation on which he must not comment. For the elites, however, the opposite is true. 3/8
📌 #Putin's appointment of Gerasimov as commander of the SVO was part of his broader political decision to streamline the military hierarchy, which drastically reduced #Wagner's autonomy and seriously changed Prigozhin's relationship with state agencies.
Prigozhin lost access to prisons and faces problems with ammunition. I do not believe this was a direct consequence of Putin's instructions (as Putin does not personally deal with such operational details), …
Right now everyone is discussing whether there will be a new Russian offensive. In my opinion, this is not the main question. Rather, the main question is whether the war should end quickly or drag on.
In just one year, the #Russian authorities have greatly evolved in their tactics against everything that it deems 'discontent.’ The previous policy was based on forcing the "dissenters" (including the critical media) to play by systemic rules. A short 🧵 on shutting down dissent.
Being critical threatened to become too expensive - to be a foreign agent costs a lot, for example. Now, anything that doesn't minimally fit into the logic of what is politically admissible (and what is admissible has shrunk to the microscopic) is simply forbidden.
Here we are referring to the designation of @meduzaproject as an "undesirable organization."
Concerning the reshuffle in the military command: Since everyone is asking for comments, I will share a few preliminary thoughts. A thread 🧵
What is interesting at the moment is that everyone seems to be in shock: #Prigozhin's people, military correspondents, and the military. A great many knowledgeable people seem to not get the gist of this decision either, which suggests that it is a situational and sudden move.
This is not a promotion for #Gerasimov, even if he retained his post as head of the General Staff. Personnel decisions recently have been made to the contrary: not in order to achieve something, but rather to avoid something.
◽️The Christmas 'ceasefire'. We explain #Putin’s logic behind he decision to announce a 36-hour truce in #Ukraine, look closer into the reaction of the patriotic camp and how the president has to balance between two approaches - strategic one and situational.
Understanding this helps to predict Moscow’s further steps – both diplomatic and military. In this context we disclose the recent activities of Dmitry Kozak and whether it virtually implies the intention to talk about peace with the West.