First, local independent media credited the attack to the armed group coalition CPC. There are credible reports that CPC were in the area, that armed men were looking for Chinese citizens days before. (2/n)
Moreover a few days before 3 Chinese citizens were kidnapped by CPC in the southwest of the country. However, this was likely perpetrated by anti-balaka, while CPC operating in the center of CAR are more likely to be UPC or FPRC affiliated (an FPRC gen was taken at Bria) (3/n)
The armed groups have been desperate for cash, so we cannot rule out a kidnapping gone wrong. The CPC, however, has denied any connection to the attack, instead blaming Russian PMCs (Wagner) (4/n)
That Russian PMCs move into mining sites is no secret. They have also been accused before of stealing Chinese miners’ equipment and pushing them off mining sites. But this attack too represents a *significant* escalation in tactics vs. foreign citizens (5/n)
And it runs in the face of recent patterns to lay low and pursue business interests. The timing is also bizarre, when Xi is visiting Moscow. (6/n)
Whoever committed this attack was very aware of the political implications, and the attack reflects *neither* the CPC nor Russian PMC MO. This is why we need to wait before speculating further (end)
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This conversation, to me, shows that people still fundamentally misunderstand Russian PMCs in Africa. Russia (and its PMCs) are inseparable from the larger ecosystem, consisting of local governments, civilians, outside powers, NGOs, etc. (1/n)
Whether a national government partners with Russian PMCs is based almost entirely on local security priorities. Russian PMCs as a potential partner are simply the latest among of slate of potential intervenors (West, particularly France, UN). (2/n)
"Neocolonial narratives" like all narratives, can be bent to rationalize choice of partner, though genuine, bottom-up, pro-sovereignty movements in the Sahel and elsewhere are making it more difficult for regimes to partner with France (3/n)
Some thoughts from Bangui on a slew of articles citing U.S. officials and plots regarding Russian PMCs in the Central African Republic. First, the recent Le Monde article (1/n)
Le Monde claims US diplomats gave Touadera 12 months to get rid of Wagner, and in exchange they would support training for CAR armed forces, increase humanitarian aid, and step up their support to the UN peacekeeping mission (2/n)
Some close to the matter told me it's nonsense; the US made no such demand. If true it's a terrible deal and a non-starter. Replacing Russian PMCs with "training" and support for peacekeepers would be regime suicide for Touadera, armed groups would quickly be at Bangui (3/n)
#CAR update: Some thoughts on the security agreement between the CAR government and #Sudan's Hemedti (a thread)
On December 29, the CAR government, represented by Hassan Bouba (former number two under Ali Darassa's UPC armed group), and Russian PMCs met with reps of Hemedti's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in CAR's northeast town of Birao (1/n)
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss armed group mobilization on the CAR-Sudan border in Am Dafok. Who exactly was mobilizing we don't know for sure - UPC were there, FPRC, Chadian rebels, Sudanese militias, free agents and Coalition Siriri were all present (2/n)
"don" comes from the Chechen дуй хьуна? (dui hwuna)
First: хьуна is the dative form of the second person singular, i.e., "to you." Literary Chechen has eight cases: nominative, genitive, dative, ergative, instrumental, substantive, comparative, and locative...
The nominative, dative, and ergative can all be subjects of a Chechen verb. Ergativity is a widespread feature of indigenous languages of the Caucasus.